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“Assimilation to me means that my fellow Americans have 
accepted me as I am.  Not tolerated me, but accepted that I am as 
American as the next person even though I may have a different 
faith, different customs, language capabilities, skin color, facial 
features…”(Ron, Arab American, Detroit.) 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Can Segmented Assimilation Theory adequately explain the experiences of Arab Americans 
in the Detroit Metro area? This study attempts to answer this question. Segmented 
assimilation theory was developed by a group of sociologists, led by Rubén Rumbaut and 
Alejandro Portes, and accounts for the several possible modes of assimilation of second 
generation immigrants to the United States after 1965.1 Their theory received its “definitive 
codification,” according to Stephan R. Warner, in the 2001 book Legacies: The Story of the 
Immigrant Second Generation.”2
The focus area of this study is Wayne, Oakland and Macomb County, Michigan. These 
three counties were chosen for two reasons: First, because that’s where the majority of 
Michigan’s Arab Americans live. Second, to be able to compare city dwellers to those that 
live in the suburbs. Dearborn (in Wayne County) is the most concentrated Arab American 
enclave in the country. Dearborn is roughly a third Arab American. Looking at the difference 
between those living in the enclave and those living in the suburbs makes this study more 
interesting. In addition, these are the same three counties surveyed in the Detroit Arab 
American Study (see more below), and so all the information from that study is relevant to the 
topic. The remainder of the City of Detroit is interesting as a contrast, since it is over 80% 
African American, but will not otherwise be dealt with specifically. When relevant, the 
Detroit Metro Arabs will be compared to Arab Americans in other parts of the country. 
  
This thesis does not have a specific time frame. However, the focus is on second-
generation immigrants in the present time. The respondents to the interviews for this study are 
mainly children of immigrants arriving after the Immigrant and Nationality Act of 1965, 
which is the same as the focus of segmented assimilation theory. Two of the respondents are 
older second-generation immigrants, and their parents arrived in the 1940s. The variation in 
age among the respondents is beneficial to this study, in that the perspectives of teenagers, 
adults, and retirees is represented. 
 
1.1 Structure 
Within the larger topic, there will be a closer look at two variables: race and ethnicity, and 
religion. These variables will be studied separately and dealt with in separate chapters, but 
there is also an interest in the intersections between them. These variables are certainly not the 
only subjects that would be relevant or interesting to look closer at in a study like this, other 
areas of interest could be country of origin, gender, class, or length of stay in America. 
However, these two were chosen for a reason. Race and ethnicity are essential to the 
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understanding of assimilation because they are both part of a person’s visible and 
unchangeable baggage, and are part of a person’s deepest sense of self. Since assimilation is 
dependant upon the society the immigrant is met by, and not just the immigrant himself, it 
seems obvious that how a person perceives your race or ethnicity will affect how they interact 
with you. 
Religion was chosen as a variable for a few reasons. First, Muslims are the focus of a 
lot of attention today, and it is important to clarify some assumptions and misconceptions that 
are out there, as well as to see how the fear of Islam affects assimilation. Second, religion is 
an essential part of many Americans’ identity, and the same is true for Arab Americans. 
Third, since Arab Americans are primarily Christian, it will be interesting to see how 
Christians of European heritage receive the Arab Christians. These three subjects are of 
course interrelated, how can one look at ethnicity without looking at religion, for example? 
These variables will be studied in relation to segmented assimilation, and to how they affect a 
person’s assimilation-trajectory.  The chapter about race and ethnicity is much longer than the 
chapter about religion. This is not a reflection of the importance of the topics; rather it is to 
avoid overlap. Many of the topics that concern both race and ethnicity, and religion, are 
introduced in chapter two, and do not need to be repeated in chapter three. 
In any academic work about Arab Americans written after 2001, lies the implicit or 
explicit question: What about 9-11? Experiences of acceptance and assimilation must be 
colored by this momentous event, both in public opinion and in government policy. Because 
of that it will be an underlying theme in this work, though it will not be dealt with in its own 
chapter. 
 
1.2 Method and Sources 
Census material is of special interest to this study and will be used as a primary source.  
The Census 2000 Special Report: “We the People of Arab Ancestry in the United States” and 
the Census 2000 Brief: “The Arab Population: 2000” are especially helpful. The first is part of 
“the Census 2000 Special Reports series that presents several demographic, social, and 
economic characteristics collected from Census 2000.”3 It was done in part because the Arab 
population lacks consensus about how to define their group, and do not have their own 
category to mark off on the census. There was a need for further research on this group, and 
so this report and the Census Brief were written. Research for the Brief and the Report were 
both conducted in collaboration with experts from the Arab community.4  
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An invaluable primary source is The Detroit Arab American Study, a population study 
financed by the Russell Sage Foundation, (part of the annual Detroit Area Study).5
Another study also used as a primary source is “A Portrait of Detroit’s Mosques: 
Muslim Views on Policy, Politics and Religion” by Dr. Ihsan Bagby. (Hereafter known as 
‘the Detroit mosque study,’) Dr. Bagby is the Associate Professor of Islamic Studies at the 
University of Kentucky, and a Fellow at the Institute of Social Policy and Understanding in 
Michigan. The study was published in 2004, and is part of a larger project, The Detroit 
Mosque Project at the Institute of Social Policy and Understanding. Farid Senzai, the ISPU’s 
Director of Research, explains that the project is a result of a post 9/11 climate, where there 
was plenty of information about Muslims in the media, yet “[d]espite the claims of these 
‘experts,’ very little is actually known about mosques in the U.S. and far less about the 
activities and views of the participants.”
 The 
DAAS is based on over a thousand face-to-face interviews of Arab Americans, people chosen 
from a sample, who self-identified as Arab or Chaldean. The study is particularly interesting 
because of the 508 interviews with the general population of the same geographic area, 
chosen as a representative sample. Carried out in 2003, this study provides statistical 
information on everything from demographics to identity to feelings about 9-11. All 
references to the DAAS in this paper are relating to the Arab and Chaldean populations of 
Wayne, Macomb and Oakland Counties, unless stated otherwise.  
6 The Institute for Social Policy and Understanding 
(ISPU) is an “independent nonprofit research organization committed to studying US 
domestic and foreign policy.”7
A final source of primary material is the interviews done for this study. Interviews 
with members of the Detroit Metro area give this study the subjective views of the group that 
is the focus of this study, and will give the paper depth and personality. Being an outsider to 
the Arab American community, I feel that the personal perspectives are especially important. 
The interviews will be of a qualitative sort, with participants recruited through snowball 
 The Detroit Mosque study is a survey of both mosques and 
their participants. The study surveyed all the leaders of all the mosques in Wayne, Oakland 
and Macomb counties, as well as 1298 participants in 12 mosques. These mosques were 
chosen in order to reflect the ethnic varieties of Detroit’s Muslims: 3 Arab, 3 South Asian, 3 
African American, and 3 ethnically mixed mosques. The mosque study is very useful for this 
thesis for several reasons. First, it is surveying the same three counties, Wayne, Oakland and 
Macomb. Second, it speaks to both participants and leaders (mainly imams) of the mosques. 
The census materials, the DAAS, and the Detroit Mosque study provide statistical information 
that give a largely unbiased view, and make some quantitative analysis possible. 
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sampling. Amir Marvasti says that snowball sampling is “considered especially useful when 
dealing with a sensitive topic that can best be understood from an insider’s perspective,” for 
instance with studies of race or ethnicity.8 The participants have all self-identified as Arab 
Americans, and the interviews have been conducted by email following the guidelines of oral 
history projects.9
A final interview was conducted for the religion chapter, an email interview with Fr. 
George H. Shalhoub, of St. Mary’s Antiochian Orthodox Church in Livonia, Michigan. Fr. 
Shalhoub was contacted after a tip from one of the other interview respondents that he would 
be a “wealth of information.”
 The interview respondents range in age from 16 to 68, live both in the city 
and in suburbs, and are all second-generation Arab Americans. A closer look at the 
demographic characteristics of the respondents can be found in Appendix Table 1.  
10 Fr. Shalhoub is originally from Syria, but has been serving the 
parish since 1972, and is one of the founders of the church. In addition to serving as pastor, he 
has a Doctor of Ministry Degree in Pastoral Counseling,  is Associate Professor of Religious 
Studies and Philosophy at Madonna University, and was “appointed by Governor Engler of 
Michigan to serve on the Mental Health Advisory Board and by Governor Granholm to the 
commission on Arab and Chaldean American Affairs.”11
Academic articles and scholarly literature dealing with assimilation theory and with 
Arab Americans are used as secondary source material. Immigration-and ethnicity studies 
stretches into several disciplines, for example Sociology, Anthropology, History, and 
American Studies, so there will be a variety of perspectives, something that will benefit this 
analysis. Regarding Arab Americans, the books Citizenship and Crisis: Arab Detroit After 
9/11,
 As part of the interview recruitment 
was sent the same email to several mosques in the area, with no response. Perhaps this is a 
reflection of the Muslim community’s suspicion and reluctance to speak to outsiders. Or 
perhaps it is just a coincidence. 
12 by the Detroit Study Team, and Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11,13 
edited by Amaney Jamal and Nadine Naber, are particularly of interest since they both use 
analysis based on the DAAS-findings, and are both quite recent, from 2009 and 2008 
respectively. Arab Detroit: From Margin to Mainstream,14
Regarding segmented assimilation theory, Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut’s 
Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation
 edited by Nabeel Abraham and 
Andrew Shryock is a wide ranging and extensive portrait of the community, published right 
before 9/11. In addition to these books, a variety of other books and articles about Arabs in 
America, race scholarship, religious sociology- and history, and immigrant incorporation- and 
assimilation have been read, and are referenced when it is fitting. 
15 is the main reference point. The 
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book provides the findings of their Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study (CILS), and 
gives empirical evidence of their segmented assimilation model. The study was conducted 
over 10 years, in three phases, and consisted of interviews with over 5,000 second-generation 
youth, and their parents who came from 77 different countries. The interviewed families lived 
in Miami, Ft. Lauderdale and San Diego, resulting in a sample that is primarily Hispanic, 
Caribbean and Asian.16
 
 A variety of articles about segmented assimilation theory have also 
been read for this thesis, and will be referenced when appropriate.  
1.3 Context: Arab Detroit 
This paper will focus on Arab Americans in the Detroit Metro area, specifically Wayne 
County, Oakland County and Macomb County (see map I in Appendix). Arabs have been 
arriving here since the end of the nineteenth century, and continue to come today. The city of 
Dearborn houses one of America’s few Arab enclaves, complete with Arabic shop signs, 
mosques and ethnic grocery stores. The surrounding suburbs have sizable Arab populations as 
well (see map II in Appendix), many of them moved as part of the suburbanization process of 
the 1960s. The Arabs in the suburbs are a majority Christian population, but Dearborn itself is 
primarily Muslim, and houses more of the recent immigrants. Three quarters of the Detroit 
Arab-American population is foreign born, yet at the same time nearly eighty percent are 
American citizens.17
Detroit’s Arab community started arriving primarily to work in Ford factories, often 
settling near the plant in Highland Park. When the company moved to Dearborn in the 1920s, 
many of the Arab workers followed, though a number of Lebanese Christians moved to the 
suburbs instead.
 Lebanese is still the main ancestry of Arab Americans in Metro Detroit, 
however, there are also sizable Yemeni, Iraqi, Palestinian and Jordanian populations. The 
suburban population is (not surprisingly) more established and wealthy than the city 
(Dearborn) population. 
18 Many Arab Americans, eager to show allegiance to America, served in 
World War I, Randa A. Kayyali reports that 15,000 Syrians served as infantrymen.19 
Likewise, at least 30,000 Arab Americans served during World War II.20 The 1950s saw a 
number of educated Levantine Muslims arriving in the United States, leading to more 
permanent settlements in Detroit. In the 1960s and 70s Dearborn and Detroit experienced 
“white flight,” leading to a more dominant Arab presence in Dearborn, which was still 
attracting new immigrants, now including many refugees.21 The 1980s and 90s see a large 
influx of new immigrants fleeing conflicts in the Middle East, many of these immigrants are 
less educated and come from rural areas. Attempts to implement bilingual programs in 
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Dearborn schools at this time, was met with heavy opposition.22 Industrial lay-offs leave 
many immigrant families in economic difficulties, resulting in a number of Yemeni going 
back to Yemen.23 However, despite the problems of the auto industry, the Detroit Arab 
community continued to attract new immigrants and refugees, and grew rapidly in the 1990s. 
September 11, 2001 marks the beginning of a new era for Arab Detroit, as immigration 
authorities start to restrict visa applicants from the Middle East and North Africa, leading to a 
reduction in the number of new immigrants.24
In comparison to Arab Americans nationally, Detroit Arab Americans differ in some 
significant ways. The Detroit Arab Americans are much more likely to be bilingual and speak 
a language other than English in the home than the average for other Arab Americans.
 
25 The 
Metro-area Arab Americans have less education than Arab Americans elsewhere.26 A full 
third of Dearborn’s population is Arab American, which is significant considering Arab 
Americans constitute 1-3% (depending on who you ask) of the United States population as a 
whole. Due to difficulties regarding the counting of Arab Americans (discussed further in 
chapter two of this thesis), there is disagreement of their actual numbers. Kristine J. Ajrouch 
and Amaney Jamal say that “Census data suggest that there are 151,493 Arab Americans in 
Michigan; however, community-based estimates suggest that the number is closer to 
490,000.”27 The Detroit Arab American Study Team suggests that a “sober calculation” of 
Arab Detroit is a population of 200,000 by 2010.28
Arab-American religious affiliations are hard to document too, and therefore these 
numbers are merely projections. A common assumption is that Arab Christians constitute 
two-thirds of all Arab Americans.
 
29 As pointed out by the Detroit Arab American Study 
Team, Arab groups in America represent “odd inversions of the demographics of their home 
countries.”30 For instance, while Arab Christians only constitute five percent of the Arab 
world, they are over half of the Arab community in Detroit. Arab Christians consist of a 
number of Christian sects: Melkite-, Maronite-, and Chaldean Catholics, Orthodox, and 
Copts. Egyptian Copts and Iraqi Catholic Chaldeans are later arrivals on the American scene, 
while the Melkites, Maronites and Orthodox have been present since the earliest waves of 
Arab immigration.31 Sally Howell and Amaney Jamal say that although the earliest Christian 
immigrants in Detroit joined pre-existing churches, most Arabic-speaking Christians quickly 
built their own houses of worship. Today they count more than a dozen churches with “Arabic 
or Aramaic-speaking congregations” in Metro Detroit.32
 Many of Detroit’s Arab Christians have settled in the suburbs, yet often in different 
areas depending on national or religious affiliation.
  
33 Some wealthy Arab Americans live in 
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Grosse Point, which is an upper-class area by the lake (See map II in Appendix). Northern 
suburbs like Troy and Warren have been a draw to Arab American engineers, many of them 
Palestinians. Livonia, a western suburb, has a sizable Palestinian Christian population.34 Iraqi 
Catholic Chaldeans have established an urban enclave along Seven Mile Road, many of them 
running grocery, liquor and convenience stores. The Chaldeans’ position as store owners in a 
predominantly African American neighborhood has caused conflict and violence, since these 
two groups “compete for scarce resources.”35 Because of urban blight and these conflicts, 
many of these Chaldeans move to the suburbs when they can afford it;36
Arab Muslims have been present in America since the before the Civil War. However 
the largest boom in numbers came after 1965, particularly in the 1990s, with immigrants 
fleeing various wars and crises in the Middle East. Arab Muslims constitute between 25 and 
35 percent of the total U.S. Muslim population.  It is important to keep in mind that the 
majority of Arab Americans are not Muslim, and the majority of American Muslims are not 
Arab. Yet, in Dearborn, their numbers are large enough that we can speak of a distinctly 
Arab-Muslim community.
 often joining the 
more affluent Chaldean communities in Southfield, Bloomfield Hills and Farmington Hills.  
37 Howell and Jamal found that 79% of Arab Muslims in 
Metropolitan Detroit live in Dearborn or Detroit, rather than in the suburbs.38 A majority of 
Dearborn’s Arabs are Muslims (only five percent of Arab Christians live in the city39), who 
historically have been working-class, and chose to settle near the automobile plants where 
they often worked.40 Some of the more recent immigrants have come from war and poverty, 
and also tend to settle in the city, rather than the suburbs.41 East Dearborn is separated from 
West Dearborn by the Southfield Freeway (see Map III in Appendix), and they function in 
many ways as two distinct cities. West Dearborn is almost exclusively non-Arab,42 and 
houses one of Dearborn’s most visited attractions, the Henry Ford Museum and Greenfield 
Village, as well as the University of Michigan-Dearborn, the Dearborn Country Club and the 
large River Rouge Park. Historically, East Dearborn was inhabited by Italian and Eastern 
European immigrant families and factory workers, but they have fled to the suburbs, leaving 
the area predominantly Arab.43 East Dearborn’s neighborhoods are described by Rossina J. 
Hassoun as “lower- to middle class.”44 The national groups include Lebanese, Yemenis, Iraqis 
and Palestinians.45 Lebanese Shi’a Muslims arriving in the late 1980s, settled in East 
Dearborn and established businesses and restaurants along Warren Avenue, contributing to a 
rebirth and an economic boom.46 Yet, the rapid increase of new immigrants has created 
financial strain on the city’s schools and public services.47  
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The Southend of Dearborn is isolated in an industrial area by the Ford Rouge Plant 
and other auto-related industries, and is cut off from East Dearborn by the Detroit Industrial 
Expressway and the Rouge River (see Map III in Appendix). Like East Dearborn it was 
historically a multi-ethnic working class area, but today it is almost exclusively Arab 
American.48 The majority of Arab Americans in the Southend are Yemeni and Iraqi Muslims, 
although there are some Lebanese and Palestinian families as well. Many of the Iraqis are 
recent immigrants, often refugees, and are Shi’a Muslims. Hassoun writes that many of these 
Iraqi refugees were “incarcerated in concentration camp-like conditions in Saudi Arabia” 
prior to their arrival.49 The Yemenis are predominantly Sunni Muslims, many from rural areas 
of Yemen, and often have a more traditional outlook than other Dearborn Muslims.50 Hassoun 
writes that the Southend community suffered particular hardships because of plant-layoffs in 
the 1980s, and has struggled to recover from this. These difficulties are exacerbated by a 
continuing flow of new immigrants, whose status as recent arrivals requires more resources.51 
The main commercial area along Dix and Vernor Avenues has not succeeded in becoming a 
bustling “Arab town” in the same way that Warren and Michigan Avenues in East Dearborn 
have.52 The Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS), has its 
headquarters in the Southend, and tries to help the community in with a variety of issues, such 
as health- and language-related problems. In addition to the city of Dearborn, there is a small 
enclave of Yemeni Muslims in Hamtramck, a working-class municipality surrounded by the 
city of Detroit, many of them working at the Dodge Plant.53
 The Detroit mosque study counts nearly 65,000 Muslims associated with the mosques, 
and says that “using the projection that ‘mosqued’ Muslims constitute one-third of all 
Muslims, a reasonable estimate of the total Muslim population in Metropolitan Detroit is 
125,000  - 200,000.”
  
54 The study does not specify how many of these are Arab, but says that 
over half of the participants seen attending Friday prayers are Arab.55 The study identifies 33 
mosques in Wayne, Oakland and Macomb Counties, 10 of these are Arab majority mosques, 
though Arab attendees can be found in over eighty percent of Detroit’s mosques.56 Muslims 
can be separated into two major sects, the Shi’a and the Sunni. The Shi’a are estimated to be 
one-fifth of the U.S. Muslim population.57 In Detroit, Lebanese Shi’a “greatly outnumber” the 
Lebanese Sunnis, this is the opposite of their demographics in Lebanon.58 Howell and Jamal 
list over half of the Detroit Arab Muslims as Shi’a, where in the Arab world, they are less 
than 15%.59
 
 The recently arrived Iraqi refugees also adhere to the Shi’a sect of Islam.  
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1.4 Assimilation Theory 
The terms assimilation, integration, acculturation and incorporation are often used 
interchangeably, and need closer defining. “Assimilation” may to modern ears sound out-
dated, and in some ways, perhaps it is. Defining it as something close to “Americanization” – 
it has overtones of force, and of complete abandonment of one’s ethnicity. During the Nativist 
period of the 1920s, there was a strong degree of force involved in immigrant incorporation, 
leaving little room for immigrant families’ retention of ethnic behavior. The term assimilation 
is however so ingrained in both public and academic debate that it may still be used in a 
meaningful way. The Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups describes 
assimilation as “the processes that lead to greater homogeneity in society.”60 We can differ it 
from “acculturation” since acculturation refers to simply obtaining cultural patterns and 
behavior. The Subcommittee on Acculturation defines it as “those phenomena which result 
when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, 
with subsequent changes in the original patterns of either or both groups.”61 Assimilation goes 
further into the immigrant’s life, meaning that he/she obtains not only culture, but also 
incorporates mainstream structure into his life, for example by joining non-ethnic 
organizations. Milton Gordon differentiates between primary- and secondary relationships, 
saying that primary relationships are “personal, intimate, emotionally affective, and (…) bring 
into play the whole personality.” In contrast secondary relationships are “impersonal, formal, 
and segmentalized, and tend not to come very close to the core of the personality.”62 It is first 
when you incorporate the mainstream into your primary relationships that you have 
structurally assimilated.63 Herbert Gans points out that “ethnics can acculturate on their own, 
but they cannot assimilate unless they are given permission to enter the ‘American’ group or 
institution” leading to the “inevitable lag of assimilation behind acculturation.”64 The term 
“integration” is largely absent from American immigration scholarship, and seems to be used 
more in Europe. Whether this is a reflection of actual value-and ideological difference, or if it 
is just a matter of tradition is uncertain. The term implies meeting half way. In this regard it 
can be seen as more accurate of what actually happens when the immigrant is adjusting to the 
host society. There is a blending, and there is a need for action by the host society as well as 
by the immigrant.  However, even though this term may be more accurate, since this paper is 
written in an American context, and because the focus is on segmented assimilation, the term 
assimilation will be used. Finally, the term “incorporation” will in this paper be used as a 
neutral term, referring simply to the acts of immigrants entering and adjusting to American 
society. 
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 The working definition of assimilation in this thesis is that assimilation occurs when 
the immigrant goes from being an “other” to being “one of us.” By using this definition, the 
pitfalls and negative connotations of cultural abandonment are avoided. Instead the focus is 
on the immigrant’s ability to be an American, which is, again, dependent upon both the 
immigrant and the host society. The ability to become “one of us” depends on the host 
society’s degree of acceptance, which will differ from place to place. Therefore an immigrant 
wearing, for instance, a hijab (head scarf) can be “one of us” in some environments, but not in 
others. The degree of cultural and behavioral adjustment needed is therefore relative to the 
environment the immigrant is in. As this paper will show, there are certain elements of the 
Detroit Arab community which are “othered” by their coethnics. At the same time, in Arab 
Detroit the context allows for immigrants who otherwise would be considered “forever 
foreign” or unassimilable, to be “one of us.”  
Segmented assimilation theory is the focus of this work, but one should never ignore 
the impact of the preceding theories in the field. Barbara Schmitter Heisler calls the earliest 
theories for the “Classical Period”, and refers to both what is commonly called the Chicago 
School and to Milton Gordon.65 This paradigm focuses on the immigrants that arrived in the 
first half of the twentieth century. In this research there is great optimism about migration, and 
about the possibility to – and ability to – assimilate. There was an assumption that all 
immigrants will assimilate, if you just give them enough time (or a few generations). Ethnic 
traits are seen as disadvantageous in this view, even among scholars who recognize the 
benefits of more pluralism (like for example Gordon).66 Josh DeWind and Philip Kasinitz 
point out that many of these early social scientific descriptions suffered from being “too often 
closely allied with political prescription.”67
There is much current debate as to whether or not we can use the past experiences of 
immigrant assimilation as a model for what will happen to today’s immigrants. Many scholars 
argue that the circumstances are so different now, that what happened in the past is less 
relevant. They speak of differences in sending countries, differences in government policy 
and programs, differences in the American economy and work force, differences in the 
outlook of Americans on how they feel about foreigners and other major changes in society.
 
68 
Other scholars argue that there are lessons to be learned from the past, that there are enough 
similarities to make comparisons.69 Richard Alba and Victor Nee say that the goal of their 
influential 2003 book, Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary 
Immigration, is to demonstrate that assimilation – as experienced by earlier immigrants - has 
continued relevance.70  Alba and Nee are optimistic about the future of the second generation, 
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and it is here that they disagree with segmented assimilation scholars who see downward 
assimilation as a possibility for some immigrant groups.71
Milton Gordon is a major name in the field of assimilation studies with his landmark 
Assimilation in American Life
 Criticism of segmented 
assimilation theory will be discussed further below. 
72 from 1964. In this book, Gordon wishes to focus on “the 
nature of group life itself”73 He uses the term “Ethclass” to describe the intersection of 
ethnicity and social class, claiming that social participation in primary relations happen within 
the ethclass.74 Gordon created a seven stage model of assimilation used to describe what was 
before seen as a more uncomplicated and linear process. The seven stages are: Cultural or 
Behavioral assimilation, Structural assimilation, Marital assimilation, Identificational 
assimilation, Attitude receptional assimilation, Behavior receptional assimilation and Civic 
assimilation.75 Gordon claims that “[n]ot only is the assimilation process mainly a matter of 
degree, but, obviously, each of the stages or subprocesses distinguished above may take place 
in varying degrees.”76
Along with the Civil Rights Era comes a new paradigm in assimilation studies, (called 
the “Modern Period” by Heisler,
  
77and “New Social History” by others.78) with the recognition 
that immigrants do not just arrive to an empty slate, but rather to a society filled with 
economic and political limitations.79 In other words, there is a new focus on structure. Using 
Marxism in the background, theorists and researchers now have a more pessimistic view of 
the immigrants’ opportunities, seeing limitations like institutional racism, labor exploitation 
and inequality. There is fear (and recognition) that the loss of industrial and other “middle of 
the ladder” jobs creates a problem for immigrants who are unable to climb above low-level 
jobs. In addition there is emphasis on migration as part of a larger world capitalist system that 
exploits people through migration.80 The Civil Rights movement put the spotlight on just how 
much race means in America, and with the new immigrants mainly being non-white, there is 
worry that this will also hinder their opportunities to climb the mobility ladder. There is 
recognition of the fact that some immigrant communities and/or individuals are barred from 
assimilating into the mainstream for reasons beyond their own agency. Nathan Glazer and 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s Beyond the Melting Pot81 is an extensive survey of ethnic groups 
in New York, in which the conclusion was that they did not “melt.” They say that “[p]erhaps 
the meaning of ethnic labels will yet be erased in America. But it has not yet worked out this 
way in New York.”82 As of 2010, this is still the case in America. The authors say that studies 
of ethnic groups commonly speak in terms of praise or blame.83 This paper will try to avoid 
both praise and blame, though it points out that retention of ethnic labels can be beneficial to 
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an immigrant community, (in line with segmented assimilation theory), at least in the case of 
Arab Detroit. 
In the 1960s and 70s the idea of a multicultural society gains popularity, both as 
ideology and as social policy.84 In this perspective the immigrant has more agency than in the 
Structuralist view where the immigrant is mainly a victim. There is still recognition of the 
problems involved in immigrant incorporation, but the desire is not to assimilate, but rather to 
achieve equality and equal rights.85 Part of the new debate is whether or not there is a “middle 
America”, unified core or homogenous mainstream for the immigrant to become part of. 
There is a desire to place the excluded in the center, and to see ethnic traits as positive and in 
constant interaction with the rest of society.86 Glazer and Moynihan say that when they wrote 
their book (early 1960s), most of the major works about ethnic history and sociology were 
old. They missed scholarship that paid attention to the persistence of ethnicity, and so set out 
to do it themselves.87
Kazal sees a renewed interest in assimilation starting in the 1980s. He says that since 
the Anglo-conformist assumption has been abandoned, historians have shown interest in 
assimilation. He points to what he calls “scholars of ethnicity,” “labor historians,” and 
“scholars of racial identity,” who have all “explored Americanization, examin[ed] how 
newcomers have come to define themselves as ‘American.’ Here something resembling an 
American ‘core’ ideology has reemerged – but an ideology subject to change and 
contestation.”
  
88 He names scholars such as Kathleen Neils Conzen, John Higham, Philip 
Gleason, Gary Gerstle and David Roediger as part of this development.89 Josh DeWind and 
Philip Kasinitz say that in the late 1990s, the role of immigrants is more debated than at any 
time since the Progressive Era, and point to the “assimilation anxiety” of such works as Peter 
Brimelow’s Alien Nation and Peter Salins’ Assimilation American Style.90 One could add 
Samuel Huntington’s Who Are We?91 to that list. He proposes that the way for the nation to 
find its national purpose and identity is to “recommit to America as a deeply religious and 
primarily Christian country, encompassing several religious minorities, adhering to Anglo-
Protestant values, speaking English, maintaining its European cultural heritage, and 
committed to the principles of the Creed.”92 Huntington, Salins and Brimelow revive Anglo-
conformity or the Melting Pot models of assimilation,93
Just as the new immigration legislation of 1965 changed the theories of assimilation, 
so did the emergence of the new second generation. The Multiculturalist approach did not 
seem to explain what was happening to them, nor did the Structural perspective deal with the 
 and are, not surprisingly, met with 
considerable criticism. 
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realities on an individual level.94 There is a growing desire to see if they are incorporated in 
the same fashion as their predecessors. At the same time there is still recognition that 
immigrant incorporation is the responsibility of both the immigrant and the host society. The 
ways in which an immigrant and his kids are received will affect the way in which he adapts 
to American society. Jeffery G. Reitz points out four features of host societies that will have 
an impact on immigrant incorporation: pre-existing racial and ethnic relations, labor markets, 
government policies and programs, and finally, globalization and changing international 
boundaries.95 This parallels some of the factors that decide assimilation according to 
segmented assimilation theory: race, a challenging labor market, inner-city countercultures, 
governmental policy and host society reception.96
Herbert Gans used the term “second-generation decline” to argue against what he calls 
straight line theory,
 What much of the more current research 
seems to show, and what Rumbaut and Portes are claiming as well, is that there is a variety of 
new patterns. Though the earlier immigrants’ children moved up the mobility ladder, the new 
second generation since 1965 have sometimes moved down. In addition there seem to be 
differences in whether they in fact assimilate, who they assimilate towards, and whether 
assimilation is always a benefit.  
97 in other words against the more classical approach. He says that maybe 
the second-generation will go in the opposite direction, towards downward mobility. Gans 
mainly blames the economy, claiming that the lack of middle-rung jobs can lead to this 
decline. He also acknowledges the fact that this generation may be assimilated enough to 
reject the lower-rung jobs, and that this in turn can lead to unemployment, drug use and crime. 
He sees this scenario as especially likely for young men.98
 
  
1.5 Segmented Assimilation Theory 
Assimilation theory has historically been dominated by some assumptions, the first being that 
assimilating is a path to betterment for the immigrant, since ethnic traits and behavior as seen 
as disadvantageous.99 Second, that with time (or successive generations) the immigrant and 
his family will assimilate.100 Third, the influence of societal reception is of minimal 
importance.101 Growing recognition that not all these assumptions are true, has led to an 
expanding body of research describing the new and more complex picture. Many of the new 
studies focus on the second generation, in other words, the “native-born children of foreign 
parents or foreign-born children who were brought to the United States before 
adolescence.”102 Portes and Rumbaut point out the relevance of studying the second 
generation in saying that “in the long term it was not the sights and sounds of the first 
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generation but the settlement process of their children that determined the long-term 
consequences of the immigrant flow for the nation. First-generation immigrants have always 
been a restless bunch, here one day and gone the next: in the society, but not yet of it.”103 
Alba and Nee make the same point, saying that assimilation is a “multigenerational process,” 
with outcomes that are not possible to assess without studying the second generation.104
One of the new theories in this vein is segmented assimilation theory. Segmented 
assimilation theory builds on earlier assimilation theory, but goes further to explain how some 
immigrants’ children actually experience downward mobility.  It also explains how retaining 
ethnic ties and culture can be a way to experience upward mobility, something the earlier 
theories did not address. Segmented assimilation scholars propose three possible paths for the 
second generation to take. The first is the classic path of acculturation followed by upward 
mobility. The second path is one of upward mobility by way of retaining ethnic ties and 
characteristics. The third path involves acculturation, but instead of moving towards the white 
majority, the acculturation is a move towards the underclass (often African American). This 
path often leads to downward mobility.
 The 
face of the immigrant has changed over time, and this makes a difference in their success or 
failure in American society. The story of the second generation allows us to predict the future, 
as well as teaching us lessons about the past, and about American society as a whole.  
105
The imminent question then becomes: What decides which path each immigrant group 
follows?
 
106 Segmented assimilation scholars claim that it is a matter of context (for example 
relations between the U.S. and their home country, and the size and structure of existing 
coethnic communities in the U.S.) and of modes of incorporation (for example prejudices of 
Americans and American social programs).107 These scholars claim that the main features that 
leave the immigrant vulnerable to downward assimilation are: color, location of settlement 
and absence of mobility ladders.108 There are also individual level differences that help decide 
the destiny of a group. One of these is the educational level of the parental generation, along 
with their attitude towards education. Another difference is English language abilities. A third 
is place of birth and age of arrival. A fourth is the family’s socioeconomic background or 
class. A final difference that can be important is place of residence.109 Interplaying with these 
individual differences are the contextual differences mentioned above. If there is a strong 
coethnic community available it can help in overcoming structural disadvantages. The same is 
true for families that have what Min Zhou calls “generational consonance.”110 This refers to 
the degree of generational conflict or agreement.  These scholars emphasize the continued 
effects of racism, claiming that it isn’t simply a historical disadvantage, but also a 
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contemporary characteristic of American society.111 However, they also point to factors that 
can contribute to “mobility success”: government programs, public sympathy and resources in 
the ethnic community.112
Segmented assimilation theory is a new theory, but it is of course influenced by old 
ideas. Harold J. Abramson (in the Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups), for 
instance, points out that the question is what the immigrant assimilates to, giving three 
alternatives: to the dominant Anglo-Saxon Protestant ethnicity, to another ethnic collectivity, 
or to a mixed subculture, meaning a true melting pot.
  
113 Speaking of racial passing, Abramson 
explains that it does not just involve minority members becoming part of the more dominant 
group, it can also be the reverse phenomenon, exemplified by the “white who becomes a 
cultural black, the Frenchman who goes native in the South Seas, and the Anglo-Saxon who 
joins the Indians on the frontier.”114 This is not exactly the same as what segmented 
assimilation calls downward assimilation, but there are similarities in the acknowledgement 
that assimilation can lead to assuming the characteristics of populations other than the 
mainstream. Kasinitz points to the fact that there is “nothing new about the complaint that the 
children of immigrants were becoming the ‘wrong kind’ of Americans.”115
 DeWind and Kasinitz point out that segmented assimilation theory has been 
“extraordinarily influential” in recent times. Yet, they say, it raises several unanswered 
questions. First, does preservation of home country ways actually improve the life chances of 
the second generation? Second, will parental pressure to “stay ethnic” cause resentment 
among the second generation? They say that there are fictional accounts that imply conflict 
between the generations over ethnic retention.
 
116 Third, is community preservation a long-
term phenomenon?117 The second of these questions will be dealt with in this thesis’ chapter 
about religion, asking whether religious customs such as gender roles can cause what 
segmented assimilation theorists call “dissonant acculturation.”118
 David Manuel Hernandez and Evelyn Nakano Glenn review Portes and Rumbaut’s 
two books: Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation, and Ethnicities: 
Children of Immigrants in America, (the latter edited by these authors). They call these books 
“touchstones” for researchers and students, as well as a convincing demonstration of the 
inadequacy of dominant assimilation theories.
 
119  They do have some criticism as well, for 
instance they criticize Legacies’ lack of attention to gender and to undocumented status.120 
They say the neglect of undocumented status is “particularly glaring” as it is so important in 
California (where the CILS takes some of its sources from), and because “studies have shown 
undocumented status to have enormous and permanent intergenerational impacts.”121 They 
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conclude that the greatest contribution of these two works is the suggestion of a “third way” 
to assimilate, rather than simply complete assimilation or marginalization, namely “selective 
acculturation,” what this thesis refers to as the second trajectory. They say – optimistically – 
that “Portes and Rumbaut’s vision of selective acculturation creates the possibility for a more 
diverse and unified nation.”122 Reviewing the same two books, Emily Skop calls them 
“brilliant” and “two useful works of scholarship.”123 She has very little criticism of the books, 
but asks for more focus on the “spatial perspective,” the critical role of place in the process of 
adaptation.124
 In Citizenship and Crisis: Arab Detroit After 9/11, Shryock and Ann Chih Lin point 
out that segmented assimilation theorists have forgotten the importance of time spent in 
America, saying that “it is still widely assumed among Arabs in Detroit, and among scholars 
who study them, that time spent in America and being born in the United States have crucial 
effects on a person’s identity and opportunities.”
 
125
 Kasinitz joins Alba and Nee in saying that segmented assimilation theory is overly 
pessimistic.
 In this regard, the respondents that were 
interviewed for this thesis are well-suited, since they represent a variety of age groups, with 
corresponding differing time spent in America. 
126 He says that the portrayal of black culture as “utterly corrosive to one’s ability 
to perform in American society” is unfair and underestimates the contributions of black 
culture.127 He concludes by saying that those who “see acculturation as detrimental to upward 
mobility (…) are expressing a general lack of faith in the economic ability of the 
contemporary United States to provide upward mobility on the scale that it did for earlier 
immigrants.”128 Likewise, Alba and Nee say that a “pattern of second-generation decline or 
stagnation does not appear to be widespread.”129
Despite some criticism, segmented assimilation remains an influential model within 
the study of assimilation. Due to the fact that Arab Americans are such a diverse group, and 
because there is very little academic work written about Arab Americans and segmented 
assimilation, this thesis finds it to be a worthwhile combination. The Arab American 
population is generally well-educated and well-off. However, the Detroit area Arab 
Americans have a lower family income than the general Arab American public,
 
130 and are 
disproportionately represented among the area’s wealthiest and poorest households.131 How 
does this population then fit into the segmented assimilation model? Does this discredit Portes 
and Rumbaut’s theory that strong ethnic ties and a co-ethnic community are helpful to upward 
mobility? Is this community experiencing downward mobility? The investigation in this thesis 
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will lead to a better understanding of these questions, and to a conclusion on how applicable 
segmented assimilation theory is to this particular group. 
 
1.6 Arab-American Scholarship 
Descriptions of Arab Americans have been written since the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when they were present in large enough numbers to be noticed. Especially the history 
of the Syrian enclave in New York City and of early Lebanese peddlers have been described. 
Theodore Pulcini has identified three distinct eras of Arab-American scholarship,132 one 
ending after World War II, one in the 1960s, and one in the 1970s and 80s. The articles and 
books written before the second World War fall into the category of contribution history, and 
are accounts describing the community and their “integrity and ability to make a positive 
contribution to America.”133 Pulcini names Philip Hitti’s The Syrians in America, from 1924 
as the first systematic and scholarly study of Syrian immigration to the United States,134
 The 1960s are a start of a new era in research. A. E. Elkholy’s “landmark work” The 
Arab Moslems in the United States (1966) examined Muslims in Dearborn and Toledo in 
detail, and concluded that Islam was not a barrier to assimilation, rather Muslim religiosity 
was a benefit for these immigrant communities.
 
marking a period of academic work intended to describe the Syrian communities and their 
assimilation. He says the pre-war studies had an “apologetic tone,” and differ from later 
scholarship. Works that describe Arab Muslims were virtually non-existent in these first 
decades, only starting to emerge in the 1950s when more Muslims arrived in America.  
135 The 1960s focus on Muslim religion was 
paralleled by a focus on Arab Christian religion. The Christians who earlier had submitted to 
a “Latinization” of their faith, now showed an increase in awareness and affirmation of their 
religious distinctness.136 An example of this trend is Mary C. Sengstock’s study of Chaldeans 
in Detroit.137 There was also more scholarship showing pride in Arab-American literature 
(with Kahlil Gibran at the forefront).138 The 1960s was marked by political turmoil in the 
Middle East, and Arab-American scholarship of this decade show a “tradition of markedly 
political works defending the Arab world against what was perceived as an entrenched 
American bias against it.”139
The bias against Arabs led to research devoted to examining the images of Arabs in 
the media, beginning the last era of research described by Pulcini.
 This tradition in Arab-American scholarship has continued into 
the present day, and has perhaps become even more present after 9/11.  
140 The 1970s and 80s are 
more defensive in tone than the works of previous eras, while they also show a sense of pride 
in Arab heritage. Works by for instance Jack Shaheen and Michael Suleiman set out to 
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challenge myths, and point out the bias in American media against Arab Americans.141 The 
1970s and 80s saw a “number of studies analyzing the situation of Arab Americans 
specifically from a minority-rights perspective,” says Pulcini.142 This trend parallels the 
research and academic work of other ethnic minorities in America, born out of the Civil 
Rights movements and ethnic “revolution” in America. The increased willingness to openly 
display frustration went hand in hand with self-affirmation and pride, symbolized according to 
Pulcini by The American Arabic-Speaking Community Almanac.143 He says that the “Almanac 
was obviously compiled to project an image of an ethnic group that was united and mobilized, 
inveterate internal divisions and political handicaps notwithstanding.”144 A number of analytic 
works were published in the 1980s, some in the form of anthologies. Many of the articles in 
these anthologies had Michigan’s Arabs as the center of attention, for instance Arabs in the 
New World.145 Pulcini names Yvonne Haddad an authority on Islam in America, and her 
“1987 opus,” coauthored with A. T. Lummis, did what Elkholy did in the 1960s,146
Pulcini’s account ends with the late 1980s. Since then, more turmoil in the Middle 
East has brought continued focus on Arab American discrimination in the United States, and 
more focus on the continuing influx of Muslim immigration, and its effects on assimilation. A 
number of scholars investigate the effects of the growth of Islam in America, and the 
coinciding Islamophobia, for instance John Esposito, Linda Walbridge, Jane I. Smith, and 
Louise Cainkar.
 and was 
followed by numerous studies on Arab Muslims in the United States. 
147 Jen’nan Ghazal Read, and Nadine Naber have studied Arab women, and 
the effect of religion on their gender identities and behavior, both finding that women’s roles 
are more of a cultural trait among Arabs, than an effect of Christian or Muslim religions.148 
Fadwa El Guindi names Barbara Aswad “the single most prolific anthropologist specializing 
on Arab America,” with a “mentorship that has produced generations of anthropologists” 
specializing in Arab America, and especially Dearborn; Linda Walbridge being one of 
them.149 Alixa Naff, Eric Hoogland, and Akram Khater write historical accounts of the early 
immigration, and transnational identities.150 A number of anthologies with contributors from a 
multitude of disciplines have been published in the 1990s,151 writing about Arab Christians 
and Muslims in many geographic locations, but nearly all of them contain research from Arab 
Detroit. Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock’s Arab Detroit (described earlier in this 
chapter) explicitly sets out to paint a portrait of Dearborn and its surroundings. This suggests 
that if one is doing research about Arab Americans, Arab Detroit is likely to become a focal 
point. 
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Since 9/11, the reality of discrimination and unease in the Arab Muslim community 
have brought about a large number of scholarly work describing the impact of 9/11 on the 
communities, exemplified by the aforementioned Citizenship and Crisis: Arab Detroit after 
9/11, as well as a number of studies and polls focusing on the same themes.152 Many of these 
works describe the move from invisible to visible minority, and the nature of Arab-American 
minority- and racial status (described further in chapter two).153
Fadwa El Guindi, writing in 2003, notes that even though the Middle East is “directly 
related to the United States’ most volatile area of foreign policy,” there are no study centers or 
programs devoted to the research on Arab and Muslim Americans.
 It seems that academic work 
still has the same defensive tone, accompanied by pride found in the 1970s and 1980s, but 
with a renewed sense of urgency.  
154 At the same time Arab 
Americans are not recruited to teach Islamic and Middle East studies, rather those positions 
are filled by Jews, “without scrutiny for possible bias against Arabs and Muslims,” she 
says.155 Since then, the Center for Arab American Studies has been established at the 
University of Michigan-Dearborn, aiming to focus on Arab Americans, and especially the 
Dearborn community.156 This has presumably led to an increase in scholarship and research 
of and about Arab Americans. In a similar fashion, Andrew Shryock’s article “Teaching (and 
Learning) about Arab America: a Survey of Materials” sets out to prove that there are plenty 
of sources of academic work about Arab Americans, and encourages teachers to use these in 
“arts, humanities, and social science courses.” He continues by lamenting the invisibility of 
Arab immigrants in textbooks about ethnicity and immigration, and suggests teaching courses 
that focus solely on Arabs in America.157 Like El Guindi, he points to the fact that America is 
waging war in the Middle East, and therefore the inclusion of Arab American topics is 
especially relevant in academic settings.158
Segmented assimilation in relation to Arab Americans has only been analyzed in a few 
select cases, for instance Kristine J. Ajrouch and Amaney Jamal’s article “Assimilating to a 
White Identity: The Case of Arab Americans.”
 
159
 
 This thesis is a small contribution to this 
tradition. 
1.7 Race- and Ethnicity Theories 
There is extensive scholarship on the history and development of race and ethnicity in 
America. This writing has been located in many fields, for instance, in Sociology, 
Immigration History, Psychology, Culture Studies, Anthropology and Labor History. Starting 
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with race, this section will review some of the most central works and paradigms in the realm 
of race- and ethnic scholarship. 
 Early scholarship on race can easily be seen as outdated, laughable or malicious today. 
The pseudo-scientific work of Eugenicists and Social Darwinists is thankfully discredited 
today, though it had major repercussions for racial minorities in Europe and America, as well 
as in colonized countries, and is neither laughable nor should it be underestimated. Peggy 
Pascoe describes the impact it had on miscegenation laws, where in its extreme, a person of 
mixed race would not legally be allowed to marry anyone of any race.160 Karen Brodkin 
points to the forced sterilization of anyone seen as unfit - often meaning women of color - a 
system that survived into the 1970s.161 The biological nature of race began to be questioned in 
the 1920s, but as pointed out by Thomas F. Gossett, it had remarkable staying power. He 
explains that eventually the “shift of the scientists and social scientists with regard to race did 
not occur because of any dramatic or sudden discovery. Racism had developed into such a 
contradictory mass of the unprovable and the emotional that the serious students eventually 
recognized that as a source of explanation for mental and temperamental traits of a people it 
was worthless.”162 Thomas F. Gossett’s book, Race: The History of an Idea in America from 
1963, is among the classic literature on race in America. Though he is a Professor of English, 
Gossett’s book is considered to be one of the most important books of the last fifty years on 
the subject of race as an idea in the development of American culture.163 Gossett’s 
chronological account details the history of race ideology, and of race scholarship, starting in 
ancient times, and leading up to the American 1960s. Like most modern thinkers, he debunks 
the myth of racial categories as biological entities.164 He points out that though academic 
discipline has experienced a “sharp swing away from race interpretations,” there still are “race 
problems aplenty.”165
This echoes much of what some important race scholarship says later: that even if 
there is reluctance to write about race, it does exist, both in the popular mind, and in 
sociological realities. Critical Race Theory developed as a response to this. The movement 
began in the field of law, but soon extended to other areas, and sought to highlight the 
importance of race, and the degree to which race permeates society.
  
166 Beginning in the 
1970s, the founders saw that though Civil Rights reforms had succeeded in the 1960s, racial 
inequality still existed, and in many cases civil rights advancements were being reversed.167 
They saw the need for new “theories and strategies (…) to combat the subtler forms of racism 
that were gaining ground.”168 The five basic tenants, (though there are differences among the 
Critical Race scholars) are: first, that racism is ordinary and common. Second, that color-blind 
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conceptions of equality can only “remedy only the most blatant forms of discrimination.”169 
Third, that race is a social product, not objective or inherent. Fourth, that “society racializes 
different minority groups at different times, in response to shifting needs.”170 And finally, that 
people of color have a unique “voice” – a “presumed competence to speak about race and 
racism.”171
Seemingly following in the footsteps of Critical Race Theory, though never 
mentioning it by name, is Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s Racial Formation in the United 
States: From the 1960s to the 1990s. Omi and Winant take over where Gossett left off, in the 
1960s. They describe the history of race and racial scholarship, and continue on to describing 
their own theory of race. Central to their argument is that previous social science literature 
was inadequate in explaining race, since even when dealing with race it tended to “diminish 
the significance of race, to treat it as a mere manifestation of some other, supposedly more 
important, social relationship.”
 Critical Race Theory has met significant criticism, both from Liberals and 
Conservatives, from both white and non-white scholars and thinkers. Yet, this paper sees 
Critical Race Theory as central to an understanding of the Arab American racial dilemma, 
Arab American racial categorization, and the debate surrounding it.  
172 The authors propose a Racial Formation Theory, which 
looks at the “sociohistorical process by which racial categories are created, inhabited, 
transformed, and destroyed.”173 They wish to put race at the center of discussions, and their 
book is an analysis of American politics and ideology from that perspective, rather than from 
the perspective of class, ethnicity or nation, where they claim that “race and racial dynamics 
in the U.S. have been theoretically understood” before.174 Like Critical Race Theory, Omi and 
Winant argue that a Right-wing color-blind conception is inadequate, but they go further and 
suggest that it is at times covertly (and overtly) racist.175 Pascoe follows some of these same 
conclusions calling “color-blindness” a racial ideology of its own, and in a memorable phrase 
says it is “an Alice-in-Wonderland interpretation of racism in which even those who argue for 
racially oppressive policies can adamantly deny being racists.”176
In How Jews Became White Folks & What That Says About Race in America, Karen 
Brodkin refers to Omi and Winant’s “racial state,” saying that she is writing of a racial 
economic system.
 
177 She seeks to explain how race and class are closely connected, and to 
explain their relationship to gender. She says that the roots of race in America are in the 
system of slavery: “slavery made race and (…) race justified a regime of slave labor.”178 The 
later arriving immigrant working class was then constructed as nonwhite using stereotypes 
formerly used for blacks.179 She says that this “construction of race almost is the American 
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construction of class, that capitalism as an economic organization in the United States is 
racially structured.”180
Brodkin is not alone in tying construction of racial categories to class. David 
Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness: Race and the Making of the American Working Class 
sets out to describe how and why whiteness became so important to white workers.
  
181 He says 
that he agrees with Toni Morrison that to “ignore white ethnicity is to redouble its hegemony 
by naturalizing it.”182 Roediger makes the claim that class is privileged over race in research 
and policy, and says he would like to contribute to shifting the balance: “the privileging of 
class over race is not always productive or meaningful. To set race within social formations is 
absolutely necessary, but to reduce race to class is damaging.”183 His analysis shows that 
whiteness was used as a way for workers to deal with their own alienation and fear of 
dependency, by gaining the privileges that came along with being white. This was especially 
gratifying for Irish workers whose whiteness was in question.184 Roediger is part of what is 
considered “whiteness studies,” developed in the 1990s, which set out to study the privileges 
and status connected to (male) whiteness, and the developments that led to immigrants 
learning to “become white.”185
Like scholarship on race, Ethnic Studies extends into many scholarly fields. 
Immigration History, as well as Anthropology and Sociology, to mention some examples, are 
full of important works dealing with ethnic groups and ethnic belonging. Although there is 
plenty of scholarship about ethnic groups, there is a long period of scholarly history that 
neglected the multicultural nature of American society, and instead focused on the presumed 
Anglo-American nature of the United States. During this time, scholars were more interested 
in national identity, and in Americanization and assimilation of immigrants, not in their ethnic 
identities as such.
 The framework of these recent race theories is useful for the 
discussion of immigrant and second generation assimilation, because most of the immigrants 
of the last 50 years, and their children, are people “of color.” Overt or covert racism will then 
affect the immigrant family’s chance at social and economic incorporation. 
186 In the 1920s, 30s and 40s we see the emergence of some “Contributions 
History”187
Oscar Handlin’s 1951 study, The Uprooted, marks a change in representations of 
immigrants to America. Though he has met with considerable critique later, the importance of 
his work should not be underestimated. He writes about the peasant societies of Europe being 
uprooted in the New World, and of the tragic loss of these social structures and homeland 
 where the second- and third generation immigrants point out their contributions to 
American society and history. At the same time, the Chicago School of sociologists were 
studying the effect of immigration to the city.  
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identities.188 He argued that Americanization was alienating rather than emancipatory.189 He 
describes the immigrants as unprepared and as passive agents in their move to a new country. 
Rudolph J. Vecoli’s small but significant article “Contadini in Chicago: A Critique of The 
Uprooted,” criticizes the assumption that immigration traumatizes and disorganizes the 
immigrant society, and “fails to respect the unique cultural attributes of the many and varied 
ethnic groups which sent immigrants to the United States.”190 He points to a variety of social 
structures brought from the homeland and retained in the U.S. In addition he shows how 
emigration was a voluntary means to “advance the material and social position of their 
families” and to “acquire capital with which to purchase land, provide dowries for their 
daughters, and assist sons to enter business or the professions.”191 Virginia Yans-
McLaughlin’s Family and Community: Italian Immigrants in Buffalo, 1880-1930 argues 
against Handlin as well. She posits that these Italian families did experience strain and 
conflict, but not disorganization. In fact, the nuclear family pattern proved to be 
“extraordinarily resilient.”192 She wants to turn Handlin’s assumptions around and look at 
why the families stayed together, rather than why they fell apart,193 and says that the “family 
is a flexible organization.”194 In a similar fashion, John Bodnar’s 1970 The Transplanted, 
criticizes earlier assumptions of the helplessness of immigrants. He argues, like Vecoli and 
Yans-McLaughlin, that systems from home can be transplanted.195 This paradigm of the 
immigrant as active agent continues to be relevant today, and ethnicity studies frequently 
speak of the creation of ethnic identities. Conzen et al speak of the invention of ethnicity as a 
process “which incorporates, adapts, and amplifies preexisting communal solidarities, cultural 
attributes, and historical memories.”196
More recent scholarship has focused on reception – in other words - not only how the 
immigrant fashions his or her ethnic identity, but how the American society’s reception plays 
into it as well. This is one of the important points made by segmented assimilation theory – 
that reception is one important determinant in the process of incorporation. The theory speaks 
of three kinds of reception: governmental policy, host society, and the existing coethnic 
community.
 
197
 
 A central argument is that maintenance of ethnicity can be beneficial to 
immigrant families, as it creates networks for support and assistance in the urban immigrant 
enclave. 
1.8 Religion in Studies of Immigration and Ethnicity 
Will Herberg’s Protestant – Catholic – Jew: an Essay in American Religious Sociology 
(1955) stands as a classic in the field of Immigration- and Religious Studies. Herberg’s thesis 
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built upon Ruby Jo Reeves Kennedy’s study of intermarriage in New Haven published in the 
1940s. Kennedy posited that marriage was confined not to national groupings, but to religious 
groupings, hence the term “triple melting pot.”198 Herberg also based his essay upon Marcus 
Lee Hansen’s “The Problem of the Third Generation Immigrant.” Philip Gleason says that 
Herberg, in fact, revitalized Hansen’s ideas,199 transferring them to the realm of religion. 
“Hansen’s Law” as Herberg calls it, is that the grandson remembers what the son wants to 
forget.200 In other words, ethnic behavior is brought back by the third generation, who is 
secure in their position as true Americans. Herberg says that this explains how religion was 
revitalized in a period of increasing secularization. “Every aspect of contemporary religious 
life reflects this paradox - pervasive secularism amid mounting religiosity.”201 Explaining 
how the second generation felt “confused, anxious, and discontented,” and not in touch with 
their parents’ ethnic heritage, they sometimes transferred these feelings of rejection to the 
ethnic church. “To them religion, along with the language of the home, seemed to be part and 
parcel of the immigrant baggage of foreignness they were eager to abandon.”202 The 
American third generation, trying to find out what kind of Americans they were, turned to 
religion.203 In this way religious behavior was revitalized, as well as organizing American 
ethnicity along three religious lines: Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish.204 Herberg’s essay has 
since been criticized for ignoring race and class,205 yet remains an influential work, evidenced 
by the many references to him in academic work about assimilation, immigration and 
religion.206
The legacies of Herberg, Hansen and Kennedy bring us to a review of more 
contemporary literature about immigration, ethnicity and religion. In Speaking of Diversity 
(1989), Philip Gleason says “I was somewhat surprised to discover how little systematic 
attention the interaction of religion and immigration has received.”
 
207 Similarly, writing in 
2009, the editors of Immigration and Religion in America: Comparative and Historical 
Perspectives say that “religion was initially a minor theme in the scholarship on the ‘new,’ 
post-1965 immigration.”208
The United States, as a whole, is a very religious country. Despite – or maybe because 
of - the fact that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights explicitly demand separation of church 
and state, and free exercise of religion, Americans are more religious than citizens of other 
Western countries.
 However a number of scholars have looked more closely at the 
intersection of the two, and have found some common themes that cross ethnic and national 
boundaries. These will be examined in the following. 
209 Portes and Rumbaut reviewed findings from the PEW Global Attitudes 
Project, and found that even though religious attitudes are negatively correlated to national 
 29 
wealth, the United States is an exception among wealthy nations. They say that one reason for 
this is the vitality and importance of immigrant religion.210 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark 
claim that the “most striking trend in the history of religion in America is its growth,”211 with 
a steady rise in religious adherence since 1776.212 They discuss the freedom of religion as a 
marketplace where churches and clergy competed for followers, and where those churches 
that did not make serious demands on their followers did not prosper.213 They say that the 
“received wisdom is that pluralism weakens faith – that where multiple religious groups 
compete, each discredits the other and this encourages the view that religion per se is open to 
question, dispute, and doubt. (…) Historical evidence says otherwise.”214 The variety of 
religious options meant that there was something to fit everyone’s needs, leading to more 
adherents on the whole.215 Finke and Stark say that the lack of regulation meant it was easier 
to start new churches, and to form the church according to ethnically and racially distinctive 
needs.216
It is well known that for immigrants, religious organizations function as a connection 
between the Old Country and their new home. Churches and other houses of worship are a 
meeting place where the immigrant can socialize with others from their home country, and 
sometimes even from the same village or town.
 
217 In times of crisis in the Old Country, 
immigrant religious institutions mobilize and collect money to send home, gather for common 
prayer, lobby in government to allow refugee settlement, or create charitable organizations to 
send money and people overseas.218 The home countries, in turn, effect religious life in 
America by training and sending clergy to staff the ethnic houses of worship,219 sometimes to 
the chagrin of community members who appreciate the more Americanized forms of worship 
that have evolved in America.220 For instance, Cainkar reports that when a new mosque was 
built in Chicago in the 1980s, staffed by an imported imam, women resented the fact that they 
suddenly were required to wear head scarves.221
  Religious institutions provide financial, emotional and practical support for 
immigrants and their families, as well as giving the immigrants a place to belong – a sense of 
identity in America.
 
222 For instance, the Detroit mosque study shows that most mosques offer 
certain social services like food donation, substance abuse programs, prison programs and 
clothing donation; and over 80% provide cash assistance.223 Handlin’s much mentioned The 
Uprooted, claims that religion was the one factor that immigrants could successfully 
transplant, and therefore became important for their stability as a group.224 Marcus Lee 
Hansen said much of the same, pointing to religious morality as an emotional stabilizer in the 
new land.225 For many immigrants, religious practice is also a way to teach children about 
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their heritage, and keep them from becoming “too American.”226 One way to ensure this is 
through religious education. Findings of the Detroit mosque study shows that participants see 
Islamic education as the top priority for their mosques, and this “demonstrates the deep 
concern of Muslims for their children – a concern that their children be raised as Muslims and 
that they avoid the danger of adopting un-Islamic practices.”227
Growth of religion can be connected to conflict and discrimination.
  
228 On the other 
hand, religion is sometimes abandoned by immigrants who meet religious discrimination, and 
think it is best to blend in.229 The editors of Religion and Immigration: Christian, Jewish and 
Muslim Experiences in the United States remind us that the unity of the Catholic church was 
“facilitated precisely because of the anti-Catholicism that has prevailed for much of the 
history of America.”230 The sources used in this thesis suggest that this is true for Muslim 
Arab-Americans as well.231 Cainkar writes that “[k]nowledge of Islam and its institutional 
growth is dialectically related to contestations faced by Muslims. As Islam and Muslims face 
more challenges, Islamic revival grows.”232 However, in the past, when there were less 
Muslims in America, many downplayed or abandoned their religion in the face of pressure to 
Americanize.233
Gleason points out that works dealing with immigration and religion can be 
categorized as either seeing religion in a positive or a negative light. In other words, religion 
can help an immigrant adjust to the host society by offering psychological and practical help, 
or it can promote divisiveness both among the ethnic group, and between the ethnic group and 
the host society.
 
234 These two categories coincide with some of the findings of this thesis as 
well. Religion and religious organizations certainly have aided adjustment for Arabs in 
America, by providing, for instance, financial help and a sense of belonging. At the same 
time, religion has created conflict between Arab religious groups, who at times use their 
religious differences to mark distance or closeness to the American mainstream.235
The Muslim experience is often compared to the history of Jewish immigration and 
assimilation in America.
  
236 The Jewish immigrants faced considerable discrimination when 
trying to adjust in Christian America. Yet, they have succeeded in becoming incorporated, 
and have even been able to re-define America as a Judeo-Christian country.237 The question 
remains whether this development is possible for Muslims in America. Even though Islam is 
the fastest growing religion in America,238 the discrimination and hostility Muslims face make 
the future look grim. The definition of American as Judeo-Christian-Muslim does not look 
likely in the Islamophobic climate of American society today.239 The editors of Immigration 
and Religion in America: Comparative and Historical Perspectives write that “one does well 
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to remember that other ethnic groups have prospered after enduring similar periods of trial. 
(…) [I]t is too early to draw strong conclusions on whether the tensions and suspicions of the 
present will exclude Muslims from the mainstream.”240 Despite commonalities between the 
three major religions, Americans often see Islam as incompatible with American culture, 
while Muslims wonder whether American intervention in the Middle East is actually a war on 
Islam.241
Segmented assimilation theory, at first, neglected the influence of religion on 
assimilation patterns. Warner laments this neglect and says that the early theory was “blind to 
the largely favourable reception of Jewish refugees from the former Soviet Union; the largely 
hostile reception of Muslims, especially in the wake of 9/11; and the advantage enjoyed by 
Christian immigrants (…) in being religiously hosted by preexisting Christian, especially 
Catholic, congregations.”
 
242 The lack of religious data in the CILS was corrected with the 
third wave of the study, which collected data on religious affiliation, contributing the third 
edition of Portes and Rumbaut’s Immigrant America: A Portrait which added a chapter on 
religion.243 What the data shows is that over 80% of the second-generation respondents are 
affiliated with a religion, most of them Catholic. One third are regular church-goers.244 The 
authors created a “Downward Assimilation Index (DAI)” to measure the correlation between 
religion and indicators like incarceration and early parenthood, as well as taking into account 
educational achievement and occupational status.245 What the CILS found is that association 
with an “established religion is strongly and positively associated with higher educational 
achievement and higher occupational prestige, and it is significantly and negatively related to 
incidents of downward assimilation.”246 (The authors make note of the fact that it is not 
always possible to know with certainty the direction of the causal relationship, for example, 
educational success may lead to a reinforcement of religious convictions rather than vice 
versa.)247 These finding are consistent with the findings of Carl L. Bankston III and Min 
Zhou’s study of Vietnamese youth in New Orleans.248 Their research showed that church 
attendance strengthened ethnic identification, which in turn led to better scholastic 
performance and avoidance of destructive behavior.249
 
 The third chapter of this thesis will 
examine these results more closely, and investigate whether the same patterns are true for 
Arab-American Christians and Muslims. 
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CHAPTER 2: Racial- and Ethnic Identities 
This chapter asks how Arab-American racial- and ethnic identity are connected to 
assimilation. Race and ethnicity are separate, yet connected aspects of a person’s identity. 
Arab Americans, for example, are divided about whether they consider themselves to be white 
or not, and about what – if any – ethnic label is to be used to characterize them. Even though 
the term “Arab American” is contested, it is used in this paper, partially for practical reasons 
since it is the only name that encompasses all of this paper’s target group, but also because the 
term is embraced by major institutions and supportive organizations such as the Arab 
Community Center for Economic and Social Services (ACCESS), the Arab American 
National Museum and the Arab American Institute.  
 The first part of the chapter discusses and analyzes Arab-American ethnicity. Among 
the topics discussed are the diversity within this group, the history and historiography of Arab 
America, how foreign policy and geo-political events shape this particular identity, and how 
Arab Americans have gone from being an invisible to a hyper-visible group in multicultural 
America. The second part of the chapter discusses and analyzes Arab-American racial 
identity. It looks at the history of Arab-American racial designations and racialization, the 
debates surrounding current racial categories, the confusions and complexities that come from 
not being comfortable in any existing racial category, and how racial identification is 
connected to discrimination, among other things. The third and final section of the chapter 
analyzes Arab-American race and ethnicity according to segmented assimilation theory. It 
will discuss how racial- and ethnic feelings of identity, and identity markers, affect the 
assimilation trajectory of Arab Americans in the Detroit Metro area. Though this is perhaps 
the most important part of this chapter, it is dealt with last. The reason for this is that there is a 
need to read the information offered in the earlier sections in order to get the full 
understanding of how Arab-American race and ethnicity relate to segmented assimilation. 
 The primary source materials used here are the interviews conducted for this study, the 
Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS), and federal census material.  The subjects of the 
interviews are all second-generation Arab American. However, they are not a statistically 
representative sample, and their experiences cannot be used to universalize for all Arab 
Americans of the second generation. Their commentary is interesting as evidence of the 
diversity within the Arab-American community, as well as proving as examples of more 
universal trends. The DAAS does not distinguish between generational categories. In some 
instances references are made to the differences between native- and foreign born. The native 
born may be second – or third and fourth - generation Arab Americans. The foreign born can 
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be first generation Arab Americans, or what is often called the 1.5 generation (children 
immigrating with parents).250 The report refers to these distinctions only occasionally, and 
since the original data was not made available to this study, this thesis is unable to analyze 
accurately regarding generational categories.  The DAAS sample is 75% foreign born.251 The 
census material used here, similarly, does not cross-reference nativity with the other 
categories of interest. Generational categories are not used. The foreign-born population 
outnumbers the native born population only in Oakland County.  In Wayne County where the 
vast majority of Metro Detroit’s Arab Americans live, 55% are native born. In Macomb 
County the number of native born is even higher, at 63%.252
 
 This means that the DAAS 
sample has a higher percentage foreign born, than what is reflected by the census data. 
Neither the DAAS, nor the census material can give accurate answers to generational 
categories, which are of interest to this analysis. Out of necessity, this material is still used to 
draw careful conclusions about the second generation, who are at least part of the source 
material used in the census and the DAAS. Readers should remain alert to this flaw in the 
analysis, even beyond the places in the text where it is specifically pointed out.  
2.1 Being Arab American 
The American ethnic groupings may present foreign concepts to a newcomer. They may seem 
constructed, impersonal or even oppressive to those that are categorized in this manner. In the 
case of Arab Americans, this is especially true. The pan-ethnic label “Arab American” is 
contested by some of those it is meant to describe, as is even the label “Arab.” Many people 
of Arab heritage prefer national or religious markers instead. Many prefer no label at all. The 
term was coined by the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) as part 
of their larger goal to educate the public on affairs in the Middle East.253 Just like the term 
“Hispanic,” “Arab American” is meant to cover people from a variety of backgrounds, and 
may therefore never be appropriate for all its intended subjects. “Arab American” covers a 
broad spectrum of people from both Asia and Africa, of both Christian and Muslim cultures, 
and a large variety of denominations within those religions. In addition, Arab Americans 
belong to different socioeconomic groups, are first- and second-generation (or even older) 
immigrants, have come as refugees, sojourners and immigrants, and have a variety of 
different physical characteristics. It is a matter of debate within the community (for there does 
seem to be a sense of common community, even if there is disagreement on labels254), 
concerning what name to use for the group. Randa A. Kayyali says that the 2000 census 
“indicated that 85 percent of Arab Americans still identify first by country of origin, although 
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this does not mean that Arab is not a secondary or tertiary identifier, or even the first choice in 
another setting.”255 She continues by saying that in recent years, an “increasingly Islamic 
consciousness rivals for primary identification,”256 and that religious identifiers are also 
common among some Christians, for instance, Chaldeans. Some religious minorities from 
Arab majority countries do not consider themselves Arab at all.257
So what does it mean to be Arab American? Who chooses this identity marker, and 
who does not? The eight people interviewed for this paper are all second generation, and have 
parents from seven different countries. They all used the term Arab about themselves, either 
directly, or more indirectly. Some use the term Arab American, but it is less common.  A 
majority identify a nationality as their main ethnic identity. Sonya specifically chooses to 
identify as Arab American, in order to “promote a unified Arab identity.”
 
258 None of the 
informants identified a religious identity as their primary choice when asked “How would you 
describe your ethnicity?” Of all the informants, the one who used the term Arab the least was 
Frank, who is Christian. The only reference he made to an Arab ethnicity was in saying that 
he was “looked at differently in a mostly non[-]Arab community,”259 which implies his 
“Arabness.” This is consistent with the DAAS’ findings, that Christians are less likely to 
accept the Arab-American label. The DAAS found that among Muslims 85% were 
comfortable with the label Arab American, and 61% of Christians feeling the same. The 
DAAS study team says that “[g]iven the diverse national, religious, and ethnic origins of 
Arabs and Chaldeans, it is hardly surprising that the term ‘Arab American’ would not appeal 
to everyone.”260 Their respondents gave “roughly 100 alternative identity labels.”261 The 2000 
census was accompanied by two special reports: “The Arab Population: 2000” and “We the 
People of Arab Ancestry in the United States.”262 These reports reflect the United States’ 
Arab-American population as a whole, not just Arab Detroit. According to the first report, 
17% identified as Arab or Arabic when asked about their ancestry. This was the second most 
common response, after Lebanese. The number of people who used this ethnic identification 
has increased by 61.6% since the 1990 census.263 The census’ American Community Survey 
of 2006 has Arab as the second most popular response to ancestry in the Arab population. 
These numbers are not easily compared to the findings of the DAAS, since the questions 
posed about Arab identification are different: one asking about a person’s ancestry, and one 
asking specifically whether the informant identifies with the label “Arab American.” Yet, the 
census numbers do reflect and acknowledge a pan-Arab ethnicity in the United States, and its 
relative popularity.  
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What does it mean to have an Arab-American identity? How does this ethnicity play 
out in people’s lives, and how does it make them different from other Americans? All of the 
respondents to interviews for this study said that their ethnic identity was important to them. 
Some referred to the importance of knowing your roots. Joseph responded to the question of 
whether he had ever concealed his ethnicity by saying: “To do so would mean denying my 
father and mother, and the essence physical/psychological being.”264 Frank refers to family 
traditions that reflect his roots: “I married a typical American girl, but it is important for my 
kids to absorb as much [of] my culture as possible…we have beautiful traditions trying to 
keep them alive.”265 Nayla has a broader, more international view of her roots, despite being 
born in the United States: “Yes, my identity is very important to me. It reflects on who I am in 
the world. (…) I live very far from my home country where I really feel like [I] belong.”266 
Janice connects her ethnic identity to knowing the “importance of family,” and to her decision 
to study and travel in the Arab world.267 Also reflecting the importance of roots, is the DAAS 
finding that over 60% of the Arabs and Chaldeans in their study watch “some news broadcasts 
in Arabic.” This is also indicated by the large number of satellite dishes in Arab and Chaldean 
homes, where 63% have them, compared to the 17% of the general population.268
As reflected by watching Arabic news, language is an indicator of ethnicity. Although 
the interview subjects for this study are all second generation, 6 out of 8 speak Arabic. The 
DAAS findings show that among Arabs in Metro Detroit 86% speak a language other than 
English at home, which for 69% means Arabic. At the same time, there are high rates of 
bilingualism with nearly 80% speaking English well or very well.
 However, 
these numbers do not tell us whether the Arab or Chaldeans mentioned are first- or second-
generation. 
269 The American 
Community Survey from 2006-2008 shows that of Arabs in Metro Detroit, 29% speak 
English only, 71% speak a language other than English at home, while 30% speak English 
“less than very well.”270 This indicates that at least 40% speak both languages well. In 
comparing Detroit’s Arabs to Arab Americans nationwide, the DAAS says that “[l]evels of 
English fluency are high in the Detroit area and among Arab Americans elsewhere, but Arabs 
and Chaldeans in the Detroit area are more often bilingual.”271
Socializing and friendships often reflect ethnic identity. Interview subject Ron claims 
that 95% of his socializing takes place in Dearborn with other Lebanese or Palestinian 
Arabs.
 These findings show that the 
Arabic language is important to the Arab-American population, and is a reflection of their 
ethnic belonging, even though English is commonly used in addition.  
272 Other respondents have more heterogeneous friendship circles, though many of 
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them refer to family in the Dearborn area. Nayla, who lives in the ethnically diverse suburb of 
Bloomfield Hills, says that her friends are “Americans” not Arabs.273 Seven of the 
respondents do spend time in Dearborn, though some only go there to shop for ethnic foods. 
Some respondents work in Dearborn, although they live in the suburbs. Janice says that 
working in Dearborn helps her “feel more connected to the Arab community.”274 Few of them 
say that being close to Dearborn has affected their choice of where to live, two of them grew 
up there, but only one respondent actually lives in Dearborn. Nayla likes the cultural 
familiarity of Dearborn: “When I go visit Dearborn, it seems as if I am back in Lebanon or 
Egypt surrounded by other Arabs who value the same [sic] as I do.”275  Suha has a similar 
experience: “sometimes it feels like I am in some Arab city, and not in the United States.”276
 
 
Four interview respondents work primarily with non-Arabs. A few of them were/are 
community activists and in that respect do work with other Arab Americans. Three of the 
respondents work for ACCESS and/or the Arab American National Museum, and naturally 
have Arab-American colleagues. The following section looks more closely at different aspects 
of Arab-American ethnicity, like political identities, pan-ethnic organizations, visibility, and 
discrimination. This is by no means an exhaustive list of ethnic identity markers; rather, it is a 
collection that is deemed relevant for this paper. 
2.2 Arab-American Ethnic History and Historiography 
A label can be a source of power, but also a way of “othering” a person. The creation of the 
“Arab-American” label was a result of a variety of historical and ideological projects. Most 
Arab-American scholars point to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War as a deciding factor. As 
Americans joined in their support of Israel, the “Arab enemy” was in focus. In response to 
this dislike, Arab pan-nationalism grew, both in the U.S. and in the Arab world.277 The 
happenings in the Middle East coincided with the American multicultural revolution of the 
1960s. As many other ethnic groups were joining forces, and fighting for recognition, pride, 
and respect, Arab America followed suit by organizing interest groups. Starting with the 
formation of the Association of Arab American University Graduates (AAUG), many more 
organizations began to use the labels “Arab American,” or “American Arab,” showing group 
solidarity and a collective identity.278  Before this time, individuals and their organizations 
tended to use religious or nationality labels. An example would be the Syrian American 
Association. Between the 1960s and 1980s, important pan-ethnic organizations like the 
National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA), the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (ADC), the Arab American Institute (AAI), and The Arab Community Center for 
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Economic and Social Services (ACCESS) emerged. ACCESS was established in 1972, and is 
considered today to be one of the most influential and important Arab-American 
organizations both in Metro Detroit, and nationally.279 From the beginning, ACCESS had 
“founders and board members from a variety of Arab backgrounds and so enjoyed wide 
acceptance.”280 In 2005, ACCESS opened the nation’s first Arab American National 
Museum. Both the organization and the museum are symbols of pan-ethnic commitment and 
solidarity. The influence of ACCESS is reflected by many of the interview subjects of this 
study, who mention it by name.281 Writing about the history of Arab Detroit, Karen Rignall 
points out how  “[i]n contrast to its predecessors in the Arab-American community that were 
organized along lines of religion or nationality, ACCESS offered non-sectarian social services 
that brought the specific needs of the Arab-American population to the forefront of local and 
regional politics.”282
In addition to becoming part of the American multicultural project of the 1960s and 
70s, the pan-ethnic mobilization among Arab Americans was also a protective action. A 
variety of international conflicts and terrorist actions in the Middle East, some involving the 
United States, highlighted the Arab world as the American enemy. Starting with the Arab-
Israeli War, followed by the 1979 hostage crisis in Teheran, the 1983 car bombings in Beirut, 
the 1985 TWA hijacking in Beirut and Algiers, 1991 Gulf War, the 1993 World Trade Center 
terrorist bombing, and culminating in the 2001 terrorist attacks, Arabs have been cast as 
America’s enemy. Although it is true that some radical Islamic Arab groups have committed 
atrocious acts, Arabs in America have had to take an inordinate amount of the blame. Arab 
Americans have faced discrimination, stereotyping, hate crime and a variety of discriminatory 
governmental programs. Nadine Naber says: “Anti-Arab racism after World War II emerged 
in an interplay of U.S. military, political, and economic expansion in the Middle East, anti-
Arab media representations, and the institutionalization of government policies that 
specifically target Arabs and Arab Americans in the United States.” 
  
283 In the face of such 
negative attention, Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut say that it is not uncommon to 
see the formation of a “reactive ethnicity,” which is “one mode of ethnic identity formation, 
highlighting the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the 
erosion of ethnicity.”284 Nabeel Abraham and Andrew Shryock, writing about the formation 
of an Arab-American identity, say that “[b]ecause Arabs are viewed negatively by most 
Americans, attempts to combat this negative image, with or without reference to the 
geopolitical conflicts that shape it, have become a powerful agenda around which to organize 
an ethnic community.”285  
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While the formation of ethnicity could be seen as a reaction to outside events, the 
institutional and organizational flowering of Arab America also served to locate and highlight 
a community that seemed lost in the mainstream through assimilation. Most scholarship about 
the early waves of Arab Americans points to a largely assimilated population.286 Aswad says 
that “[u]ntil the mid-1960s most Arabs as well as other ethnic groups in America strove to 
assimilate American ways,” for instance by using American names and American clothing.287
In studies of Arab Americans, scholars have commonly written about invisibility.
 
Interestingly, the names of the respondents in this study reflect this trend. Though all of them 
are second generation, they range in age from15 to 68. All the older participants (over 30) 
have “American” names, like Frank, while the younger participants (with one exception) have 
“Arab” names, like Nayla.  
288 
Louise Cainkar writes: “Unlike other ascribed and self-described ‘people of color’ in the 
United States, Arabs are often hidden under the Caucasian label, if not forgotten all 
together.”289 Elia Nada points to a “systematic erasure” from American political discourse and 
representation, from “the discourse of multiculturalism,” and from popular culture.290 These 
and other scholars are referring both to physical invisibility,  through disappearing in white 
suburbs and losing cultural markers and traditions, but also to the ideological invisibility of 
not being a known group in America’s racial and ethnic hierarchies. Interview respondent 
Joseph points out the political aspect of this invisibility. He co-founded and chaired the Arab-
American Voter-Registration and Education Committee, in the 1980s, and says that the “work 
of AAVEREC was specific to politicizing the Arab-American community, which had no 
voice in American politics.”291
Following 9/11, this new visibility turned into hyper-visibility, when Arab America 
suddenly was the center of a lot of negative attention, both by government, the public and the 
media. The government enacted laws allowing surveillance, profiling, detainment and the 
deportation of Arab Americans. The public was scared, and Arab Americans (along with other 
individuals perceived to be Muslim or Arab) became the target of violence, hate mail and 
discrimination. The media played into the public fears by reporting on supposed terrorist 
connections. In the end, the government’s hunt for terrorists turned out to be fruitless. Very 
few of the detainees were proven to have any connection to the 9/11 attacks.
  
292 Unfortunately 
the damage done to the Arab-American community was more long-lasting, both in distrust of 
Arab Americans by the American public, and by Arab-American distrust of the government. 
In the DAAS, even though nearly half of Arabs and Chaldeans are willing to give up “some 
civil liberties to curb terrorism,”293 when these infringements are directed specifically at Arab 
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and Muslim Americans, the support goes down dramatically, to 8 -17% depending on the 
issue at stake.294 This shows that Arab Americans in the DAAS sample do not have complete 
confidence in government fairness. At the same time, “Arabs and Chaldeans express more 
confidence in local and government institutions [such as schools, police and legal system], 
than does the general population.”295 86% have confidence in local police, which is higher 
than the general population. 66% have confidence in the legal system. “The confidence of 
Arabs and Chaldeans falters only on the question of fair trials for Arabs and Muslims accused 
of terrorism.” 50% believe that they can receive a fair trial, against 66% of general 
population.296
Moustafa Bayoumi claims that Arab and Muslim Americans are “the new ‘problem,’” 
emerging after 9/11, while before they were “virtually unknown.
 
297 When asked about the 
impact of 9/11 on his community, Ron replies: “From some of our highest elected officials in 
the country to our neighbors living on the same street people look at Arabs, no matter what 
generation they are, as ‘The Enemy.’  Presidential candidate [John McCain] ‘defended’ 
candidate Barack Obama from an accusation that he was an Arab by saying, ‘No Mam [sic], 
he is a decent family man.’”298 Seven of the respondents referred to some negative effects that 
9/11 had on their community, while the eighth respondent said that 9/11 simply reinforced old 
stereotypes.299 Nidal makes reference to the media’s portrayal of Arabs and Muslims and 
blames it for his experiences of discrimination. He says: “people rarely think outside the box; 
they rarely think objectively because they are exposed to a media that is ridiculously one 
sided and close minded.”300 Joseph says that “[j]ust after the Arab oil embargo and after 9-11 
our organized activist groups and individuals, myself included, received considerable hate 
mail, and death threats that were turned over to the FBI.”301 The DAAS reports that the 
community feels the need to “fight stereotypes and foster a more equitable, less hostile 
environment for Arabs in America.” 16% believes the way to that goal is through “better 
representation in the media and government.”302
 Due to the “hyper-visibility,” many Arab Americans have been the target of 
discrimination and violence after 9/11. According to the DAAS sample, 15% of Arabs and 
Chaldeans report having “a bad experience” due to their ethnicity after 9/11. “These 
experiences included verbal insults, workplace discrimination, targeting by law enforcement 
 In other words, the hope is that through more 
Arab-American representation, the visibility will be of a more positive character. Of the 
DAAS sample, 50% believe the news is biased against Islam and Muslims. (41% of the 
general population agrees.) 38% believe they see bias against Arabs and Chaldeans in the 
media. (35% of the general population agrees.)  
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or airport security, vandalism, and, in rare cases, vehicular and physical assault.”303 Of these 
people, Muslims and non-citizens are more likely to be targets. Only 2-4 % of Arabs and 
Chaldeans report “that their ethnicity, race, or religion resulted in a loss of employment, 
vandalism, or physical attack,”304 but about half of the population reports feeling less 
secure.305 The Arab American Institute has compiled the following reports showing how 9/11 
has impacted the Arab-American community: “Profiling and Pride: Arab American Attitudes 
and Behavior Since 9/11,” and “Report on Hate Crimes and Discrimination Against Arab 
Americans: The Post September 11 Backlash.” The findings of these reports show that in “the 
first nine weeks following the September 11 attacks, (…) over 700 violent incidents directed 
at Arab Americans, or those perceived to be Arab Americans” occurred.306 One in five 
reported experiencing discrimination after 9/11.307
Being the focus of negative attention has led some Arab Americans to conceal their 
ethnicity. Although all the respondents expressed pride in their ethnicity, half of them 
admitted concealing it in some situations. Ron says: “I have never concealed my ethnicity, but 
as of late when I travel to Canada I take the Quran or mashala (Rosary beads) down from my 
rear view mirror [in order to avoid] automobile searches, body searches, lengthy questioning, 
etc.” Both Janice and Sonya mention that in childhood they avoided explaining their ethnic 
background to people, because they found it difficult to explain what and where Palestine 
was.
  
308 Suha, who is Sudanese-American, has a different experience. When asked whether 
she has ever concealed her ethnicity she says: “It is very rare that I let people know that I am 
Sudanese, most often I refer to myself as Black. Proclaiming my ethnicity to people tends to 
bring a lot of confused looks, and questions about the civil/political situation in Western and 
Southern Sudan.(…) I cannot hide my ethnicity because I look different from others. 
However, if there is no need to announce my place of origin I don’t.”309
Visibility has led to a sort of defensive ethnicity for Arab-American individuals who 
feel the need to constantly prove themselves as “good” or as true Americans. Ron explains the 
effect of 9/11 on his identity: “I feel much more of a moral responsibility to act very properly, 
and engage my fellow citizens whenever possible to explain what being an Arab is and how 
Islam is being unfairly denigrated.”
  
310 Andrew Shryock says that in order for Arabs or 
Muslims to be fully accepted as Americans, they must denounce and distance themselves 
from “bad Arabs/bad Islam,” and cultivate “good Arab/Muslim” identities.311 Joseph explains 
how he has felt the “need of educating the outside community of the qualities and 
contributions of our community and the Arab world to the general world population. I have 
made a number of presentations in high schools and before various organizations about those 
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contributions.”312 Shryock and Howell describe the situation well in saying that “in the 
aftermath of 9/11, Arab and Muslim Americans have been compelled, time and again, to 
apologize for acts they did not commit, to condemn acts they never condoned and to openly 
profess loyalties that, for most U.S. citizens, are merely assumed.”313
Historically, some individuals have shown loyalty by joining U.S. war efforts, 
something that may be especially problematic when the United States is waging war in Arab 
countries. Orm Øverland points to “blood sacrifice” as one way immigrants have historically 
proven themselves as Americans.
  
314 He says that “immigrant leaders saw an obligation to 
make loyalty and sacrifice of immigrants visible and in doing so to promote the view of 
immigrants as Americans, not foreigners.”315 Øverland points out that by doing this, the 
ethnic community is not trying to glorify their contribution, as much as “knocking on the door 
of a home that will not accept you as a full member of the family,” and is therefore more of a 
“response to being closed out than it is a glorification of ethnic excellence.”316 The 
Association of Patriotic Arab Americans in Military is an organization with similar motives. It 
lists 3,500 Arab Americans currently serving in U.S. Armed Forces. The organization was 
created after 9/11 and lists as one of its objectives to “[e]ducate our fellow American and 
Arab communities of our proudness to our ancestral heritage, coupled by our patriotism and 
burning dedication to our country, by emphasizing our service and sacrifice as military 
service men and women in the United States Armed Forces, and [t]o ultimately close the gap 
that lies between bigotry, ignorance and prejudice on one end, and tolerance on the other.”317 
Ron, who is a member of this organization, did not join the military to prove his loyalty or 
patriotism, he was drafted. He says: “I am very proud of my service to my country, but I [was] 
absolutely opposed to the war in Vietnam.  Many that were more courageous than I refused to 
go and went to jail.”318 Ron continued to serve his country by becoming a police officer. “My 
career as a police officer had nothing to do with displaying my patriotism either. (…) But 
[m]y community holds me in high esteem because I was a police officer.”319 Joseph who 
joined the military voluntarily does not claim patriotism or loyalty as a reason either. Yet, he 
does point out that “[a]s an Arab American, I always believed it was important to project a 
positive image to overcome the scrutiny and criticism that was/is typically associated with 
being a Arab/Muslim.”320 To this end, “[s]ome fifteen years ago I organized an Arab-
American military veterans presence in the city's annual Memorial Day parade to project the 
military sacrifices that Arab-Americans have made in the service of America.” Though some 
Arab Americans undoubtedly have served their country through military service, the number 
of Arab-American veterans is lower than the general population of Metro Detroit. The ACS 
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from 2006-2008 shows nine percent as being civilian veterans in the population as a whole, 
while Arab Americans in the same area have two percent. It is hard to say exactly what causes 
this difference, but it is not hard to imagine the difficulties for Arab Americans in joining an 
army that is engaged in war in the Middle East. In order to honor those who did join, in 
addition to others that have served their country in other ways, the Arab American National 
Museum is currently compiling artefacts for a new exhibit that will be called: “Patriots and 
Peacemakers: Arab Americans in Service to our Country.”321
In the same way as Arab Americans themselves, Arab Detroit as a whole and Arab-
American organizations must prove themselves to be loyal to America. Shryock claims that 
“domestic recognition as ‘good Arabs’ is granted in exchange for acquiescence in matters of 
U.S. foreign policy.”
 
322 After the attacks of 9/11, mosques, imams, and Arab-American 
organizations publicly condemned the terrorists. The mosques encouraged their congregation 
to give money following the attacks.323 In fact, law enforcement in Dearborn was especially 
helpful in the months following 9/11, aiding the FBI in their hunt for terrorists. Shryock says 
that “Dearborn is touted nationally as a model for community cooperation in the war on 
terror.”324
While neither invisibility nor negatively charged hyper-visibility are desirable goals, 
post-9/11 visibility has had some positive outcomes. Following the attacks, the American 
public became hungry for knowledge about this population group they knew little about, and 
sought information from books, classes and public figures
 
325. Kayyali reports that though 
some “Arab Americans have reacted to the post-9/11 atmosphere in the United States by 
distancing themselves from their heritage, most Arab Americans have felt a larger 
responsibility to educate others about their community and about the Arab world.” 326 Ron 
explains how 9/11 has affected Arab Americans, but also his own ethnic self-identification: 
“9/11 also aroused interest in Islam and Arabs. (…) What is an Arab?  What is Islam?  These 
and other related questions were being asked constantly of me in my capacity as a community 
leader/spokesperson.  Journalists from around the world asked to interview me and others like 
me. It causes me to do research to answer some of the stickier questions.  Along the route of 
finding answers to these questions I learned more about myself.”327 When asked the question 
“Do you think that 9/11 has affected the way you see your own identity?” most respondents 
answered no. Nayla explains that “I was still proud to say I was Arab and I came from the 
Middle East, a place not many people came from in my area. At the mere age of 5 years old I 
witnessed the news and the gossip of my own people. Instead of thinking ‘Arabs are bad’ I 
thought we are all different and you can’t judge us based on others actions.”328 Nidal has a 
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similar view, he says: “People are People, bad or good.”329 The AAI reports show that 88% of 
Arab Americans have “more” or “the same amount” of pride in their ethnicity following 
9/11.330
Another form of visibility is a new “politics of inclusion,” a conscious attempt to 
include Arab Americans.
 
331 Examples of this new inclusion are elections and appointments of 
Arab Americans to political office, creation of University programs to study Arab Americans 
and Islam, and the creation of the first Arab American National Museum. The AAI reports 
that several ethnic organizations, for instance The Korean American Coalition, lent their 
support.332 The media did a part as well. The Detroit Free Press issued “100 Questions and 
Answers about Arab Americans: A Journalists Guide.”333 The Ad Council created a series of 
television and radio spots and print public service announcements about hate violence against 
Arab and Muslims. Starz Encore Group (a cable and satellite movie provider) ran public 
service announcements that reached 64 million households.334 Many Arab Americans report 
positive outreach from people outside their community. In the DAAS, one third say they 
“received gestures of support from non-Arabs after the attacks.”335 The AAI lists many 
individual actions done by non-Arabs to show support, such as donating money for victims of 
hate crimes, candlelight vigils outside mosques, free legal assistance and solidarity 
websites.336
Though a pan-ethnic label was created, it has not had the same course through 
American history as many other pan-ethnic labels have. By being a relatively small and well-
assimilated group, Arab Americans may well have remained in the shadows of ethnic 
America, were it not for major geo-political events, as mentioned above. These events 
brought Arab America into the spotlight, and many Arab Americans and Arab-American 
scholars claim that these events (and American foreign policy connected to them) are the 
main reason Arab Americans are discriminated against.
 As a result of all these developments, the “Arab American” is no longer an 
invisible figure.  
337 Wayne Baker and Shryock say that 
“Arabs are set apart from other hyphenated American populations by aspects of U.S. foreign 
policy that drive a sharp ideological wedge between Arab and American identities.”338 Some 
scholars go even further and say that anti-Arab images and discriminatory government 
programs are purposely meant to “intimidate, harass, and discourage Arab American 
resistance to U.S. policies in the Arab world,” and to “quell criticism of Israeli state policy by 
demonizing its critics.”339 340
American foreign policy and international crises can affect American identities, as 
some of the interviewees explain. Suha, points out how the situation in her parents’ home 
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country affects her sense of identity in America: “whenever a discussion about Arabs [in] 
Africa[] or African nations and Sudan is brought up I am instantly looked at as the expert. 
Although more often than not, my knowledge of these countries and their social/political 
status is the same as the people who consider me to be an ‘expert’. (…) Most questions 
directed towards me are from the angle of ‘how can you allow such atrocities to occur.’ When 
more likely than not I really can do nothing about these situations.”341 Though the informants 
do not tie foreign policy to discrimination, there is definite interest in American foreign 
policy, and in the politics and warfare in the Middle East. Joseph, talking about the troubles of 
Yemeni youth, blaming a change in American values: “America has lost its sense of priorities, 
and what should be important.  We seem to be good at making weapons and war, and not 
much else. And I honestly believe that the violent nature of our society is tied to the 
expansionist policies projected by our government using the military. Diplomacy is [a] word 
that's absent from the American lexicon.”342  The DAAS shows that “Arabs and Chaldeans 
and the general population are equally attentive, and anxious, about events in Iraq,”343 with 
about seventy percent paying attention. However, there is not always agreement between 
Arab Americans and the general population on the specific issues. 53% of general population 
believes the U.S.’ involvement in the Middle East is bringing stability to the region. 36% of 
Arabs and Chaldeans agree. One major area of difference is the creation of a Palestinian state. 
The DAAS shows 70% support among Arab and Chaldean Americans, with only 3% 
opposing it. “Among Arab and Chaldeans, there is overwhelming, across-the-board support 
for the creation of a Palestinian state. In no single sub-group does resistance rise above 4 
percent.” 344 In the general population only 8% oppose a “two-state solution,” while over 50% 
have not given it much thought.345 Two of the informants to this study mention support of a 
Palestinian state.346 Ron explains that his support is political, not religious by saying: “We 
boycott those businesses that support Israel in its war against Islam.  We do not boycott 
Jewish owned businesses because they are Jewish owned.”347 Joseph, explains that his 
“prayers are confined to asking for justice in Palestine for the Palestinian people, and a 
redressing of the wrongs perpetuated by Israel in Palestine and Lebanon.”348
Increased visibility is tied to benefits like inclusion in minority programs, and 
increased political power. This is the reason why many Arab Americans feel that embracing 
pan-ethnicity is beneficial for their community, even though the pan-ethnic label is not 
embraced by all. In the following section we will look at how Arab Americans view their 
racial identity, and how this is tied to many of the same complexities as questions about ethnic 
identity. 
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2.3 Arab-American Racial History and Historiography 
Although racial markers are socially, and not scientifically, constructed, many ethnic groups 
have a history of struggle connected to their move from one racial designation to another. As 
discussed in the introduction of this paper, scholars have written about the “whitening” of 
various ethnic groups, such as the Irish and the Jews. This section investigates Arab-American 
racial history and historiography. Arab Americans began their story in America as “white by 
default.” This was followed by years of court battles to keep their white designation. At the 
dawn of the new millennium, many Arab Americans wish to be recognized as something 
other than white.  
In the beginning of Arab immigration history, the immigrants from the Arab world 
were so few, and lived so dispersed, that they avoided negative attention and enjoyed the 
privileges of “whiteness.” This changed when the 1910 census began to count Syrians and 
Palestinians as “Asiatics,” and thereby excluded them from citizenship and other “white” 
privileges.349  From this time and until the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, Arab 
Americans (like many other “borderline whites”) used the court system to fight for status as 
“white” in America. In fact, according to Sarah M.A. Gualtieri, who has written extensively 
on the subject, they were disproportionately represented in “racial prerequisite” cases.350 The 
courts have at various times allowed for or denied white status, often depending on the 
ideology of the time. Decisions have been based on what was considered to be scientific 
evidence, on physical appearance, on religion, on perceived assimilability and democratic 
mind, on differing definitions of “Caucasian” and on so-called “common knowledge.”351 Ian 
F. Haney-Lopez says that “the Supreme Court abandoned scientific explanations of race in 
favor of those rooted in common knowledge when science failed to reinforce popular beliefs 
about racial differences.”352 Though he is referring other national groups’ court battles, the 
same can be said for Arab-American court cases. Kayyali points out that Syrians were found 
to be white in some years, but not others, because “[i]n the 1913 and 1914 cases, common-
knowledge arguments swayed the courts’ decisions in rulings that Syrians were not white.”353 
Similarly, Gualtieri says that “[w]hen scientific and common-knowledge rationales reinforced 
each other the courts embraced them, but when they differed the courts jettisoned science in 
favor of common knowledge.”354 One of the most effective arguments Arabs used to their 
advantage was their common Christianity with whites, and its origin in the Middle Eastern 
region.355 One Arab who pleaded for citizenship is quoted saying “If I am a Mongolian, then 
so was Jesus, because we came from the same land.”356 Another common way to argue their 
case for inclusion as citizens was to distance themselves from other groups that were seen as 
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undesirable, for example, from Mongolians or Muslims. The arguments were often based on 
what was then considered scientific evidence, a racial indexing of all peoples, which placed 
Arabs/Syrians as “Semitic,” who in turn were Caucasians.  
By 1924, Syrians were officially categorized as white, but the battle for Arab 
“whiteness” resurfaced in court in 1942. This time it was a Muslim Yemeni who lost the right 
to naturalize based on his skin being “undisputedly dark brown in color,” among other factors. 
However, following this decision the “immigration authorities issued a statement that a person 
of ‘the Arabian race’ was eligible for naturalization” in 1944.357 The 1952 Immigration and 
Naturalization Act “affected a policy of color-blind naturalization (…) [and] negated any 
further need for racial prerequisite cases.”358 Arabs continued to be counted as white. 
Gualtieri argues that “questions about race were central to the construction of Syrian ethnicity 
in the United States in the first half of the century, [and how they] came to view themselves in 
racial terms and position themselves within racial hierarchies.” Thus Arabs are placed “at the 
center of discussions of race and racial formation, from which they have for too long been 
marginalized or ignored.”359
 Achieving a status as white had clear benefits, as Arab Americans could be granted 
citizenship. However, there can also be consequences to not being seen as a distinct group in 
America’s racial system. The United States’ racial organization is an ever-changing, 
politically and socially constructed system. There is no all-encompassing classification system 
that all can agree on, nor should there be, perhaps.  Michael Omi and Howard Winant point 
out that “race in the U.S. is concurrently an obvious and complex phenomenon. Everyone 
‘knows’ what race is, though everyone has a different opinion as to how many racial groups 
there are, what they are called, and who belongs in what specific racial categories.”
 
360 
Similarly, Peggy Pascoe says that “although most Americans are sure they know ‘race’ when 
they see it, very few can offer a definition of the term.”361
 At the same time, the government needs a guiding framework. To this end, the 
Office of Management and Budget has provided Statistical Policy Directive No. 15. Directive 
15 “provide[s] a common language to promote uniformity and comparability for data on race 
and ethnicity” in order to “enforce civil rights laws,” for use in the decennial census, but also 
for surveys, administration forms and research.
  
362 Within this framework, Arab Americans 
are considered white, thus excluded from a variety of statistics and benefits awarded minority 
races. On a more local level, or in certain situations, Arab Americans do have minority status. 
Kayyali says that “[i]n the business environment, Arab Americans are officially considered as 
minorities (…) in a few isolated cases.”363 The Michigan Office of Minority Health identifies 
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“Arab” as one of five “populations of color” that they serve.364 Rosina J. Hassoun says that 
“Michigan is one of the few states that has officially recognized Arab Americans as an ethnic 
and underserved population,”365 and Shryock says that the Michigan state government has 
given Arabs “[d]esignation as a ‘special population.’”366 However, according to the Arab 
American Specialist at the Michigan Department of Civil Rights, Arab Americans are “not 
classified as a minority at all” though there is a federal health survey conducted in Michigan 
“to recognize health disparities among Arabs and Chaldeans to separate them from the 
mainstream Whites.”367 Professor Ronald Stockton agrees, saying “Arab American[s] are not 
a legally protected minority under Affirmative Action law.  In fact, people from the Middle 
East are specifically prohibited from being included in the law as written (when I checked it 
some time ago).  Politically and in other ways, Arab Americans are commonly identified as a 
‘minority’ but that is not a legal designation.”368 In an article for the U.S. Department of 
Commerce’s Minority Business Development Agency, Detroit’s Arab-American and 
Chaldean population pleads their case: “The Arab American and Chaldean communities have 
been productive contributors to our society. Yet still they have the same barriers [language 
and culture] commonplace to other minority groups that have been granted such status. (…) It 
is important to identify the barriers this community is facing and to implement remedies that 
will ensure continued progress in business development.”369
 This dilemma is not unique to Arab Americans, many white “ethnics” have faced a 
similar challenge: gaining access to affirmative action programs on the basis of discrimination 
faced by society. However, the exclusion from affirmative action programs is not the sole 
reason Arab Americans are fighting for a new racial designation. There are practical reasons 
for it too. Since the U.S. Census (and other government statistics and research) bases itself on 
Directive 15’s racial categories, Arab Americans are not distinct in these statistics. In the 
census, Arab Americans have been classified in a variety of ways. They have been wrongfully 
labeled as “Turks” or “Ottoman,” and at times they have simply been called “Asian.” This has 
led to a problem of counting the Arab-American population. Abraham and Shryock point out 
that “[t]he U.S. Census determines how government funds will be distributed. The 
controversy over the size of Arab Detroit is, at heart, a struggle over money: who gets it and 
how much.”
  
370 The census itself expands on that, explaining how the race data is used: “Race 
is key to implementing many federal laws and is needed to monitor compliance with the 
Voting Rights Act and the Civil Rights Act. State governments use the data to determine 
congressional, state and local voting districts. Race data are also used to assess fairness of 
employment practices, to monitor racial disparities in characteristics such as health and 
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education and to plan and obtain funds for public services.”371  After the 1980 census was 
conducted, Arab-American advocates, along with other ethnic advocates began to argue the 
need for a category on ancestry or ethnic origin.372 Following the 1990 census, “AAI [the 
Arab American Institute] testified that current federal definitions (…) were inadequate at best 
and confusing to the growing number of immigrants from that region.” They “proposed an 
ethnic category that would, like Hispanic Origin, complement race data.”373 This was not 
successful, but they were able to, with the help of other ethnic advocates, save the ancestry 
category from being dropped. The 2000 census included this category of ancestry, which 
allowed for a count of those who claimed an Arab (or other Middle Eastern national) 
background, but the 2010 census has removed this option, leaving it now to the American 
Community Survey.374
 In order to gain access to the benefits of being counted in the census, various Arab-
American interest groups (for instance the AAI) have conducted campaigns, in cooperation 
with the census, to get Arab Americans to fill out the census forms, ahead of the last 3 census 
counts.
 Along with the ancestry question, the census of 2000 allowed for 
respondents to choose “other race,” and some Arab Americans used this as their opportunity 
to gain visibility. However if their ancestry was traceable as Arab, these respondents were re-
coded as “white,” meaning that in the census they are once again invisible.  
375 Immigrant groups often qualify as “Hard to Count” in census terms. This means 
that they are less proficient in the language, and have often left countries where government is 
not a source to be trusted.376 Arab Americans are especially skeptical to government 
investigations of their private lives, due to profiling and other negative attention after 9/11.377 
The fact that there is no race category that fits properly for Arab Americans has, according to 
Helen Hatab Samhan in her testimony to the House Subcommittee on Information, Policy, 
Census, and National Archives, caused “confusion, alienation, and even anger” within 
segments of the Arab heritage group.378 Samhan explains that “Given this context, and the 
fact that ancestry data is no longer collected in the decennial census operation, activists and 
advocates have the dilemma of encouraging participation in a survey which does not appear to 
recognize who Arab Americans are.”379 One solution used by some Arab-American interest 
groups is to urge that Arab Americans write in “Arab American” as their race. One campaign 
calls it “Check it right – You ain’t white.”380 According to Abed Ayoub of the American Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Committee, unfortunately, the same pattern as the 2000 census will 
apply: identified Arab identities will be re-coded as white.381 Ayoub points out another reason 
why counting is important: “hate crimes against Arab-Americans post-9/11 has drastically 
increased. And the FBI is not keeping statistics on these hate crimes. And we're being told 
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they don't keep statistics because of the fact census does not keep count of Arab-Americans. 
So, we got no way of telling how many hate crimes have been committed against Arab-
Americans.”382
We will now turn to how race is recorded and perceived by the census, the DAAS, and 
by respondents to this study. The Census 2000 has eighty percent of Arabs nationwide 
reporting race as “white and no other race.” Less than twenty percent report two or more 
races, only 1.1% report black and one percent chose “some other race.”
 
383 In the DAAS, 
which is limited to the Detroit Metropolitan area, 64% call themselves white, while 31% 
prefer “Other.” In the Dearborn area identification as “Other” rises to 45%, elsewhere it is 
lower, at 25%. Christians are much more likely to identify as white (73%), as are the 
American born, and citizens.384 The DAAS states that “[t]he preference for ‘white’ or ‘other’ 
is nearly exclusive. Only 4 percent (…) call themselves ‘Asian,’ and only two individuals (…) 
say they are ‘black.’”385 When the respondents were asked to suggest what kind of other race 
they belong to, the majority chose “Arab.”386 What these numbers tell us is that identification 
as white is more likely among Arab Americans generally, than it is to Arab Detroiters 
specifically. However, we must keep in mind that people may choose to respond differently to 
questions asked for a census, than for a local research project. Arab Americans are aware that 
they are “supposed” to choose the “white” box,387
  The findings of this study reflect the perceived racial diversity of Arab Americans. 
None of the study participants answered “white” when asked: “Do you consider yourself to be 
of a particular race?” Suha is one of those few that identify as “black,” though she says that 
she chooses “Arab” if it is available.  Being Sudanese-American might explain her choice of 
racial classification. None of the other informants to this study opted for “black” 
classification. More commonly the preference is for “other,” though not everyone finds this to 
be a comfortable option. Suha explains: “I used to check the ‘other’ box, until I realized that 
the term other is probably doing more harm than good.”
 and perhaps this influences their choices. 
What is consistent in both the census and the DAAS is that very few Arab Americans identify 
as “black” or as “Asian.” 
388 Joseph is the only participant who 
chooses white on official forms, although he says: “by default.”389 A few participants reject 
the idea of racial classification all together.390 For instance, Sonya says that she thinks “race is 
a vague and archaic way to identify someone.”391 Ron, on the other hand, feels that he does 
belong to a particular race: “I consider myself as a member of the Semitic race known as 
Arab.”392  Many of the participants lament the lack of accurate labelling on official forms, 
preferring to write in Arab whenever possible. When asked about racial self-identification 
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rather than on official forms, there are also a variety of answers, but most often the choice is 
Arab or Arab American. Janice is unique in saying that she is “technically Asian,” though she 
does not identify with that category.393 Frank prefers a national label: Palestinian.394 Thus – in 
quoting Helen Samhan again – “confusion, alienation, or even anger”395
The final aspect of Arab-American racial identity that will be explored here, after 
having looked at official designations and problems of counting, is questions of personal 
identity and belonging. The reality felt by many Arab Americans is that though they are 
officially classified as white, the white majority does not see them as white, nor are they 
treated the same as the white majority.
 seem to all be present 
in the participants to this study. 
396 As pointed out above, it can be confusing and 
problematic not to have a racial category to belong to. Cainkar calls it “the double burden of 
being excluded from whiteness and from mainstream recognition as people of color.”397 
Kayyali points to larger ramifications of the Arab-American “racial dilemma”: “Inclusion in 
the generic ‘white’ racial category blurs Arab American ethnic identity and distinctiveness. It 
diminishes opportunities for community outreach and the right to participate in multicultural 
structures and the racialized discourses of ethnic studies and scholarship.”398 One way to see 
Arab-American exclusion from “whiteness” is in the public’s reaction to terrorist actions. 
Cainkar points out how the actions of Timothy McVeigh (the Oklahoma City bomber), or 
members of the IRA are seen as “extremists whose actions do not reflect on an entire race, 
religion, or civilization,”399 while after 9/11, Arab and Muslim Americans were singled out 
for “collective responsibility”400
There is general agreement today, that race is a social, not biological construct. A 
larger discussion of the history of racial scholarship was covered in the introduction. Here it 
will suffice to point out that though race is a social creation, it is still a very real part of 
American life, and therefore it is something a new immigrant will have to contend with.  
 with broad public support of special treatment of this group. 
Arab-American scholars writing about race is a relatively new phenomenon. Earlier studies 
have used the “language of ethnicity” or focused largely on religion.401 Gualtieri locates early 
scholarship on Arab Americans within what she calls “the celebratory tradition of 
immigration studies, a tradition that focused on the ability of an ethnic group to maintain a 
distinctive culture while assimilating into a mainstream American core.”402 She continues by 
saying that this “emphasis on assimilation, however, led frequently to an uncritical acceptance 
of whiteness within Arab American studies, [and] avoided discussing the implications of 
claiming whiteness.”403 Naber says that “[a]pproaches to Arab American studies that refer to 
Arab Americans as an ‘ethnic/cultural’ group while ignoring the realities of anti-Arab racism 
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and the structural inequalities that shape Arab American experiences illustrate the limitations 
of ethnicity theory.”404 At the same time, Arab Americans were hardly ever mentioned in the 
emerging field of race studies that dealt with not only black and white, but also Asian, Native 
American and Latin racial discourse.405 Only in the 1990s do we see a growing number of 
scholars write about Arab Americans and race. Some important work has been done in this 
field not only by Gualtieri, but also Kristine J. Ajrouch, Helen Samhan, Nada Elia, Amaney 
Jamal, Louise Cainkar, Andrew Shryock, and Nadine Naber. A recent edited volume deals 
with this explicitly, Race and Arab Americans Before and After 9/11: From Invisible Citizens 
to Visible Subjects. (eds. Amaney Jamal and Nadine Naber). Here they “highlight[] the 
heterogeneity of Arab American histories and the shifting and contradictory historical 
contexts through which Arab Americans have engaged with immigration, assimilation, and 
racialization.” Racialization is the term often used in much of this literature, and it is most 
frequently connected to American foreign policy, and the creation of “the Arab” as enemy to 
the nation.406 “Racialization” can be defined as the process of creating a race, or of seeing 
someone or something in racial contexts.407 In other words, Arab Americans used to be seen 
as an ethnic group, or as a variety of national and/or religious groups. In recent years, 
however, their experience points more towards a racial designation of the group as a whole. 
This plays out both in how they feel about their own experiences, but also in how the 
American public views them. Cainkar, arguing that Arabs are now considered a race, says that 
“the social exclusion of Arabs in the United States has been a racial project because Arab 
inferiority has been constructed and sold to the American public using essentialist 
constructions of human difference.”408 She points to the Clash of Civilizations view, and says 
that the “seemingly race-neutral lens of essentialized cultural and religious differences was 
evoked after blatant racism had lost its power as an effective hegemonic tool.(…) 
Nonetheless, all the components of a racial project were there: the assertion of innate 
characteristics held by all members of a group.”409 Like many other scholars writing about 
Arab-American race, she ties this recent racialization to America’s involvement in 
geopolitical events in the Middle East.410
Anti-Arab racism is surprisingly obvious in the form of representations in the media. 
These can be seen as stereotypes in films and tv-shows, but also in the way Arabs are 
portrayed in mainstream news coverage. Stereotypes of Arabs include: backwards or 
uneducated immigrants, Muslim fundamentalists or terrorists, violent and barbaric, sexual 
perverts (in the case of men), rich sheiks (who want to buy American women), or victimized, 
subservient sexual objects (in the case of women). 
  
411 Scholars have pointed out the 
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pervasiveness of these stereotypes in American culture and media, and commented on how it 
seems that people find it more legitimate than other racial/ethnic stereotyping.412 Jack 
Shaheen, who has researched and written extensively on the topic, points out that though 
racist lingo is no longer tolerated towards Asians, Blacks, Italians, Irishmen, Jews, Indians, or 
Hispanics, one group is still fair game: the Arabs.413 “[I]mage makers are now giving children 
of other ethnic origins positive role models to identify with (…), just about every racial and 
ethnic group on the planet, except the Arabs.”414 Laurence Michalak suggests that some of the 
reasons for this may be lack of representation in corporate and administrative worlds, small 
numbers/invisibility, and lack of knowledge about Arabs among the American public.415 
Michalak’s article is from 1988. Since then we have experienced an increase in geopolitical 
conflicts involving the U.S. and the Middle East. As argued before, the Arab American is no 
longer invisible. Yet the stereotypes persist, and have perhaps gotten more violent in 
character. 9/11 is not commonly seen as the starting point of anti-Arab racism, it is more of a 
turning point, with “representations of ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamic fundamentalism’ (…) 
increasingly replac[ing] other representations (i.e., the rich Arab oil sheikh and belly-dancing 
harem girls).”416 Interview respondents say the same thing.417 For instance, Suha says that 
9/11 did not change the way Arabs are seen in America, “it just reinforced the old ideas. Prior 
to 9/11 ster[e]otypes of Arabs were that we Arabs are womanizing, violent, religious fanatics, 
and ignorant FOBs [Fresh off the boat]. These stereotypes still exist.”418
 The informants had a variety of explanations for discrimination they had experienced. 
Some quoted religion as the source of discrimination/racism. This will be looked at more 
closely in the next chapter. Suha ties her discrimination to her national ancestry rather than 
her phenotype. She says that proclaiming her Sudanese background can result in “treatment 
that is less than nice,” while she cannot hide her ethnicity because she “look[s] different than 
others.”
  
419 Frank says that his ethnicity led to him being “[h]indered, picked on at school, (…) 
unable to achieve leadership positions very easily.”420 Joseph ties discrimination to race and 
religion, though he says it is hard to identify at times: “[r]acism and bigotry in America 
conceals itself behind more subtle touches that are not easy to identify and understand how it 
has affected one's life.” He also says that “[i]n the homogenous oriented American society, if 
your [sic] not ‘white’, and ‘Christian’ the social road is not as smooth.”421 He has had 
experiences that tie discrimination against him directly to phenotype. He relates how “[a]s a 
young man, in Kentucky I wasn't allowed into a bowling because of my dark complexion. 
And I was referred as a ‘nigger.’" Ron also has a story that shows this: “In 2002 I was flying 
out to Knoxville, Tennessee with my partner for a police training class.  My partner was very 
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fair with blue eyes.  Back then you could still check baggage outside of the terminal.  He was 
allowed to do so. I was directed to go inside, stand in line for people who had not yet received 
their tickets (I had mine) and have my check-on baggage go through additional security 
check.  I had worked for 11 years at the airport as part of the Airport Police Detail.  My 
partner protested more than I did to the security staff, to no avail.”422 Janice says that since 
she lived in a “white suburb” her dark complexion and Arab food choices caused teasing.423 
Other respondents have cited the problem as being stereotypes and wrongful representations. 
Nidal explains that he feels one problem is “people’s racism and ignorance and their 
acceptance of sources of Fox News as Credible, they just don’t know any better.”  He relates 
how this has had an effect on his personal life: “In Grand Rapids where I live, some females 
are less likely to date me because of my race/religion. (…) [T]hey’re raised in a culture that is 
less accepting of different cultures, particularly a culture that is painted with such a bad set of 
stereotypes by the media.”424 Suha also sees how stereotypes, added to familial expectations, 
can lead to problems with the opposite sex: “As a woman, I often feel that in relationships I 
have to be extra defensive of my ethnicity and self. It is hard to (…) have close relationships 
with men because of the various ideas that people have about Arab/Muslim women, and my 
family’s expectations.”425
Some Arab-American activists are seeking to be removed from the category of 
“white,” though not everyone wishes for a separate racial category. Samhan, in her testimony 
to the House of Representatives, asks for a closer look at those that choose “Some Other 
Race” and the extent to which it is chosen by Arab-American respondents to the 2010 census, 
followed by looking at the “results of the experimental 2010 census panels that will evaluate 
alternative ways to word questions on race and ethnicity.”
  
426
A new immigrant to the United States is met with a racial system they may not be 
familiar with. Although the idea of a racial categorization of people is not unique to the 
United States, there does seem to be something unique in its history and in how it is played 
out in America today. Omi and Winant’s racial formation theory addresses this specifically, as 
they claim that a “sort of ‘exceptionalism’ turns out to be necessary if one is to address racial 
dynamics in the U.S.”
 To sum up: there is unease and 
conflicting views on Arab-American race, both in the sense of official categories, but also in 
personal identification.  
427 The outcome of the meeting between immigrant and racial 
dynamics, then, will be part of their assimilation process. Ajrouch and Jamal say that 
“[i]mmigration to the United States includes the experience of being placed into a racial 
hierarchy, which becomes one of the primary means by which identity is established. (…) 
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Racial identity is one of the primary means by which immigrants assimilate to the United 
States.” 428 Shryock and Ann Chih Lin claim much of the same, saying that “[i]n learning to 
think of themselves as Arab American, or white, or racially ‘other’, people of diverse 
national, religious, socioeconomic, and linguistic backgrounds learn to represent themselves, 
and to be represented, using identity labels that make sense to millions of Americans. Fluent, 
convincing use of these labels is proof of Americanization, because little of this terminology 
is brought to the United States from Arab homelands.”429  The implications made by these 
scholars is that in order to assimilate to an American mainstream, one needs to be able to 
place oneself in the American racial hierarchy. Arab Americans, then, could simply choose to 
“remain” white, which is frequently the choice made on official forms and questionnaires.  
However, their experiences are leading them to feel less comfortable in the white category. 
Samhan makes the claim that “[m]any immigrants and second generation Arab Americans do 
not understand the race distinctions (…) and have lived through experiences, both before and 
after 9/11, where they do not feel treated like the White majority population, and therefore do 
not relate to that racial classification.”430 Since there is not an adequate racial category to 
choose (and “other” is not always an option on forms), they are left in a “racial void.” 
Shryock and Lin claim that there are “real consequences, socially and politically, for citizens 
who cannot be located, or cannot locate themselves, on the existing ethnoracial grid.”431
 
 This, 
then, seems to apply to most Arab Americans, for even if a person chooses to identify as 
white, there is no automatic acceptance of that person’s whiteness by the mainstream.  
2.4 Segmented Assimilation Theory’s Relation to Race and Ethnicity 
Segmented assimilation theory speaks explicitly about both ethnicity and race. Starting with 
ethnicity, Min Zhou and Alejandro Portes discuss its positive force. They see a “coethnic” 
community (in other words, a community of people that share a sense of common ethnicity) 
as beneficial to assimilation. They call the coethnic community the third and most important 
type of resource available to “confront the challenges of contemporary assimilation,” since 
networks in the coethnic community give “[i]mmigrants who join well-established and 
diversified ethnic groups (…) access from the start to a range of moral and material 
resources.”432  They point to ethnic/private schools and job opportunities or business 
apprenticeships as ways to “circumvent outside discrimination and the threat of vanishing 
mobility ladders.”433 Zhou goes further in claiming that immigrant communities can use 
“deliberate cultivation of ethnicity” to help children achieve in school, through the help of 
parental pressure (my emphasis).434 She sees ethnic networks as social capital, where both 
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support and control can affect children’s adaptation. This adaptation is in turn affected by how 
the ethnic community fits into to the mainstream society. Zhou explains that the coethnic 
society can function as a mediator and “buffer zone” between an immigrant family and 
American society.435 These ideas are not new, of course. David Ward, in Harvard 
Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, says: “Too often the social problems of particular 
ethnic groups have been related in a simplistic fashion to their segregated residential 
patterns.”436 He says there are benefits to be had by ethnic geographic concentration, for 
instance political power, economic advancement, protection and a reinforcement of group 
solidarity and well-being.437 Nathan Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s influential Beyond 
the Melting Pot also discusses some positive effects of ethnic concentration. Speaking of Jews 
in New York, they credit the ethnic community with benefits like “a strong family life” and “a 
low rate of alcoholism.”438
However, Zhou and Portes point out, arriving to a “large but downtrodden coethnic 
community may be even less desirable than no community at all. This is because newly 
arrived youths enter into ready contact with the reactive subculture developed by earlier 
generations. Its influence is all the more powerful because it comes from (…) ‘people like 
us’.”
  
439
Segmented assimilation scholars claim that race is a factor to be considered in 
segmented assimilation theory. Portes and Rumbaut say that “[i]n America, race is a 
paramount criterion of social acceptance that can overwhelm the influence of class 
background, religion, or language.”
 Zhou and Portes believe that the deciding factor for whether ethnicity is a positive 
force in assimilation and upward mobility is the nature of the coethnic community. 
440 Zhou and Portes say that “the majority of 
contemporary immigrants are nonwhite. Although this feature may appear at first glance as an 
individual characteristic, in reality it is a trait belonging to the host society. Prejudice is not 
intrinsic to a particular skin color or racial type, and, indeed many immigrants never 
experienced it in their native lands. It is by virtue of moving into a new social environment, 
marked by different values and prejudices, that physical features become redefined as a 
handicap.”441  This bears resemblance to what David Roediger calls a long tradition of 
“Blacks pointing out that race in the US was not a ‘Negro problem’ but a problem among 
whites.”442 In a 1997 article, Zhou says that racial discrimination is on-going, not simply a 
thing of the past. It affects residence, which she points to as the most important element in 
matters of mobility. Class and race, then, go hand in hand, affecting the schools, 
neighborhoods and local environments that confront immigrant and second-generation 
youth.443 In some of these urban environments, youth are met by an “adversarial subculture” 
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that views school achievers as “sell-outs” or as “acting white.”444 Zhou uses the example of 
Chicano and Puerto Rican youth who were “forcefully excluded by their coethnic peers as 
‘turnovers’ acting ‘white’” when they did well in school.445 Portes and Rumbaut write 
extensively about Haitian youth experiencing the same dilemma.446
Segmented assimilation, as described in the introduction, is divided into three possible 
trajectories. The first trajectory is the kind often used to describe the assimilation of various 
European immigrants: Americanization coupled with upward mobility. The second trajectory 
is economic advancement through cultivation of ethnicity. The third trajectory is downward 
mobility due to assimilation to an urban American underclass. These three paths will be 
discussed in the following section using data from the census, the DAAS and the interviews.  
 
Traditionally, Arab Americans have been described as very assimilated, successful and 
suburban. This has been the case for those who arrived before WWII. Those who have arrived 
later have had more divergent paths. As described earlier, the suburban population and the 
Christian population (often the same people) are more likely to feel “white” than the Dearborn 
population.  In this regard we can conclude that part of the Arab-American community have 
followed this first path of segmented assimilation.  
There are many ways to report or analyze upward mobility. Segmented assimilation 
scholars use determinants such as school achievement and attainment of professional 
occupations.447 According to the American Community Survey of 2006-2008, Arab 
Americans in Metro Detroit have similar levels of college and graduate school enrollment as 
the general population of the same area (27% for Arab Americans, 24.8% for general 
population). The attainment of education for the 25 and older population shows that the Arab-
American population also has similar percentages as the general population regarding 
Bachelor’s degrees or Graduate and Professional degrees. When looking at “Management, 
professional or related occupations,” the Arab-American population is slightly behind the 
general population (35% versus 31.7%). 448
These numbers change when we look at the differences by county. The three focus 
counties of this study are Wayne, Macomb and Oakland. Dearborn and the city of Detroit are 
in Wayne County. In Wayne County, the numbers for Arab-American college and graduate 
school enrollment are 1% below that of the general population. The levels of educational 
attainment for the 25 and over population are 1% above the general population for Bachelor’s 
degrees, and 1% below for Graduate or Professional degrees. For “Management, professional 
 All in all, the Arab-American population of Metro 
Detroit has similar levels of educational and professional occupation achievement as the 
general population of the same area.  
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and related occupations,” the Arab Americans have nearly identical numbers to the general 
population.449
In Oakland County, school enrollment for Arab Americans in college or graduate 
school is significantly higher than the general population, at 38% and 26.6% respectively. The 
educational attainment of the population of 25 and over, however, is more or less the same. 
The numbers for “Management, professional and related occupations” show the general 
population at 6% higher occurrence than the Arab-American population (45.4% to 39.6%).
 This means that in Wayne County, the Arab-American population’s education 
and occupation does not significantly differ from the general population.  
450
In the third county, Macomb, school enrollment in college or graduate school is 10% higher 
than the general population. The attainment of Bachelor’s and Graduate degrees is similar to 
the general population. Employment in “Management, professional and related occupations” 
is lower for Arab Americans than for the general population, with 26.1% compared to 
32.6%.
  
451
The DAAS reports that “Arabs and Chaldeans have roughly the same percentage of 
college and advanced degrees as the general population,”
 What we can gather from this, is that Arab Americans in the suburbs are ahead of 
the general population regarding school enrollment in higher education, but in the city they 
are approximately the same as the surrounding population. In respect to attainment of college 
degrees, the Arab-American population more or less mirrors the general population of the 
area, both in the city, and in the suburbs. The numbers for Management and Professional 
occupations show that Arab Americans in the city are better off than the general population, 
where in the suburbs it is the other way around.  
452 a similar finding to the American 
Community Survey. The DAAS uses a different categorization for occupation, and says that 
“Arabs and Chaldeans are more likely to work in sales, office, and administrative positions” 
than the general population (38% to 25%). The numbers for “management, business, or 
financial occupations” show Arabs and Chaldeans trailing behind by 4%. When it comes to 
professional occupations, both the Arabs and Chaldeans, and the general population have a 
22% participation rate.453 Neither the American Community Survey, nor the DAAS show the 
differences within this category according to choice of racial identification. It is therefore 
difficult to say how these findings are affected by race. The only conclusion to be drawn at 
this point is that when comparing Arab Americans to the general population (using DAAS 
data) in matters of education, the suburban Arab Americans are ahead of their fellow 
suburbanites, a pattern that does not hold true for the city dwellers. Employment in 
management and the professions show the suburban Arab Americans trailing behind the 
general population, which is not true for the city populations.  
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To conclude, we should go back to the original question: Are Arab Americans 
following the first possible path of segmented assimilation – the classic path of 
Americanization followed by upward mobility? There is some evidence to support that this 
has occurred among those that live in the suburbs. This population is also the most likely to 
choose a white identity, according to the DAAS.454
The second described path of segmented assimilation is “rapid economic advancement 
with deliberate preservation of the immigrant community’s values and tight solidarity.”
 Therefore there is an indication that a 
choice of white identity is connected to upward mobility, though we cannot make any 
conclusions as to the causal relationships of these determinants.   
455 
Zhou and Portes point out the importance of a strong and diversified coethnic community.456 
Portes and Rumbaut speak highly of the benefits to a strong ethnic community in blocking 
downward assimilation. “The varying character of co-ethnic communities determines the level 
of social capital available to immigrant families. Social capital, grounded on ethnic networks, 
provides a key resource in confronting obstacles to successful adaptation.”457 They point to 
economic opportunities and reinforcement of parental authority in ethnic networks as key to 
the success of the second generation. They continue by saying that “[s]ocial capital depends 
less on the relative economic or occupational success of immigrants than on the density of ties 
among them.”458
The Dearborn Arab community is known for its strength.
  
459 Arabs have been in the 
area for about a century. Kayyali explains that the Dearborn enclave was the only Arab-
American cluster to survive the Americanization and assimilatory efforts of the early 20th 
century.460 The community has powerful institutions (notably ACCESS and the Arab 
American and Chaldean Council, ACC), and has gained political influence as well as political 
representation. Ron talks about his (former) city: “Two of the 7 members of the city council 
are Arab Americans, one male and one female.  The Chief of Police is a 3rd generation Arab 
American.  The recently retired Fire Chief is 2nd generation Arab American.”461 Baker and 
Shryock point out the diversity of agencies, businesses, organizations and institutions in Arab 
Detroit, and say that “[d]espite obvious success in the small business sector, most Arabs in 
greater Detroit are not entrepreneurs; they can be found in all sectors of the local economy 
and at all income levels.”462 They continue on to say that “no other [Arab-American] enclave 
rivals Dearborn in size or political prominence.”463 Sally Howell and Jamal claim that Arab 
Detroit is “exceptional,” saying that “Michigan’s Arabs, through the work of myriad 
individuals and the efforts of many successful ethnic institutions, have been incorporated to a 
remarkable degree into local structures of economic, social, and political capital. At the 
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national level, by contrast, Arabs have found their efforts to organize and influence 
governmental policies (…) blocked.”464 After 9/11, Arabs in the Detroit area fared better than 
their coethnics in other cities in America.465 Howell and Jamal analyze data from the DAAS 
and compare to other national polls, and conclude that Detroit is a contrast to Arab America 
as a whole. Arab Detroiters experienced less discrimination and violence, worried less about 
their future, and were less willing to forgo civil liberties in exchange for security after 9/11, 
than Arab Americans nationally.466
The combination of the density of Arab Americans, and great demographic and the 
economic diversity is a sign of a healthy ethnic community. This is what Portes, Rumbaut, 
and Zhou all claim can help block the likelihood of downward assimilation, and instead be a 
way to “[u]pward assimilation combined with biculturalism.”
 It is important to remember that in this particular context, 
the Arab-American enclave, though more demographically dense in Dearborn, must be 
understood to include suburban Arab Americans as well. (This is because of cultural and 
familial ties that the suburban population have to Dearborn, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter.) 
467 The high levels of 
bilingualism, discussed earlier in this chapter, are an indicator of this biculturalism. The same 
are the similar statements made by several of the respondents about their biculturalism.468 
Frank says much of the same when describing his family: “We participate in American 
Activities, for instance we are masons, moose members. Coach athletics. Kids participate in 
them. English is spoken in the home. Into American pop culture. We do however, try to 
incorporate our traditions into our daily lives as well.”469
According to the respondents to this study, the presence of an ethnic community can 
have two effects, phrased nicely by Ron: “The large community in Dearborn acts as a shield 
against the slings and arrows of my fellow Americans on the one hand.  On the other hand it 
is the focal point for those that would do their best to make bogeymen out of Arabs and 
Muslims.”
  
470 Ron has made the move out of the city of Dearborn and into suburban Livonia: 
“In the national census of 2000 our city, Livonia, was dubbed ‘the whitest big city in 
America.’ The population is about 100,000 and 98% white. (…) I was extremely le[e]ry about 
moving into Livonia initially. It has been ten years now and I must say that I have 
encountered more bias against Arabs in Dearborn, Michigan than I have in Livonia, 
Michigan.”471  When asked whether he thinks that he would experience less prejudice and 
racism had he lived in Dearborn, rather than living in West Michigan, Nidal replies: “Maybe; 
not sure.  I think even being in an area with people more similar to my own 
culture/religion/values etc. would not necessarily make Americans feel comfortable.”472 It is 
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noteworthy, however, that Nidal is the respondent who has made the most mention of racism 
and prejudice, though it is not safe to conclude that that is due to his geographic location. 
Sonya has a different experience, and makes specific mention of the protection that Dearborn 
has afforded her in the wake of 9/11: “I was out of high school by the time 9/11 happened and 
the college I attended was in Dearborn where there is a large Arab population and people 
seemed to be more open-minded and willing to learn, rather than discriminatory and 
racist.”473 She also sees advantages in the ethnic enclave in relation to her job: “I work at the 
Arab American National Museum which is located in Dearborn. We are responsible for 
educating people about Arab Americans, so being in such a concentrated community is 
helpful.”474
 It is difficult to make any conclusions about whether or not Arab Americans in Detroit 
are following the second path of segmented assimilation. The literature based on the DAAS 
findings, along with other studies, would seem to suggest that the ethnic community of 
Dearborn is the typical environment that segmented assimilation scholars point to as 
beneficial to the second trajectory of segmented assimilation. Yet the experiences of the 
informants show that they see both benefits and downsides to this ethnic concentration. 
 
The third path of segmented assimilation is assimilation - not to the mainstream 
culture, but to the underclass - leading to permanent poverty, often called downward 
assimilation. This is usually characterized by inner-city immigrant youth adapting the values 
and norms of existing inner-city cultures, often marred by crime, high drop-out rates from 
school, and drug use. Zhou and Portes note three features that “create vulnerability to 
downward assimilation:” color, location, and absence of mobility ladders.475
Detroit, however, does have a clear color profile. It is a majority black city, with the 
American Community Survey from 2006-2008 reporting 83% African American 
inhabitants.
 The first, color, 
has been discussed at length in this chapter. Though Arab Americans do not have a clear 
“color choice,” it can be argued that they are often seen as a “people of color” and sometimes 
see themselves as the same.  
476 The inner-city youth that the Arab immigrants’ children could be expected to 
assimilate to, are therefore black. Detroit ranks as one of four large U.S. cities with the lowest 
median income, and highest poverty rates.477 Detroit has the unfortunate reputation of violent 
crime and high murder rates. In a 2007 article, Forbes Magazine has Detroit topping the list 
of most murderous cities in America (based on statistics from the FBI). “Detroit's murder rate 
is more than 8% higher than the country's second most murderous city, Baltimore.”478 A 2009 
Forbes article names Detroit as the nation’s most dangerous city, with a number of crime 
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syndicates and gangs operating in the city.479 Time Magazine is currently doing a year-long 
report on Detroit, “Assignment Detroit.” They write that “[n]ot all that long ago, Detroit was 
one of the richest places in the country (…). Today it struggles for its life: not one national 
chain operates a grocery store in the entire 138-sq.-mi. city limits of Detroit. The estimated 
functional illiteracy rate in the city limits hovers near 50%. The unsolved-murder rate is about 
70%, and unemployment is around an astonishing 29%.”480 The EPE Research Center has 
done research that shows graduation rates in US cities. Detroit City School District had a 
37.5% graduation rate for the class of 2005, placing it in the bottom three of the 50 largest 
cities in the country.481
It is clear, then, that Detroit has an urban underclass, and that according to segmented 
assimilation theory, this underclass could be a draw to the neighboring ethnic enclaves’ 
disenchanted youth. However, this does not seem to be the case. One reason for this could be 
the Arab Americans’ relationship to African Americans and color. Shryock claims that Arab 
Americans have kept a “strategic distance from black identities” as part of a cultivation of a 
white ethnic identity.
 
482 He follows by saying that “outright identification with African 
Americans among Arabs, (…) is virtually nonexistent.”483 Kayyali says much of the same, 
speaking of Arabs using distance from other races as part of their assimilation to an 
“American middle-class lifestyle,” specifically setting “themselves apart from African 
Americans.”484 Aswad says that “Dearborn has a reputation of being racist.”485 Hassoun 
blames the bad relationship between African Americans and Arab Americans on the distrust 
between shop keeper and the black community suffering from “economic 
disempowerment.”486 She says that the African Americans do not “understand the insular 
nature of the Arab family structure,” and the Arab Americans do not know or understand the 
history of African American poverty.487 Kayyali, similarly points out that “when an Arab 
Muslim family opens a store in an urban area that is predominantly African American, there 
are usually tensions between the ethnic grocery storeowner and the customers from the 
community. As with other ethnic groups, such as the Korean American storeowners in Los 
Angeles, these tensions can escalate into violence that results in fatalities.”488
At the same time, Kayyali says that on a national and on a local level, “Arab 
Americans have good relations with African Americans.”
  
489 Shryock quotes Lisa Majaj 
advising other Arab-American writers that “our experience has shown us, time and again, that 
our formal status as white is merely honorary, and is quickly revoked in the wake of political 
events (…), we need to probe links with other groups of color.”490  However, Shryock says, 
the identification between “blackness” and Arab Americans’ identity is largely restricted to 
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media, film, music and art.491 While Arab Americans may not understand or wish to be linked 
to black culture, Shryock and Baker point to studies that show that “[w]hites and blacks alike 
in the Detroit region prefer more social distance from Arab Americans than from any other 
group.”492
Using the American Community Survey of 2006-2008, we can look at differences 
between Arab Americans and African Americans. Concentrating on Wayne County, since that 
is where both the city of Detroit, and the city of Dearborn are located, shows little indication 
of Arab Americans assimilation to the African American urban culture. The rate of female 
households with no husband present and children under 18 years is 6% for Arab Americans, 
and 20% for African Americans. The percentage of the population that is divorced is 5.5% for 
Arab Americans, and over double that for African Americans. Arab Americans have a much 
higher percentage of their population with less than a high school diploma (31.5%, to 21% for 
African Americans). The numbers change when we look at how many have college or 
graduate school, where almost 22% of Arab Americans have at least a Bachelor’s degree, 
versus 11.2% of African Americans. 8.4% of Arab Americans are unemployed, (mirroring the 
general population), African Americans have a slightly higher number, with 12%. When 
looking at the Median household income, African Americans trail behind Arab Americans by 
$7,000, though both populations have significantly lower incomes than the general 
population. Both populations have higher numbers than the general population, of families 
“for whom poverty status is determined,” though Arab-American poverty rates are a few 
percentages higher than African Americans (30.2% and 27.2% respectively). Almost 64% of 
Arab Americans live in owner-occupied housing units (close to the level of the general 
population), the same number for African Americans is 52.4%. Almost 8% of Arab-American 
households have no vehicle, for African Americans, that number rises to almost 21%. 
 In other words, the distrust and dislike goes both ways. This may affect the 
likelihood of Arab youth assimilating to a black culture. 
493 All 
in all, for most socioeconomic criteria in this random selection, Arab Americans are better off 
than African Americans. However there are significant exceptions, namely in poverty rates 
and in numbers of people lacking a high school diploma. The latter can possibly be explained 
as a result of childhood in a foreign country. The fact that Arab-American poverty rates are 
higher than the African American population, who in most other categories seem more 
disadvantaged, is interesting, and lacks obvious explanations. This will not be pursued further 
here, suffice to say that the census findings do not show Arab Americans replicating Detroit’s 
urban culture to a significant degree. 
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The second vulnerability factor (after color), according to Zhou and Portes, is location. 
The close contact between minority and immigrant youth “exposes second-generation 
children to the adversarial sub-culture developed by marginalized native youth to cope with 
their own difficult situation.”494 Dearborn borders the city of Detroit. There would seem to be 
plenty of opportunities for downward assimilation, yet the Arab Americans have not entered 
the Detroit underclass in significant numbers. Though some of the inhabitants of Dearborn are 
at the lower end of the income scale, there is little evidence that they are joining Detroit’s 
gang-and drug culture. This does not mean there are no problems for the young people of 
Dearborn, though. Joseph points out: “Our [Yemeni] teenage boys are going through a 
difficult time. The school dropout rate is high, but there's no indication that gang activity is a 
major factor among our youth. In my recent experiences at a substitute teacher at the high 
school level across the city of Dearborn, I recognized as a problem the disregard and 
disrespect that a large number of students have for others, including their teachers. I've 
associated it with a general lack of self-esteem that's associated with self-respect.”495
The city of Detroit is heavily African American, and has few Arab Americans. On the 
other hand, Dearborn’s population has over a third claiming Arab ancestry. This would seem 
to imply that most Arabs are remaining within the enclave, or moving to places other than the 
city of Detroit. One could argue that members of the community moving to the urban 
underclass of Detroit, joining gangs or other subcultures, would not be counted by the census, 
and thereby remain invisible. The argument is valid, however, for lack of evidence it will not 
be pursued further in this paper. Attempts to uncover proof of large numbers of Arab-
American gang members in Metro Detroit have proven unfruitful; therefore the assumption in 
this work is that there is not a large Arab-American presence in Detroit’s underworld. 
    
One exception is important to note, namely the existence of a gang called the Chaldean 
Mafia. The FBI describes the gang as “predominantly of Iraqi nationals, operated a narcotics 
distribution network moving drugs from Phoenix and San Diego to Detroit. Involved in 
violent crimes such as homicide, assault, kidnaping, armed robbery, and arson, the gang used 
intimidation and brutal force to move the narcotics and collect drug proceeds.”496 The FBI has 
arrested over a hundred individuals involved, and seized large quantities of narcotics. The 
National Criminal Justice Reference Service (Administered by the U.S. Department of 
Justice) calls the Chaldean Mafia “a highly exclusive organization,” with ties to international 
drug cartels, whose focus is “[o]btaining income rather than ‘representing’ or generating 
public attention.”497 In this sense, the Chaldean Mafia is not a typical street gang. Its 
exclusivity means that it is not likely to recruit new members from the Arab-American 
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population in general. None of the respondents to this study have mentioned the Chaldean 
Mafia, even when asked specifically about Arab gangs. Frank says: “I have worked with 
youth in the Arab American community for over 10 y[ea]rs. I have never seen any suggestion 
of gang activity at all. Its a non starter.” Ron, who has worked as a police officer and 
community activist for decades says: “I am aware of no ‘gang’ that has formed in the Arab 
Community of Detroit.” It is possible that these respondents do not think of Chaldeans as 
Arabs, since Chaldeans tend to disassociate themselves with the label. Or perhaps they did not 
think of the Chaldean Mafia as a “gang,” since it operates in more of a “mafia style.” There is 
also the possibility that they have not heard of the Chaldean Mafia, or preferred not to 
mention it. None of the literature used for this study speaks of the Chaldean Mafia, though 
Aswad makes a brief mention of Chaldeans having “become a force in the local drug 
business.”498
It is interesting to view Detroit’s Arab population as a contrast to the Arab-American 
population in Chicago, where there indeed was evidence of an Arab-American underclass, 
similar to other urban underclass cultures. Cainkar has done extensive research on this 
community and says: “Our research indicates that current [1990s] problems within the 
community exist partly because of a deteriorating ‘ethnic safety net,’ which is defined as 
internal Arab community networks that provide for the cohesion, safety, security, and 
prosperity of Arab families through interaction, assistance, and intervention.”
 
499 She found 
evidence of drug use, alcoholism and domestic violence,500 and also gang membership. “Arab 
street gangs are part of the local scene, and Arab theft ring members, who largely victimize 
other Arabs, have instilled fear and distrust among community members.”501 Cainkar’s 
research shows what is often called “role reversal:” “Many Arab parents feel they have lost 
control of their children and, as immigrants, do not know how to handle parenting in urban 
America. There is no longer a strong, insular Arab community to provide them with help.”502 
The study of Arab Americans in Chicago shows evidence of segmented assimilation theory’s 
third trajectory. Though Cainkar does not show that the Arab second generation is joining the 
existing underclass, they are certainly showing signs of the same behavior. Their story bears 
resemblance to what has happened in other immigrant communities across America. Portes 
and Rumbaut detail many such cases, and say that “community networks are often the only 
factor compensating for the weakness of the parents’ own economic position. Dissonant 
acculturation [defined as the situation where children are more acculturated than the parents, 
leading to role reversal] can be most effectively resisted when parental authority is reinforced 
by supportive kin and ethnic networks.”503 “Atomized households and the consequent lack of 
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social capital mean that parents must confront the challenges of the outside environment and 
the threat of role reversal on their own. For those of modest condition, the challenge is all too 
often overwhelming.”504 Kayyali also mentions the Chicago case, saying that “[th]e high rates 
of alcoholism, drug abuse, and domestic violence in the Chicagoan case indicated that the 
family structure has been weakened.”505
 The third factor creating vulnerability to downward assimilation, according to Zhou 
and Portes is the absence of mobility ladders in a new “hourglass economy.”
  
506 The way to 
combat this potential problem is through education and financial resources, combined with 
parental guidance in providing proof of “the viability of aspirations for upward mobility.”507 
As we have seen in an earlier section of this chapter, the Arab-American population is not 
trailing significantly behind the general population when it comes to education, at least not 
when looking at the youngest segment of the population, which includes much of the second 
generation. In some instances the Arab population is ahead of the general population in higher 
education. The DAAS shows that “Arabs and Chaldeans have roughly the same percentage of 
college and advanced degrees as the general population, but a higher percentage has less than 
a high school degree. Those born in the U.S. [ie the second or third generation] have more 
education than either the general population or Arabs and Chaldeans born abroad.”508 The 
American Community Survey shows Arab Americans in all three counties having 
approximately twice as many people with less than a high school diploma, compared to the 
general population.509 The numbers reflect those that are 25 years and older, and could be 
both first, second and third generation Arab Americans. There is a likelihood that many of 
those without a high school diploma went to school outside the United States, in other words 
before emigration. The foreign-born Arab population in all three counties is about half of the 
total Arab population, according to the American Community Survey. Hassoun says that the 
“second, third and fourth generations of Arab Americans [in Michigan] invariably have 
benefited from better education. Education is highly valued (…) in Arab culture in 
general.”510
At the same time, the concentration of Arab businesses and organizations can provide 
jobs and training that Arab-American youth might not have access to outside the community 
due to prejudice.  The DAAS reports that a slightly higher number of Arabs and Chaldeans 
own their own business, compared to the general population (19% to 14%).
 There is no evidence that the Arab-American second generation is assimilating to 
an urban culture where school drop-out rates are high.  
511 It is interesting 
to note that among immigrants, “business owners report the highest levels of income,” while 
among the American born, “higher incomes are associated with higher levels of education 
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rather than with business ownership.”512 When comparing occupation and citizenship, the 
DAAS finds that citizens (the second generation among them) are more likely to work in 
management, business, finance, and professional occupations, than are non-citizens.513
The interviews conducted for this study cannot be used to generalize for the Arab-
American population as a whole. However, a survey of the education and occupation of the 
participants is in order. One participant is a high school student. The rest have at least a 
Bachelor’s degree. Several of the participants are or have been community activists. One 
works in the government. One is a teacher. Three work for the Arab American National 
Museum. One works in finance. None of the participants are entrepreneurs. Sonya explains 
that her ethnicity has been an advantage in her job pursuits, since she has worked in places 
like the Arab American National Museum.
 All 
this data from the DAAS indicates that the younger generation of Arab Americans is getting 
both an education, and higher paying jobs. 
514 Working the same place, Janice says that being 
Arab helped her get “a job that makes me happier than any other job I’ve ever had.”515
In summary regarding the third trajectory, there is little evidence to support a trend of 
downward assimilation among the Arab-American second generation in Metro Detroit. Even 
though Aswad points to unemployment, some drugs and alcohol, some illegal activities, 
increased welfare, and some role reversal amongst Lebanese Americans in the 1980s,
   
516
The three trajectories described here are all present in the parts of the Arab-American 
community of Metro Detroit. However, when looking for general trends, the third path – that 
of downward assimilation – seems the least applicable. The trend of downward assimilation is 
generally used to describe urban ethnic communities with proximity to an American urban 
underclass. Since Dearborn borders the city of Detroit, and is indeed an urban environment, 
there is fertile ground for such a development. Yet it does not appear to be taking place on a 
large scale. The more suburban Arab-Americans in Oakland and Macomb Counties are not 
expected to be following the third path, nor is there any indication that they are. A more likely 
scenario for these suburban Arab Americans is to follow the first path, which there is an 
indication of in the data used here. In this regard, many Arab Americans are following the 
classic American story of immigrant assimilation, by becoming “white” and “suburban.” The 
second trajectory is more relevant to the population of Wayne County, mainly in Dearborn. 
 there 
is little indication that this is a continuing problem on a large scale. Overall, the Arab-
American youth in Metro Detroit are seemingly being “sheltered” by the strength of their 
community. Or perhaps the reasons can be found in the relationship between Arabness and 
color, where an association with black Americans is not seen as desirable.  
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This is where the Arab American community is concentrated enough to constitute the 
environment described in segmented assimilation theory. The data implies a likelihood that 
this ethnic community functions as protection and a benefit to Arab Americans in the area. 
The following chapter will look at how assimilation is affected by religion. Certainly 
race and ethnicity are closely tied to religion. For instance, Muslim respondents to the DAAS 
are more likely to choose a racial identification as “Other.”517
 
 Using their common 
Christianity, early Arab immigrants were able to argue their whiteness. Arab Muslims share a 
common religion with a large group of American Black Muslims. These are a few examples 
of the links between race, ethnicity and religion. The next chapter will discuss this more 
thoroughly, as well as look at how religion plays into segmented assimilation theory for Arab 
Americans. 
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Chapter 3: Religious Identities 
This chapter asks how assimilation has been affected by Arab-American religious identity. 
The three trajectories of segmented assimilation theory will be discussed in turn, using an 
analysis of the differences between Christian and Muslim Arabs, developments in American 
Islam and increased religiosity among Muslims, and finally an analysis of Dearborn’s 
Southend as a possible example of downward assimilation. There is an imbalance in the 
amount of material regarding Muslims compared to Christians. More time is spent discussing 
Arab Muslims because there is more focus on Islam in public debates and in scholarship. For 
the purpose of this thesis, moreover, this focus is appropriate in that most Arab Christians are 
more assimilated, while Arab Muslims constitute the majority of more recent immigrants, and 
city dwellers, on whom segmented assimilation theory tends to focus.  
 Segmented assimilation theory, as it was originally developed, did not take religion 
into account. Alejandro Portes and Ruben Rumbaut have at a later time incorporated a chapter 
about religion in the third edition of Immigrant America: A Portrait. The only work that 
explicitly deals with segmented assimilation theory and religion is Min Zhou and Carl 
L.Bankston III’s study of Vietnamese in New Orleans, which resulted in scholarly articles and 
the book Growing Up American: How Vietnamese Children Adapt to Life in the United 
States. These authors have found a strong connection between the well-being and educational 
attainment of these second-generation immigrants and their belonging to an ethnic church.518 
P. Stephen Warner laments the lack of religion in work on segmented assimilation, urging 
students of urban religion and students of assimilation to incorporate the model into their 
studies.519
 
 That is precisely what has been done here. 
3.1 The First Trajectory: Assimilated Christians 
The first trajectory of segmented assimilation is when acculturation is accompanied by 
upward mobility into the traditionally white middle class. Arab Christians are more 
assimilated than Arab Muslims, therefore they can be seen as more likely to be following the 
first trajectory of segmented assimilation theory. Arab Christians constitute a majority of Arab 
Detroit and of Arab Americans nationally. They are diverse in their national origins, as well 
as their religious orientations. Common for all is that they came from Muslim majority 
countries, and some from Islamic states. Accustomed to being a minority, perhaps they had a 
benefit right from the start, when they arrived and joined America’s multitude of minority 
populations. Most scholars agree that for these earlier immigrants, a Christian religion gave 
them significant advantages in gaining access to American society.520 Randa A. Kayyali 
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writes that Christians were more likely to work as rural peddlers than Muslims, since 
Christians “could reach a comfort level with the farm wives by quoting from the Bible and 
finding a religious commonality with their customers.”521 Muslims, on the other hand, arrived 
in a country without common religious traditions, or houses of worship, and arrived in smaller 
numbers than Christians.522 Due to religious discrimination, Muslims were unable to 
integrate, despite the higher education levels of these second wave immigrants. 523 In a recent 
volume about Arab Americans, Sally Howell and Amaney Jamal write that Arab Christians 
are more integrated in the American middle class than Arab Muslims due to having been 
present in the country longer.524
The fact that Arab Christians are more likely to live in the suburbs, than in the city, shows a 
higher degree of assimilation. Like the debate over the priority of the chicken and the egg, one 
could question what came first, the move to the suburbs or the assimilation; but nonetheless it 
is a self-perpetuating cycle. Suburban living brings Arab Christians into contact with 
mainstream middle class Americans at a much higher degree than living in an urban 
environment does. The Detroit Arab American Study (DAAS) found that only 5% of 
Christian Arabs live in or near Dearborn, the rest are dispersed in suburbs to the north, east 
and west of Detroit.
 Yet it is too simple to rely entirely on time of arrival to 
explain assimilation, although it does have an effect.  
525 In contrast, the same study found that two thirds of Arab Muslims in 
Metropolitan Detroit live in Dearborn or Detroit, rather than in the suburbs.526 An exception 
to this pattern is the Iraqi Chaldeans, who have established an urban enclave along Seven 
Mile Road, many of them running grocery, liquor and convenience stores. Surrounded by 
urban blight, many of these Chaldeans move to the suburbs when they can afford to,527 in line 
with the general pattern of Christian and Muslim settlement. The income and educational 
levels of Arab Christians and Arab Muslims can help explain the residential patterns, as well 
as indicate upward mobility of Arab Christians. In the 2009 book about Arab Detroit, 
Citizenship and Crisis: Arab Detroit after 9/11,  the editors say that one-third of Muslims 
have not finished high school, and they are less likely to have college education than Christian 
Arabs. Muslims are twice as likely to have an annual household income of less than $20,000, 
while the majority of Christian household earn more than $50,000.528 In other words, having 
lower incomes blocks the possibility of moving to the suburbs, while the lack of higher 
education means income advancement is less likely.                                                                                                                                                                      
 Self-identification shows assimilation too. Christians are more likely to identify as 
white, the DAAS found 73% accept their race as white, compared to 50% of Arab 
Muslims.529 They differ in ethnic identification as well. Arab Christians are less likely to 
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accept the “Arab American” label, the DAAS reports that 61% of Christians, compared to 
82% of Muslims that welcome the term. Citizenship and place of birth do not have a bearing 
on identification as Arab American,530 therefore this cannot simply be explained by time of 
immigration. Jen’nan Ghazal Read says that the fact that Muslims identify more readily with 
the Arab American label “indicate[s] that Christians are more assimilated than their Muslim 
counterparts, in terms of both attitudes and behaviors.”531 The implications of racial and 
ethnic identifications for segmented assimilation were discussed in the previous chapter, and 
are simply mentioned here to show the differences within the religious groups, and how 
personal identity is proof of Christian assimilation.                                                                                                            
 Arab houses of worship show differences in levels of assimilation. Forty percent of 
Arab mosques use Arabic only,532 in other words, sixty percent use both English and Arabic.  
In contrast, the largest Orthodox church, The Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese, 
uses 90% English.533 Arabic classes are rare in Arab churches (with Palestinian churches 
being a notable exception), while mosques frequently hold Arabic training.534 A similar 
comparison can be made of the clergy. The Detroit Mosque study found that nearly all of the 
trained Detroit Imams are immigrants, and had their training overseas.535 The Antiochian 
Orthodox Christian Archdiocese, on the other hand, has 90% U.S. trained clergy.536 Fr. 
Shalhoub of St. Mary’s Antiochian Orthodox Church in Livonia (a western suburb of Detroit) 
was trained both in Lebanon and in the United States. He was one of the founders of his 
church, and says that right from the beginning St. Mary’s purposely made efforts to “reach out 
to the neighborhood community socially, politically and in civic affairs.”537 He says that this 
gave his church respect in the mainstream. Fr. Shalhoub says that both Christians and 
Muslims in the Detroit area are well integrated, and in the church 30% have married cross-
culturally.538 In fact, many Arab churches have suffered from “drastic out-marriage rates,”539 
according to Kayyali. Alexei D. Krindatch’s study of Orthodox churches shows that the 
second generation’s “natural desire to assimilate with the dominant American culture has 
caused them to drift away from the language, customs, and, to a large extent, the Orthodox 
faith of their parents.”540 Fr. Shalhoub agrees that the second generation practices religion 
differently than their parents, they are less involved, though he claims they take their faith 
more seriously.541 Frank is an example of this development. He says religion mattered more 
to his parents than it does to him, because his parents had more time to be involved.542 This is 
a contrast to Arab Muslims who show a marked increase in religious practice and behavior.                                                                          
 Many scholars have pointed out that as part of their acculturation, some Arab 
Christians have distanced themselves from their Middle Eastern Christian faith, for instance 
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by affiliating with Orthodox churches of more established immigrant communities.543 This 
bears resemblance to Italian immigrants that arrived around the turn of the 20th century, who 
associated with the already established Irish Catholic church. Yvonne Y. Haddad writes that 
the Arab Americans who have achieved leadership positions in America have “mostly 
abandoned eastern Christianity (…), and joined mainline American churches.”544 Mary 
Sengstock found that some Detroit Chaldeans had assimilated by choosing to attend the Latin 
rite Catholic churches, rather than the Chaldean rite churches.545 A commonality with fellow 
Christians was seen, according to Sengstock, in that Christian Lebanese identified more 
strongly with the West than with Lebanese Muslims, and she sees a similar pattern among 
Iraqi Chaldeans, saying that “during the British protectorate in Iraq in the early Twentieth 
Century, many Chaldeans identified with the British more than with Iraqi nationalists.”546 
Arab Christians bring with them memories of hostility between Muslims and Christians in the 
Middle East. 547 For instance, in the Lebanese Civil War, Maronite Christians joined Israel 
against the Muslim population, leading to distrust on both sides.548 This means that Arab 
Christians and Chaldeans arrived in America with a feeling of commonality and fellowship 
with the West, a fact that encouraged assimilation.                                                                                                       
 In addition to distancing themselves from the Middle East, Arab Christians use 
distance from Arab Muslims to gain acceptance, and this need became more pressing in the 
aftermath of 9/11.549 Read says that “Christian Arab Americans may be able to use their 
Christian identity as bridge to the American mainstream, thereby distancing themselves from 
9/11 and demonstrating that they are not terrorists or terrorist sympathizers.”550 This strategy 
is not unique to Arabs, it has been used by many immigrants to the United States as a means 
to easier acceptance and assimilation. Orm Øverland says that a way to improve one’s 
immigrant status can be to “claim that you are different from those who by association may 
lower your status. The definition of your proximity to the elite must include a definition of 
your distance from those who are looked down upon by the elite.”551 For instance, ethnic 
organizations may fear identification with Muslim extremism. 552 Scholars argue that some of 
Detroit’s Christian churches, especially Maronite and Chaldean ones, have worked to isolate 
their congregations from Arabs and Arab identity.553 Andrew Shryock says this is true of 
community spokesmen too, claiming that some Chaldean and Maronite Catholic community 
leaders “cannot resist the urge (…) to distance themselves from Arab Muslims, or make 
disparaging remarks about Islam,” when talking to reporters.554 This strategy can also be 
employed on a personal level. Barbara C. Aswad reports that “as Muslim Arabs receive so 
much attention in this country, many Christians Arabs in the Detroit area are distancing 
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themselves by wearing large crosses. I’ve seen them as big as six inches.”555 It is also 
exemplified in Nadine Naber’s study, where some Christian Arabs have incorporated 
“Orientalist approaches,” used by the mainstream, such as stereotyping which claims that 
Muslim men are violent.556  This was used as a strategy among her interview respondents’ 
parents, to discourage their daughters from marrying Muslim men.557 None of the respondents 
in this study say anything negative about the other faith. However, Frank does use his 
Christianity to distance himself from terrorism. When asked whether he thought 9/11 had 
affected the way he sees his identity, he replied: “Not really, being Christian I do not identify 
at all with the terrorist.”558 Janice explains that both her gender and her faith have been 
advantageous in avoiding discrimination: “As an Arab Christian female, I haven’t felt the 
affects [sic] of 9/11 directly, but many of my male friends and relatives, along with my female 
Muslim friends, felt a lot of animosity from many people after the attacks.”559 The DAAS 
shows that Arab Christians display an acculturation of American beliefs, when asked about 
the causes of 9/11. Where 37% of the general population saw the causes of 9/11 to be 
American beliefs of “democracy, freedom, and equal rights for women,” only 9% of Arab 
Muslims agreed, in contrast to 31% of Arab Christians.560 All in all, 9/11 has consolidated 
some of the differences between the Arab Christians and Muslims. The fact that the attacks 
were carried out by Muslims, gives Arab Christians yet another advantage, even though one 
should remember that not all Americans have a clear idea of the differences in Arab-
American religious identity.561
Arab Christians, then, are more assimilated than Arab Muslims both because they are 
more similar to the mostly Christian mainstream, but also because they have actively made 
changes and cultivated their commonalities with most Americans. Looking back to the 
previous chapter, one does well to remember that this population fought court battles to prove 
that they were similar to Americans. Certainly, Arab Christians face discrimination and 
stereotyping; however, in comparison with Arab Muslims their situation is vastly better. 
Added to the religious difference is a class difference, and a difference in the time of 
immigration, which again makes Muslims more visible, and easily targeted. It is important to 
remember that part of the reason that Arab Christians are more assimilated than Arab 
Muslims is that Muslims are more discriminated against than Christians. It is not solely the 
assimilative efforts of the Christians that create the differences. The portrait of Detroit’s Arab 
Muslims as unassimilated, however, is unfair and inaccurate. There are plenty of 
developments that point to Americanization of this population, as well as economic 
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advancements. Perhaps this is due to the strength of Detroit’s Arab enclave, a point that will 
be discussed in the following section.  
 
3.2 The Second Trajectory: Muslims are Assimilating Too! 
The second path of segmented assimilation describes how community support and ethnic 
retention blocks downward assimilation. Since this chapter deals with religion, it is more 
appropriate to speak of religious retention, rather than ethnic retention. The Arab Muslim 
community in Dearborn and Metro Detroit provides an example of this type of assimilation, 
where both the emergence of an American Islam, and the growth of Islam among the second 
generation grant Detroit’s Arab Muslims the support and strength needed to prevent 
downward assimilation. The support can be in the form of peer and parental guidance found 
in mosques and religious schools, ethnic or religious pride, or kin networks in religious 
institutions that can assist in finding jobs and services. Religious institutions can be schools, 
mosques, or other organizations. These institutions provide financial and practical help or 
training in order to make sense of American society in a way that ultimately can lead to 
acculturation or assimilation. Bankston and Zhou say that church membership “is a prime 
source of identity and motivation precisely because it is a focus for organizing the social 
relations of a group. First-generation immigrants perceive it as the one element of real 
continuity between their country of origin and their new home and as an effective strategy for 
linking themselves with their American born or raised children while acquiring acceptance in 
the host society.”562 It is important to remember that psychological well-being is just as 
important as economic well-being in regards to feeling at home in America, and one may well 
lead to the other. Second-generation immigrants are often described as being trapped between 
two cultures, and feeling alienated as a result. The privileging of a religious identity over an 
ethnic identity, along with participation in mainstream society, allows youth to remain 
connected to God, their parents and the old country, while at the same time being fully 
American. The danger of role reversal and dissonant acculturation is thereby avoided, and 
Muslim Arabs are free to become part of a multicultural America. The main hindrance they 
face in this endeavor is Islamophobia, which is prevalent in American life and media at this 
point in time. Yet, the support and degree of homogeneity in Arab Detroit shelters them 
somewhat from this. Therefore it is possible to claim that Detroit’s Arab Muslims are 
following the second trajectory of segmented assimilation theory. This section will start by 
discussing the emergence of an Americanized Islam, followed by a discussion of the growth 
in religiosity among young Arab Muslims, that ties these developments to segmented 
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assimilation theory’s second trajectory. The role of religious institutions in these 
developments will be part of the discussion.                                               
A development that is given much attention by scholars of Muslim Americans is the 
movement to create a new “American Islam,” influenced by American life, and adapted to 
American traditions. Part of the motivation for this development is greater unity and 
cooperation among American Muslims, especially important in the face of widespread 
Islamophobia. Haddad says: “The new understanding was that only an Islamic identity, 
creating solidarity between Muslim nations, can provide the necessary resources to fight for 
Muslim causes.”563 She points to young activists who use modern means of communication, 
like the internet, to collaborate with religious rights organizations, and who “take American 
values very seriously.”564 Those advocating a unification of the faith are national 
organizations and community leaders, many of them immigrant professionals from South 
Asia and the Middle East. 565 Often they see America as the perfect place to begin to build the 
Muslim Ummah, because America affords them many freedoms. 566 (The Ummah is an 
“overall community, with no boundaries of race or ethnic identities.”567) M.A. Muqtedar 
Khan explains that many Muslims are thrilled with the idea of practicing Islam and building 
movements and institutions in the U.S., rather than in “the presently autocratic Muslim 
world”568 However the optimism of being able to create the Ummah has been tempered by 
9/11, and the hostile climate following it. In addition to Islamophobia, the internal divisions 
within the American Muslim community (ethnic and racial, immigrant and native-born) can 
create conflict over who is to be the authority, how progressive Islam in America should be, 
and who should represent and interpret Islam in America.569 Yet, though there certainly is 
conflict, the major American Muslim organizations – CAIR and AMC – purposely have a 
multi-ethnic leadership,570 and 90% of contemporary US mosques have congregations with 
mixed ethnic backgrounds where a new American Islam can be cultivated.571 Although 9/11 
has made the idea of a pan-Muslim community seem less likely to some, the civil rights 
abuses in the aftermath have ironically also given many Muslims the incentive to try to 
achieve it. Ron says that “Muslims are banding together as never before just to try to hang on 
to the civil and human rights all Americans have.”572 The Detroit mosque study’s respondents 
named “greater Muslim unity and a stronger sense of community”573 one of top three 
priorities for their mosques. The development of this new brand of Islam is in itself a 
movement towards assimilation. It also gives Muslims in America the chance to be part of 
something beyond their ethnic community, installing pride in being part of America’s 
religious multitudes. For Arab Muslims, this new Islam can function as a connection between 
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the new and the old, along with providing support in networks and communities outside the 
Arab enclave.  Mosques have been Americanized, as part of the project of “fitting in” and 
attracting a wide audience. In the American mosques, practice of faith, and types of activities 
can be quite different than in the Middle Eastern mosques. Karen B. Leonard writes that this 
leads to conflicts between the board of directors (who are often educated or “Americanized” 
Muslims) in the mosque, and the imam they hire (who often is foreign-born).574 Generally, 
mosques are governed by both the imam and the board. Gary David and Kenneth K. Ayouby 
write of a Dearborn mosque that fired several imams for “attempting to apply the overseas 
model.”575 Yet, one should not assume that most imams are traditional, even though they are 
foreign-born. The Detroit mosque study shows that 71% of Detroit’s imams prefer to read the 
Quran in light of modern circumstances, and influenced by modern Islamic scholars.576 In 
other words, only a minority of imams follow a traditional approach. Immigrant imams often 
play roles they never would have played at home, for instance as counsellors or community 
activists,577 a role more similar to that of the American pastor or priest.578                                                                             
 While mosques in the Middle East are primarily a place for prayer, almost all mosques 
in Detroit host events other than prayer, for instance schooling or social activities.579 Almost 
40% host fitness or sporting events regularly. The Detroit mosque study shows that most 
mosques offer certain social services like food donation, substance abuse programs, prison 
programs and clothing donation; and over 80% provide cash assistance.580 Muslim interview 
respondents report that their mosques hold fundraising dinners for charity and for the mosque, 
ecumenical conferences, Sunday school, parties, tours of the mosque, bake sales, and health 
screening.581 Almost 40% of mosque participants see the central purpose of the mosque as a 
center of activities. Unsurprising, in light of it being a religious institution, nearly 60% see the 
mosque primarily as a place of religious observance,582 and the 5 daily prayers are held in 
70% of the mosques.583 Another kind of Americanization concerns the day of religious 
worship. Some mosques have chosen to hold services on Sundays, more in line with 
American traditions, and work schedules, rather than the Muslim tradition of Friday.584                  
 Another element of this Americanization is the changing role of women in American 
mosques. In the Middle East, in general, women are not a major part of mosque life. Some 
mosques prohibit their entry, and some limit their worship to segregated areas of the mosque. 
In America, and in Detroit, women have other options. Many women have been instrumental 
in the building of mosques. Women may sit on the boards, or teach in Islamic schools. The 
Detroit mosque study found that “[i]n Detroit, mosques are still the domains of men, but 
Muslim women have a small but significant presence.” 585 Countering this study, are the 
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findings of Jamal. In her article published in 2005, she found that among immigrant Arab 
Muslims in the Detroit area women are more likely than men to be involved in mosques and 
ethnic organizations. In their participation they feel more linked to broader Arab Muslim 
interests, and are more likely to exercise their political voice “when they perceive the 
community is targeted.” 586 Similarly Howell and Jamal say that “women are more likely to 
be in the highest attendance categories, a pattern that defies expectations, given that 
participation in congregational prayers is considered more of an obligation for men than for 
women and that many of Detroit’s mosques do not accommodate women as readily as they do 
men.” 587 The Detroit mosque study found that the accommodation of women in the mosques 
varied, with African American mosques being the least restrictive and South Asian mosques 
the most restrictive. The Arab mosques are in the middle, regarding women’s presence, where 
they are allowed to pray, and whether they are allowed to serve on the board. 588 Aminah 
Beverly McCloud argues that mosques established since the 1960s are less liberal; the 
tendency is for older mosques to have more female participation.589 An example of that is the 
Dix mosque in Dearborn, built in the 1930s, where “women had been the primary instigators” 
in its establishment.590 Mosques are also Americanized in the regard that they have become a 
place for the whole family,591 in line with the role of mainstream American churches.              
 Nayla, the youngest interview respondent, sees mosque attendance as assimilation: 
“The term assimilation means becoming a part of one. I believe this is a term bringing 
religions together. I think I have assimilated in many ways and many times. Every time I go to 
the mosque I believe this is a form of assimilation. This is coming together as one.” She 
represents the second generation that is looking for a new kind of Islam. Scholars have 
pointed out that although the first generation of immigrants tend to hang on to culture-specific 
practices and traditions, their American raised children are more interested in a “more 
essential Islam,”592 less colored by Old World ways. 593 Ron gives an example of the more 
flexible kind of Islam that he prefers, and says that “Islam teaches us to look beyond ethnicity, 
color, geography and that ALL Muslims are brothers and sisters.”594 In their article about 
Muslim Arab second-generation youth in Dearborn, David and Ayouby show that these youth 
have created their own local Islamic culture. These authors found that the youth would drink 
and date in secret. They would get tattoos, but with Islamic words or symbols on them 595 The 
girls frequently wore hijab, but accompanied it with full make-up or tight clothing.596 David 
and Ayouby explain that “[i]n the minds of the Arabic youth, none of this makes them ‘bad 
Muslims.’ Rather they are simply carrying out their localized cultural variant of Islam.”597 
The efforts of the second-generation Muslim Arabs are an attempt to create a bridge between 
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their parents and the American culture they are part of. In creating an American brand of 
Islam, they are attempting to join the American mainstream. The mainstream they are trying 
to join is not the typical American middle class, rather it is the mainstream envisioned by 
Multiculturalists, where religious- and racial tolerance is a reality. Scholars are optimistic that 
the American Muslim Ummah is possible, exemplified by McCloud who sees both foreign- 
and American-born youth as “bright lights on the horizon of this emerging American Islam 
[by] rejecting the efforts of their parents and grandparents to define Islam in culture-specific 
terms.”598 If the Ummah is realized, Muslim Arabs will have a larger community of support in 
addition to their local Arab Muslim community in Dearborn. There is strength in numbers, 
and perhaps, by banding together, Muslims in America will be closer to recognition as an 
American religious group, instead of being “others.” For the second- and third-generation 
immigrants, recognition is a great step in path towards upward mobility and assimilation.      
 As established by Bankston and Zhou in their study of the role of ethnic churches 
among American-Vietnamese, belonging to an ethnic church promotes adjustment “precisely 
because it promotes the cultivation of a distinctive ethnicity, and membership in this 
distinctive ethnic group helps young people reach higher levels of academic achievement and 
avoid dangerous and destructive forms of behavior.”599 Bankston and Zhou maintain this “is 
also generalizable to other immigrant and ethnic groups.”600 Mary Waters’ research among 
Afro-Caribbean families yielded similar results, showing that the most important factor in 
their lives is the ethnically rooted church. “The key factor appears to be the combination of 
connecting both parents and teens to social networks that reinforce their values and attitudes 
as well as the moral and cultural reinforcement that church teachings provide for the messages 
parents give to children.”601 A number of scholars have similar findings – church or mosque 
participation facilitates assimilation, and discourages youth from ‘falling out.’ 602 Portes and 
Rumbaut’s CILS, Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study, (the basis of segmented 
assimilation theory) shows “significant positive correlations between religious involvement of 
youth and their educational and occupational achievement and negative correlations with 
indicators of downward assimilation.”603 Though Detroit’s mosques include several national 
backgrounds, they are to a large degree ethnically homogenous.604 Therefore, in theory, they 
can function in the same way as Bankston and Zhou’s Vietnamese churches. Looking to the 
future of the mosques, Ann Chih Lin points out that incorporation is dependent upon the next 
generations and “the ability of communal interaction and institutions to claim the attention 
and allegiance of these immigrants’ children and grandchildren.”605 Of this study’s 5 Muslim 
respondents, only one respondent goes to mosque regularly (once or twice a month); the 
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others only go a few times a year. This all to limited sample gives the impression that for 
these second-generation Muslims, mosque attendance is not their primary choice of religious 
practice. Four out of the five pray, but no one performs the 5 daily prayers. However, they all 
practice their religion in one form or another, for instance through food choices. Joseph 
explains that he has “adopted a perspective that I'm a citizen of the world, with the world 
being my church and my religion to do good, (…) I do embrace the fundamental principle of 
Islam that deeds speak more of conviction than words of belief.”606 Nidal explains his 
religious philosophy in saying that “I believe in God and I believe any way that a person 
decides to worship Him is up to that person; there should not be influence from another 
person as that is the most intimate relationship there is.”607  If these sentiments are a 
representative reflection of second-generation Muslim Arabs, the role of the mosques may 
change drastically in the future.                                                                                                                                
 As described by many of the scholars above, participation in religious schools can 
hinder downward assimilation. Ethnic or religious schools are easier for parents to understand 
(language and culture), and therefore promote parental involvement, which leads to higher 
educational achievement for their children.608 One should remember that in an ethnic enclave 
like Dearborn, youth can find community in their public schools that is nearly as homogenous 
as it would be in private religious schools, with staff of the same ethnic group. For instance, 
the Salina Elementary School, in Dearborn’s Southend, is 99% Arab609 and has an Arab 
American principal.610 Yet, public schools are not necessarily organized around the same 
moral principles or ethnic considerations as the private schools would be. Jane I. Smith says 
that many Muslim parents in the United States are worried about the quality of education in 
public schools, especially in metropolitan areas. They worry about the influence of drugs and 
crime as well as the exposure to “un-Islamic requirements,” such as inappropriate attire for 
gym classes, coeducational physical education, and sexual education.611 Islamic schools in 
America are generally of high quality, and tend to be expensive, and are therefore out of reach 
for some parents.612 Weekend schooling is provided in some mosques. As a way to attract the 
younger members of the community, some of these mosques are offering sports as part of 
their programs.613 The main focus for most of these schools is Arabic instruction. The 1990s 
growth of Islam in America has also led to the creation of Islamic graduate studies, some of 
which offer training for imams.614 Because of this, the newer generations will see a growth of 
American-trained religious leaders. The post 9/11 climate has led to a fear that Islamic 
schools are functioning as “sleeper cells” and are training radicals.615 This study has not 
uncovered any evidence of this being the case.                                                                           
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 It is perhaps a paradox, that some of the benefits of religious schooling and close-knit 
ethnic networks can also be a constraint on members of the communities. Christian Smith and 
Melinda Lundquist Denton’s National Study of Youth and Religion found religious 
institutions to be inductions into a “moral order” and a promotion of “network closure for the 
diffusion of social control,” among other things.616 In other words, the “ethnic options” can be 
narrowed, and parental authority can become too dominant. The social control enacted by the 
close-knit community can limit adults and children alike. Aswad’s study of Yemini immigrant 
women on the Southend found that the majority of the women “indicate that their husbands 
rely on religious authorities as a means of controlling them.”617 Sonya recalls how the close-
knit community has positive and negative effects, and says that “an important part of Arab 
culture is a reliance on family and extended family, and supporting each other. In this regard, 
the support has really helped me in my life. However, there are two sides to every issue, and 
while I would say that I have felt supported, I have also felt hindered by the somewhat 
sheltered lifestyle that can be fostered through such a tight-knit existence.”618 Warner explains 
some of the pros and cons of this situation saying that “[e]nhancing parental social control is 
not always to the advantage of youth, particularly of girls who may be abused by parents or 
stepparents and whose aspirations may be discouraged in the name of traditional gender 
norms. Nonetheless, because girls are typically subject to greater social control by their 
families, they often do better in school and are more likely to be effectively bilingual than 
their brothers.”619 Bankston and Zhou differentiate between psychological adaptation and 
adaptation as achievement and upward mobility, and remind us that these two kinds of 
adaptation may not always coincide.620  The gender roles of Arab Americans will be 
discussed further in the next section of this chapter. Here it will suffice to remember that not 
all parental control, or religious authority is beneficial, even if there are some great 
advantages to being part of a strong ethnic community.                                                                                                        
 Islam is fast becoming America’s second largest faith.621 There are several reasons for 
the growth of Islam in America, for instance international trends, Islamophobia, and new 
immigration from Muslim countries. Muslim immigration has shown a marked increase since 
the 1990s.622 The New Immigrant Survey Pilot (from 2001) found that Muslims are the 
second largest group of new immigrants, although Arab emigrants are not coming in high 
numbers. The largest group of Muslim immigrants is from Pakistan.623 Another reason for 
growth in numbers is through conversions, many of these are African Americans in prison, or 
students on University campuses.624                                                                                         
 Not only is the number of faithful growing, the Muslim population is experiencing an 
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increase in religiosity. This development is similar to other immigrant groups. The editors of 
Immigration and Religion in America: Comparative and Historical Perspectives say that a 
“consistent pattern to be observed in incorporation into American society is that immigrant 
groups, especially in their native-born generations, tend to become more religious over 
time.”625 Warner has said that in order to ensure that immigrant children keep their religion, 
many people say they are “more religious here than they were at home.”626 Since there is a 
growing number of Muslim immigrants, in this view, it is not surprising that both immigrant 
and second-generation Muslims are experiencing an increase in religiosity. Louise Cainkar, 
Linda S. Walbridge, and Aswad have all studied Middle Eastern populations in the American 
Midwest, and agree that there is a measurable difference in religiosity of Muslim Arabs, 
starting in the 1990s. 627 Aswad, speaking of Lebanese Americans, says the reasons for this 
development result from “Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East and of anti-Islamic 
feeling in the United States.”628 The combination of Islamic revival in the Middle East, and of 
discrimination and Islamophobia in the U.S. has been a potent mix for religious revival. “The 
increased religiosity in the community is due both to the infusion of immigrants and to the 
attempts to assume a position of solidarity in the face of the antagonism felt in the United 
States in general and in Dearborn in particular against Arabs and Islam,” says Aswad.629 Ron 
agrees that part of the reason for increased religiosity among Arab Muslims is Americans’ 
perceptions of Islam. He says that “[o]ne reason is peer pressure. (…) Another reason for the 
greater practice of the faith is the siege mentality that has been forced upon us.  There is 
safety in numbers!  Attacks against Islam are practically a routine now in the media.” The 
failure of pan-Arab nationalism has added momentum to the Islamic movements’ and their 
struggle against secularism and the West.630 Cainkar says that the appeal of Islam “to Arab 
Americans lay in its capacity to provide meaning and resilience for the Arab American 
experience.”631                                                                                                         
 The second-generation is of course also affected by increased religiosity. In many 
cases they are more religious than their parents.632 In a famous quote, Haddad has said of 
Islam that “the grandparents fought for independence, their children for nationalism and 
socialism and their grandchildren for Islam.”633 The Detroit Mosque study revealed that the 
older participants were more likely to wish for a flexible approach to Islamic practice, than 
the younger participants,634 who may often be second generation.  Cainkar’s research among 
second-generation Arab Muslims in Chicago shows that Islamic revival among youth is 
clearly related to discrimination faced in America. She says that Islam provides “meaning and 
resilience”635  and helps them “cope with their particular local experiences as homogenized, 
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dehumanized and voiceless Arabs in America.”636 Ron is an example of this increase in 
religiosity, and again ties it to Islamophobia. He says that even though his parents did not fast, 
pray or go to hajj, he does. He says that “[i]n their defence my parents did not experience the 
bias and prejudice that I and my brethren do.”637  For some respondents, though, the 
experience is the opposite. Nayla says “I think religion mattered more to my parents then me. 
They grew up in a time of basics where everyone was focused on their culture and practiced 
the religion as their number one priority.”638 Suha only goes to mosque on holidays. She says 
that religion matters less to her than her parents, and gives exposure to many different 
religions in America as the reason for her lack of religiosity. It is interesting to note that Nayla 
and Suha are the two youngest respondents, and Ron is one of the two oldest. If religiosity 
increases over the life span, Nayla and Suha’s religious outlook may change over time.                                                                                                                                    
 The previous chapter includes a discussion of how 9/11 and other international crises 
make the Arab-American population visible, where they used to be invisible. Of course, this is 
all true of Muslims, as well. In the aftermath of 9/11 there were reports of non-Arabs being 
targeted for attack due to the fact that they were Muslim, or were thought to be Muslim. In 
addition to this type of negative visibility, Muslims have become more visible simply because 
their numbers have swelled, and because of their increase in religiosity and willingness to 
show it. Haddad and Smith say that “Muslims who are members of minority communities are 
increasingly aware that when they congregate, become visible, they may invite various forms 
of retribution. Visibility may lead to identification as dangerously foreign, ominous, and 
threatening given the anti-Muslim atmosphere that currently permeates Western society. (…) 
Despite these concerns, however, growing numbers of immigrant Muslims in all areas of the 
Western world are now opting to be more visible.”639                                                            
 One type of visibility that results from the growth of Islam in America is the growth in 
hijab-wearing. In the 1960s, few Muslim women were covered. 640 Haddad explains that 
newly arrived immigrant women may choose to wear hijab, even when neither their mothers 
nor grandmothers wore it.641 Ron, speaking of newly arrived Iraqi Shia, ties their veiling to 
arrival time: “Many of them still wear the long black Chadours from head to foot. Very few, if 
any, of the Lebanese Shia women dress in this manner. The Iraqi Shia are still new to 
America and these more ancient traditions will fade or adjust with time, as they have with the 
Lebanese.”642 Haddad and Adair T. Lummis found that the degree of adherence to Islamic 
dress varied from mosque to mosque.643 The meaning of the hijab for these Muslim women 
varies too. A veil is a cultural symbol, hence it can be interpreted in a variety of ways. The 
meaning is not inherent to the veil itself.644 Recent scholarship warns that although there is 
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certainly evidence of subjugation of women in the Middle East, “a growing number of 
scholars now argue that claims about the oppression and subjugation of veiled Muslim women 
may, in many regards, be overstated (…) [since] women’s motivations for veiling can vary 
dramatically.”645 Studies have found that hijab can function as a way for Muslim women to 
participate in public life, and work alongside men. 646 The veil, for these women, functioned 
as protection, allowing them to safely enter the public sphere they otherwise would have 
avoided. In this regard, the hijab certainly needs to be seen as a means to upward mobility 
(through possibility of work), and greater assimilation.                                                                                                           
 The most common reason for veiling is that it is proscribed by the Quran.647 There are 
other reasons for veiling, many of them center around the idea of obedience (to God, to 
gender rules), but a different kind of argument of why to veil, is as a symbol of defiance 
towards the West. 648 Read and John P. Bartkowski say the hijab can function as a “sign of the 
devout Muslim woman’s disdain for the profane, immodest, and consumerist cultural customs 
of the West.” 649 Yet another reason for veiling, found in Read and Bartkowski’s study, is 
women’s networks that form around the veil, which are “particularly indispensible because 
they live in a non-Muslim country.”650 The veil gives comfort and ethnic distinction in a 
foreign land. This is a way that increased religiosity leads to psychological well-being, which 
is indicative of segmented assimilation’s second trajectory. The authors make an interesting 
point when they remind the readers that ‘culture wars’ are fought by the elite and by activists, 
their beliefs are not necessarily in correspondence with opinions of actual women. 651 Haddad 
and Smith say that in contrast to Muslim countries where the hijab may be banned or 
enforced, “the West, at least theoretically, provides the freedom to be Muslim in the way that 
one chooses.”652                                                                                                                             
 This religious freedom has led to some Muslims’ claim that they are just as American 
as everyone else, and that they deserve acknowledgement of this fact. Since assimilation is a 
process that requires willingness both on the part of the immigrant and of the mainstream, 
acceptance of an immigrant’s religion is necessary. Immigrants have employed different 
strategies to this end. One method is to downplay or discard ones religion.653 Another is to 
claim that to be American one must have the freedom to practice religion how one pleases, 
whereby one can celebrate or accentuate differences as being part of an American religious 
mosaic.654 Lin says that immigrants can “try to modify American society and culture so that it 
acknowledges what they bring as legitimate and valuable.”655 Scholars write that in the 1970s, 
Muslim leaders and individuals saw the Americanization of earlier Muslim immigrants as 
having gone too far. As a reaction to this, some Muslims started to emphasize their 
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differences.656 Khan says that in the 1990s, there was more confidence among leaders and in 
the community: “While the senior generation was content to defend, the new generation is 
eager to be more proactive. They are not satisfied with the mere preservation of Islamic 
identity. They want it accepted and recognized as a constituent element of American identity 
itself.”657 Ron’s definition of assimilation is an example of this type of assertion. He says that 
“[a]ssimilation to [me] means that my fellow Americans have accepted me as I am.  Not 
tolerated me, but accepted that I am as American as the next person even though I may have a 
different faith, different customs, language capabilities, skin color, facial features, etc.”658 
Awareness of constitutional rights has led to the establishment of organizations to demand the 
privileges and rights owed them.659 This type of religious assertion is new to many 
immigrants to the United States who have not enjoyed religious freedom in their home 
countries. For some people, it was their main reason for emigrating. Freedom of religion, 
secured in the Declaration of Independence, has led many Muslims to feel optimistic about 
their future in America. Leonard writes that Muslim leaders saw “the existence of a Muslim 
public sphere where Muslims can think freely to revive and practice Islam [as a] gift to 
Muslims, something unavailable in most of the Muslim world.”660  The participation in a 
multicultural society, and gaining acceptance as “one of us,” rather than “other,” is only 
possible if the mainstream allows Muslims the right to be American. Zhou and Portes explain 
that context of reception is one of the main determinants that decide which trajectory an 
immigrant family is likely to follow. They describe both government policy and societal 
reception as part of the context, alongside the strength and health of the pre-existing coethnic 
community. Government policy has not had a major bearing on the newer immigrants from 
the Arab world – at least not officially. The main exception is Iraqi refugees, who have had 
the benefit of some government programs.661
Societal reception, on the other hand, has had a major impact on Muslim Arabs’ 
possibilities. Many Americans are unwilling to accept Arabs, perhaps especially Muslims, as 
true Americans. Shryock writes that “[i]n the days following September 11, Arab Detroit was 
awash in American flags. (…) For some, American flags were talismanic shields; for others, 
they were defiant assertions of patriotism. Many non-Arab and non-Muslim observers thought 
it was all for show – some of it was, of course – but this sceptical attitude only proved how 
hard it was for Arabs and Muslims to be seen as ‘authentically’ American.”
      
662 Scholars say 
that concerns about the compatibility of Arab values to American values are reminiscent of 
Nativism in the past.663 One could, for instance, point to the fear that Irish Catholics would 
not be able to be real Americans, due to their allegiance to the Pope in Rome, rather than to 
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American democracy. Looking back, these types of worries almost seem comical, since Irish 
Americans at this point in time are as American as apple pie. We could perhaps assume that 
we will feel the same about Middle Easterners in a hundred years. Wayne Baker and Jamal 
use the World Value Study to show that “the traditional values of Arab Americans are not that 
far from the traditional values of other Americans, once we view values in global perspective. 
(…) Americans in general are closer to Arab Americans and the Middle East [on the 
traditional-secular scale] than they are to the peoples of all historically Protestant European 
nations.”664                                                                                                                    
 Writing about hate crime in the form of attacks on individuals, mosques and 
businesses after 9/11, John Corrigan and Lynn S. Neal make the claim that “the interpretation 
of these groups and their religious traditions as ‘foreign’ justified action against them, all in 
the name of upholding American values and protecting American liberty.”665 The authors 
name the contemporary media as part of the problem, and say that it depicts Islam as a violent 
religion saying that is “antithetical to the American way of life.”666 McCloud explicitly 
mentions assimilation, saying that Muslims are hindered by Americans who cannot accept 
immigrants from “countries that are not considered friends of this nation.”667 As discussed in 
the previous chapter, the views portrayed by the media, about Muslims, are tied to American 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Since the United States generally has favored Israel, many 
Arabs feels that they are enemies “by default.” The fact that most Middle Eastern extremists 
are Muslim has led to identification of Islam as America’s enemy abroad. Islam has taken 
over the position formerly held by the USSR668 In combination with increasing Zionism, Arab 
and Muslim organizations are portrayed as “spies and propagandists for foreign interests”669 
Interventions in the Middle East are commonly seen as a war on Islam.670 Khan says that 
some Muslims in America have a negative view of America and Americans as a whole, 
because they have “trouble reconciling America’s benign attitude toward Muslims at home 
with the consequences of its malevolent foreign policy.”671 Joseph exemplifies the Arab 
American view of American foreign policy: “The media emphasis on Muslim fundamentalism 
in America is part and parcel of Israel's propaganda machine in America. All to advance 
Israel's interests, even when it runs contrary to America's strategic interests. President Obama 
and other ranking officials have finally recognized that the status quo in the middle east [sic], 
particularly as it relates to the Palestinian question and Israel's abuse of the Palestinian people 
serves as a recruiting poster for extremism that puts American soldiers in harms way. Finally, 
the tail no longer wags the dog.  Thank God!!!!!!!!!”672 Joseph has hope for the current 
administration’s betterment of American-Middle Eastern relations. Until this is achieved, 
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Arab and Muslim immigrants will be unfavorably received in the United States. This will 
ultimately affect their chances at assimilation.  
 
3.3 The Third Trajectory: Southend Poverty 
The third trajectory of segmented assimilation is commonly described as the situation where 
an immigrant population acculturates, but instead of a move towards the white middle class, 
they take on the characteristics of the urban (often non-white) underclass. The Muslim Arab 
community in Detroit is not only diverse, but also a divided community. The Iraqi and 
Yemeni Muslims living in the Southend of Dearborn are easily described as unassimilated, in 
contrast to the Muslims described in the previous section. The question is whether they are 
vulnerable to downward assimilation, or will they over time become assimilated into the 
American Islam described above? Low socioeconomic status, social and geographic isolation, 
as well as the discrimination they suffer from more assimilated Arab Muslims, leads one to 
believe that they are likely to feel alienated in the Arab Detroit community. Findings in the 
previous chapter do not indicate that these Arab Muslims are joining gang- or drug-related 
activities, but one can wonder whether Islamic radicalism could be a draw to disenchanted 
youth in this enclave of the enclave. This study has not uncovered any evidence of that 
particular development. However, it is likely that radicalism, being so strongly linked to 
criminal activity (terrorism), would in fact be difficult to discover, especially from an 
academic standpoint. This section discusses developments that point to an isolated sub-
community of Arab Muslims, where many members do not show signs of assimilating, nor do 
they perhaps wish to assimilate. This in itself means they are less likely to gain mainstream 
acceptance, as well as acceptance into the growing American Islamic community, leading 
them to become permanent “outsiders,” which in turn can lead to downward assimilation over 
time.                                                                                                                                        
 This section will also discuss the possibility of dissonant acculturation, as a result of 
cultural gender expectations that clash with typical American gender roles. Dissonant 
acculturation is defined by Portes and Rumbaut as the situation that develops when the 
children’s knowledge of American culture and the loss of immigrant culture happens at a 
different rate than their parents’. This “undercuts parental authority” and places children at 
risk for downward assimilation.673  As a part of young peoples’ acculturation, they are likely 
to oppose Arab gender roles, which in turn can lead to conflict between the generations. In a 
less assimilated and more isolated environment like the Southend, the maintenance of 
traditional gender roles is more likely. If the second-generation is without a larger support 
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group, and feels alienated from both Muslim American youth, American youth, as well as 
their parents, their opposition can lead to more dire consequences than is likely in a more 
diverse, resourceful, and culturally accepting environment as was described above.                                                                 
 Dearborn’s Southend is an enclave within an enclave.674 Being an area that is close to 
the Ford manufacturing plant, it used to be inhabited by a variety of immigrant groups, 
especially those arriving from Southern and Eastern Europe. As with the rest of Detroit, white 
flight took those immigrants to the suburbs, and the area was left to Arab immigrant 
populations.675 The Southend of Dearborn is separate and distinct,676 Aswad says “it has been 
regarded as the ‘other side of the tracks’ for many in Dearborn.” 677 It is isolated, 
geographically, by freeways and the plant, and is a staging area for new immigrant 
settlement.678 The area is inhabited by Arab Muslim working class families, often of peasant 
background, mainly Yemeni, but also Palestinians, and Iraqis.679 The area is marked by 
pollution, high unemployment, government subsidized housing, low socioeconomic status,680 
and more traditional religious practices.681                                                                              
 The Iraqi Shia came to the United States as refugees, often having spent time in 
refugee camps before arrival. Some of these refugees have reported torture, rape and 
trauma.682 The U.S. Office of Refugee Resettlement have assisted these refugees, for instance 
by helping to obtain jobs or in learning English. This assistance was limited to two years, 
making successful incorporation “a very daunting and nearly impossible task in so short a 
time,” according to Rosina J. Hassoun.683 Many observers say that these Iraqi Shia are not 
part of the larger Muslim Arab community of Dearborn 684 and experience some 
discrimination by other Arab Muslim groups in Dearborn.685 This is exemplified by Ron who 
says that despite their common Shi’a faith, Lebanese Muslims would prefer that the Iraqi 
Shi’a did not come to the Lebanese mosque, because of their conservative and traditional 
ways. 686 Along with the Yemeni, who are also a newly arrived, these populations are often 
referred to as ‘boaters’ by Arab Muslims elsewhere in the Metro area.687 They are 
discriminated against, and David and Ayouby found that in order to be distinguished from 
these ‘boaters,’ Arab Muslim youth call themselves ‘Arabics’ rather than Arabs. These 
authors found that in Fordson High School, which is over 90% Arab American, “the ‘boater’ 
youth (…) are viewed in condescending terms as unsophisticated and generally nerdy.”688 
Shryock and Nabeel Abraham write that Arab Detroit has two faces, “one is American(izing), 
one is Arab(izing), and each is potentially a source of embarrassment to the other.”689 In many 
cases, this division is between the first and second generation, leading to the possibility of 
dissonant acculturation described later in this chapter.                                                                                                                                    
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 There is a marked class difference between Iraqi and Yemeni Muslims in the 
Southend, and other Muslims living in East Dearborn and in suburbs. Karen Rignall says that 
the “cycle of starting out in Dearborn and then moving to the suburbs is happening less and 
less. The socioeconomic foothold of the most disadvantaged immigrants, the Yemenis and the 
Iraqi Shia, is so tenuous that it creates virtually insurmountable barriers to long-term skilled 
employment.”690 Aswad studied Yemeni and Lebanese working class immigrants, and their 
attitudes towards welfare and women working. She found that the auto recession had brought 
on a new acceptance of welfare.691 The acceptance of welfare was seen as an embarrassment 
to the Yemeni men, and to their children, while the women saw it as a source of independence 
because it left them less dependent on their men.692 The Yemeni displayed more traditional 
gender practices than the Lebanese, for instance in wanting their daughters to marry other 
Yemeni, and to marry young. This led to conflict between the generations, which in turn led 
to an increase in family counselling at ACCESS.693 In conclusion, Aswad says that this 1994 
study shows that since her last study of Dearborn Arabs in 1971, “the numbers of Arabs on 
welfare is markedly increasing due both to high rates of unemployment and the influx of new 
refugees.”694 The finding that Yemeni and Iraqi Muslims in the Southend are more isolated 
and less assimilated than the Lebanese (who primarily live in East Dearborn) is confirmed by 
Howell and Jamal in 2009,695 meaning this was not just a passing phase.                         
 Shryock, writing in 2002, calls the Southend “gritty, (…) easily the most conservative 
and visually ‘exotic,’” and says that in his many communications with the media, this is the 
imagery and community they are interested in writing about.696 Abraham and Shryock point 
out that Arab Detroiters are all “boaters until proven otherwise.”697 This exotic community, 
according to Shryock, exemplifies what the American public fears: a religiously conservative 
Muslim Arab community, with a “possible presence of a ‘fifth column.’”698 Yet, this study 
has been unable to uncover evidence of such a presence. The Detroit mosque study reminds 
us that following a more traditional interpretation of Islam “does not imply isolationism or 
rejection of American society.”699 The study concludes that “[r]adicalism and isolationism are 
not evident in Detroit mosques.”700 The Arab American study team reached the same 
conclusion,701 and interview respondents say much of the same. Ron and Joseph are both tired 
of Islam being linked to terrorism and radicalism, and remind us that there are radicals in all 
religious persuasions. When asked if he is aware of any fundamentalist groups in Arab 
Detroit, Ron says “NO!  Are there mosques and religious leaders who have a stricter 
interpretation of the Holy Qur'an than other mosques or Imams? YES!  That does not mean 
that they are terrorists or that they are anti American.”702 Joseph ties these assumptions to 
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foreign policy saying that the “Muslim community, myself included, are vocal in expressing 
disgust and anger with the U.S. government's policies in the middle east  [sic] that allows 
Israel to brutalize the Palestinian people, and senselessly attack Lebanon. To some taking this 
stance and holding these opinions qualifies as being an extremist and a fundamentalist, then I 
guess the entire Muslim community, myself included, qualify.”703 Joseph says that if there are 
fundamentalists, they are a small minority. Frank also says that he has never heard of 
fundamentalist groups operating in Detroit or Dearborn.704 Since this study has not found any 
evidence of radical fundamentalist groups, it cannot make any assumptions or predictions of 
the Southend second generation’s downward assimilation towards such groups. The only 
possible conclusion is that the alienation of these youth, can lead to vulnerability, which can 
be taken advantage of by such groups, if they do in fact exist in Detroit.                                                                                                                                 
 One source of disagreement between the parental generation and their children is in 
gender roles. Lin says that “immigrants use changes in family and gender roles as one way to 
mark their adaptation – or resistance – to American society.”705 This is part of what is 
happening between the first and second generation of Arab Americans. Most scholars that 
study Arab Americans agree that the source of their gender roles is the Arab culture, not the 
religions specifically. 706 Aswad says that “Muslim and Christian Arab families both have the 
same general family organization and rules, which often are incorrectly characterized as 
Islamic.”707 Read has done a variety of studies about Arab women (some in cooperation with 
other scholars) and has found that inegalitarian gender roles, feminist orientations, and labor 
force participation are tied to degree of religiosity, not to religious affiliation as Christian or 
Muslim. 708 Likewise, Naber found that feminist affiliation was linked to race, class and 
historical circumstances, not to religion. 709 These findings are similar to the findings of 
scholars of other religious and ethnic groups; it is the degree of religiosity, or how 
conservative the sect of the religion is, that determines women’s roles.710 This coincides with 
the findings of this study. Both Muslim and Christian interviewees report feeling restricted by 
their parents’ ideas of women’s roles. Suha says that it is “hard to (…) have close 
relationships with men because of the various ideas that people have about Arab/Muslim 
women, and my family’s expectations.”711 Janice was raised Orthodox Christian and says she 
hated not being able to date or go to parties and sleepovers.712                                               
 The Southend population is nearly exclusively Muslim, therefore they are the focus 
here. As displayed earlier in this chapter, the younger Muslim generation is experiencing a 
rise in religiosity, yet they are eager to “divorce” their faith from Arab culture. One of the 
arenas this is likely to occur is in gender relations. The parental expectations of the home as 
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women’s sphere, for instance, will be challenged by the second-generation’s awareness of 
women in the American workforce, as well as by receiving higher education themselves. Read 
has demonstrated that the stronger the cultural bonds are, the less likely women are to be 
employed and have power in family decisions, while strong religious identity, on the other 
hand, led to higher labor force participation rates. 713 Scholars have shown that Muslim 
women in America are active participants in public life, and in discussions of women’s 
roles.714 For instance, the Detroit mosque study found that females are more likely to be 
registered to vote.715 Aswad’s study of Lebanese and Yemeni women mentioned above found 
that in the Yemeni families men controlled the money, women were hindered in gaining 
employment, and neither men nor women attended the mosque much. 716  In contrast, the 
Lebanese families were more religious, attended mosque more often, and men and women 
were more likely to both work and share financial responsibilities. 717 In other words, 
religiosity need not be a hindrance in women’s public life.                                                        
 If the gender roles ascribed are a cultural phenomenon, acculturation is inevitably 
going to change them, even while maintaining religious identities. U.S. born Arab American 
women are more educated, have fewer children, have higher employment rates, and have 
more autonomy and power in the family, 718 according to Susan E. Marshall and Read’s 
research. Portes and Rumbaut’s CILS found that across almost all nationalities, female 
students aim much higher than male students, as well as perform better in school.719  Public 
participation, even if endorsed by parents, will inevitably lead to more interaction with 
mainstream youth, which in turn will work against maintenance of traditional gender roles. In 
a case of dissonant acculturation, parents lack coethnic support, children Americanize rapidly, 
and rebel against their parents. If the parents are not familiar with American forms of 
discipline, they can alienate their children even further. Portes and Rumbaut write that many 
immigrant parents rely on physical punishment to control their children. In the United States, 
however, children can threaten to call the police. “Parents of modest education, who often 
lack the skills to devise other means of social control, thus fall at the mercy of peer pressure 
and the external environment.”720
 
 In many cases the parents resort to private schools or 
overseas education, if they can afford it, and if the home country’s conditions are stable 
enough. One could imagine that sending their children home for education is not a viable 
option for Iraqis at this time, nor are private schools, due to their cost. Thus it is likely that 
rebellion over gender roles will cause parent-child conflict in the Southend Muslim 
communities 
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3.4 Conclusions about Religion 
The main conclusion to be drawn from this chapter is that the community is too diverse to be 
described as following one specific path of assimilation. Not only is the assimilation 
trajectory affected by Christian and Muslim affiliation, it is affected by geography, societal 
reception and class. The lower socio-economic conditions that condition the opportunities of 
Southend youth are unlikely to improve in the near future. The geographical isolation, the low 
levels of social capital of the new immigrants along with their histories of mistreatment, and 
the discrimination they face by both mainstream Americans, but also by Arab Americans, 
leads us to believe that the children growing up in the Southend today face some serious 
barriers to successful incorporation. The light in the tunnel is the strength and numbers of the 
East Dearborn Muslim community, along with its community organizations, which possibly 
can help these immigrants overcome their obstacles.                  
Looking beyond the Southend, the Arab Americans living elsewhere in Metro Detroit 
seem to be well-integrated, even if they are religiously segregated. Their strength lies in the 
fact that they can be part of a larger Arab Detroit – and be part of an “us” – even if the 
mainstream sees Arabs or Muslims as “others.” Lin says that Detroit’s Muslim Arabs “still 
face discrimination and prejudice, (…) [b]ut the size of the community is such that there are a 
variety of ways to combat enemies or pursue common goals, as well as ways to find 
community without engaging in battle.”721
 
 Living their formative years in such a supportive 
environment leads to a likelihood of both economic and psychological well-being for the 
Arab-American second generation. It is possible to acculturate, yet have high degree of 
religiosity. If Americans are willing to accept Islam as an American religion, these youth 
would no longer face major barriers to mainstream society. However, in the current political 
climate, both in America and globally, this seems unlikely.                                                       
 The conclusion is that most Arab Muslims are following the second trajectory of 
segmented assimilation, while most Arab Christians are following the first trajectory. There is 
little evidence to support downward assimilation in Arab Detroit’s religious communities, but 
current developments leave the Muslims on the Southend vulnerable, especially in the face of 
Islamophobia, where this population seems to be the personification of ‘the Muslim’ that 
America fears.  
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Chapter 4: Conclusion 
This conclusionary chapter has two goals. First, to compare and analyze the findings from the 
chapters about racial- and ethnic identity and religion, concerning segmented assimilation 
trajectories. Second, to compare the experiences of Arab Americans to those of other 
immigrant groups, in order to show that perhaps they are not as different as many Americans 
think they are. The research for this thesis is primarily done in the field of Arab-American 
studies, and the reader could be misled to think that Arab-American immigrant experiences 
are novel. Some of them, of course, are. Yet, many of the assertions made in this thesis could 
easily have been made about other ethnic groups as well. The first part of this chapter will 
detail some of these assertions, the second part will look at the main topic of this thesis, 
segmented assimilation, and make some conclusions regarding the findings from both chapter 
two and three. Finally, this conclusion will point to areas for future research regarding 
segmented assimilation and Arab Americans.   
Arab Americans have had a shifting, and uneasy relationship to race, similar to that of 
many other immigrants to the United States.722 Some individuals of non-European descent 
went to court to prove their whiteness, in order to gain the right to naturalize. At this time in 
American history there was uncertainty regarding how to classify races, and the courts relied 
on a variety of “experts” and “scientists” to help them decide whether or not, for instance a 
person from India, was white. Peggy Pascoe says that racial categories in this period were 
“more notable for their malleability than for their logical consistency.”723 Court cases 
involving persons of Indian and Japanese descent show how the category of “white” shifted 
from referring to skin color, to perceived racial categories (Caucasian), to common 
knowledge arguments of what was meant by “white.”724
Although Arab Americans achieved white status, after the 1960s there was growing 
discontent about belonging to that category. One reason was that in being white, they were 
excluded from minority benefits such as affirmative action. Other white ethnics, like Slavs 
and Italians, were also saying that they felt overlooked, and that they needed access to social 
programs to help with upward mobility.
  
725 Jews had become quite successful by the 1960s, 
and were considered white too, though they had a history of being considered what Eric 
Goldstein calls “a racial conundrum.”726 Goldstein shows how becoming accepted as white 
had social benefits, but also emotional costs.727 He says that the “loss of [Jewish] ‘race’ as a 
term for self-description rendered inarticulate some of their deepest feelings of group 
solidarity and difference. (…) the need to identify as white made it exceedingly difficult for 
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Jews to assert a minority consciousness in American society, something that was extremely 
central to many Jews’ self-conception.”728 This resembles Arab American racial history as 
well. Increasingly they feel uncomfortable in the white category, and in some cases are 
actively lobbying for a distinct racial category. Arab American interest groups have fought to 
keep the “ancestry” category in the census, since it gives them an opportunity for visibility. 
They are not alone in wanting this. Goldstein explains that Jews often wrote in “Jewish” in the 
category for “other race” on the 2000 census, just like Arab Americans wrote in “Arab.”729 
Helen Hatab Samhan speaks of a national Working Group on Ancestry in the U.S. Census, 
where Arab Americans joined forces with advocates of the Italian, Polish, German, 
Hungarian, Greek, and Armenian communities.730
In other words, Arab Americans do not have a simple relationship to race, but they are 
not alone in this history. Karen Brodkin says that “ethnoracial assignment” is not a choice, 
however an individual can self-consciously invest in the construction.
  
731 Groups like the Irish, 
for instance, have invested in a white identity in order to rise from their lowly position as 
marginal whites.732 Arab Americans have used distance to other racial groups, especially 
African Americans, to prove their whiteness. The same is true of other groups, for instance 
Jews and members of the Irish working class.733 “For Jewish whiteness to be unambivalently 
embraceable, as Toni Morrison argues about whiteness in general, it needed blackness that 
was its repellent opposite.”734 One way to create this distance is to use stereotypes. Brodkin 
says that stereotypes “invented in service of slavery and imperialism” were used about other 
racial minorities as a way to support domination over them.735 Stereotypes used about Arab 
men were also used about for instance African American and Polish men, who were portrayed 
as hypersexual and lusting after white women.736
Arab American ethnic history and development is not unique either. The creation of 
the Arab-American ethnic identity took place in the 1960s. At this time, America was 
experiencing an “ethnic revolution,” where other groups were becoming visible, and fighting 
for minority rights too.  César Chávez’ strikes among Mexican American workers got national 
attention, though it perhaps gave the workers more recognition than actual monetary 
benefits.
 
737 Jews were by this time integrated and successful enough that they could pursue 
more distinctiveness.738 The Jewish Renewal Movement used symbols and language from the 
Black Nationalist movement to argue their cause.739
Scholars argue that the earliest Arab American immigrants did their best to blend into 
American society, in order to gain acceptance and avoid discrimination. Among other things, 
Arab Americans changed their names. This behavior was common among other immigrants 
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too, for instance Jews.740 In later times, some Arab Americans have avoided loud 
proclamations of their ethnic identity, especially when the United States was at war in the 
Middle East. The same can be said of other immigrant groups. For instance, during World 
War I, German Americans changed their names “from Schmidt to Smith.”741 Øverland says 
that German Americans had to “argue for their loyalty and their sacrifices for a skeptical 
audience that identified them with the enemy.”742 In times of war, various immigrant groups 
have joined the military to prove themselves as loyal members of the American citizenry. This 
is true of Arab Americans, but also of for instance Germans, Romanians, Finnish, Lithuanians 
and Italians.743 Øverland shows that for Greek Americans “the world war became the most 
important opportunity to demonstrate that they too had sacrificed their blood for their land of 
choice.”744 When the United States was at war with the immigrants’ homelands, these groups 
have suffered from discriminatory governmental programs. Arab Americans were rounded up 
for questioning after 9/11, some were detained, and some were deported. Similarly, Japanese 
Americans were put into internment camps during World War II. Military leaders justified it 
by explaning that even if the Japanese were assimilated, they were still of the Japanese race, 
and those “racial strains are undiluted.”745
Thus, Arab Americans have struggled to be seen as authentically American, and have 
employed some of the abovementioned measures to that end. Over the course of American 
immigration history many other immigrant groups have been seen as un-American or as un-
assimilable too. Brodkin says that Asians, Mexicans and some Europeans were seen as “so 
foreign, so savage, and such dangerous criminals that they could never be assimilated.”
 One can wonder if this was the rationale of the 
American government after 9/11 too.  
746 
Øverland’s Immigrant Minds, American Identities: Making the United States Home, 1870-
1930 is a study of how immigrants from for instance Italy, Scandinavia and Ireland employed 
“homemaking myths” to prove that they too were American.747 American Catholics faced 
discrimination for a long time, in part because Americans feared that their loyalty was to the 
Pope, and not to America.748 Gleason writes that the separate Catholic schools were a major 
reason why Catholics were not accepted as loyal citizens.749
This thesis argues that Islam as a faith in America is growing, as well as mutating. It is 
becoming Americanized, and there is a movement to unite Muslims of all ethnic and racial 
backgrounds under this new American Islam. Part of the reason for this move to unite is the 
discrimination faced by Muslims in America. These developments, however, are not unique to 
Muslims.
 
750 Haddad, Smith and Esposito write that the unification of the Catholic Church was 
“facilitated precisely because of the anti-Catholicism that has prevailed for much of the 
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history of America.”751 A common religion means strength in numbers, but it can also mean 
gaining access to recognition and status that is denied the immigrant in mainstream society, as 
has been found to be the case in the development of black churches.752 The growth of Islam, 
and the increased religiosity of Muslims is partially due to developments in the Middle East. 
However, immigrants in America have commonly embraced religion as a means to grapple 
with their experiences in the new country.753 Religiosity can grow with subsequent 
generations, as evidenced by for instance the high levels of church affiliation and religious 
practice among second-generation Haitians in Miami,754 and does not necessarily disappear 
when the immigrant becomes upwardly mobile.755 Hirschman says that a “recurrent finding in 
research on religiosity is that persons with above average socioeconomic status are more 
likely to join churches and attend services regularly.”756 He also points out that “there is very 
little support for the secularization hypothesis that religion will disappear with modernity.”757
 Immigrants in America are often concerned about the quality of American education, 
and of school giving their children access to undesirable aspects of American society, such as 
drug cultures, or class requirements that go against religious dictates. This is a concern for 
Muslims, just as it has been and continues to be a concern for immigrant families of other 
ethnic backgrounds. Philip Gleason writes that for Jews, the return to religion was seen as a 
way to “‘inoculate’ the next generation against assimilation.”
  
758 Brodkin writes that in her 
childhood, she was not entirely sure she wanted to belong to the mainstream society, since it 
“was somehow materialistic and shallow, lacking in real meaning.”759 Interviews done by the 
CILS show a number of examples of parents that are concerned about their children’s access 
to American culture, for instance in schools where they see “teachers who can’t discipline, 
unruly classes, and the ominous presence of gangs.”760
One way to ensure that your children avoid excessive acculturation is to enrol them in 
religious schools. As mentioned in chapter three, not all Muslims can afford these schools, 
and some are worried that their children will become too isolated. Gleason writes that 
Catholics and Jews have traditionally had different approaches to this dilemma. He says that 
Catholics “held that the need for religious schooling outweighed the negative effects of 
having a system that kept their children apart from other young people,”
 
761 while Jews have 
generally had their children attend public schools, but have used “supplemental education to 
fulfil religious needs.”762 Gleason writes that among German and Poles, the desire to preserve 
the mother-tongue was one incentive to starting religious schools.763 Portes and Rumbaut 
write that Cuban Americans have a “high probability of attending bilingual private schools 
and, consequently, of finding themselves in an upward-mobility.”764 Likewise, Hirschman 
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writes that Catholic schools “may have been critical for the upward mobility for the children 
and grandchildren of immigrants.”765
A final finding of this thesis that should be compared to other immigrants’ experiences 
is the finding that higher religiosity and fundamentalist religion reinforces restrictive gender 
roles. These findings are true for Protestant, Jewish and Muslim religions.
 
766 Sherkat says that 
for Protestant fundamentalists the “divine order of family relations relies on the headship of a 
Christian husband, the submission of the wife to her husband, and the subordination of 
children to their parents. Without this pattern of authority, many conservative Christians 
believe that the family cannot function properly, and a host of personal and social problems 
will proliferate.”767 Jen’nan Ghazal Read has found that Muslim religiosity “exerts a negative 
influence on women’s labor force participation, but only when children are present in the 
home,” and says this is true for Christian and Jewish women too.768
 Having given some examples of how other groups are similar to Arab Americans, we 
now turn to segmented assimilation theory, and the conclusion regarding the likelihood of 
Arab Americans following the three trajectories. The overall conclusion that can be reached is 
that Arab Detroit is too diverse, with its multitude of national-, generational-, socioeconomic-, 
and religious groupings to find an overall pattern. The picture is too complex to make a clear 
assessment of which trajectory is most fitting in describing Arab Americans in Metro Detroit. 
Yet, some generalized patterns can be observed, as long as we keep in mind that there are 
certainly many exceptions to these “rules.” 
 Certainly we could find 
examples of this in other religious groups too. This is important to remember, since one of the 
most enduring stereotypes of Arabs is that they are misogynistic.  
 The first generalization to be made is that the suburban population, which is more 
likely to be Christian, and more likely to consider itself white, is following the first trajectory 
of segmented assimilation. The suburban population is ahead of the general population of the 
area regarding school enrollment in higher education. They mirror the general population in 
respect to attainment of college degrees. They are consistently described as well-integrated 
and assimilated. Their suburban-living means they belong to an economic class that differs 
from some of those who live in the city. The fact that they are more likely to choose a white 
racial identity reinforces the assumption that they feel like part of the (primarily) white 
mainstream. Their religion does not differ significantly from the mainstream’s and therefore is 
not a hindrance to assimilation or mobility. Perhaps one reason for their acceptance of the 
white mainstream, and the mainstream’s acceptance of them has religious roots. Arab 
Christians felt a commonality with American Christians right from the start, and have actively 
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used their common religion to their benefit. At the same time, the fact that most of the first 
Arab immigrants to America were Christians means that they have a longer history in the 
United States, generally a trait that encourages assimilation. They lived in America through 
the Americanization pressures of the pre-war era, and many of them purposely changed their 
names and home country behavior to suit their new American home. It is harder to pinpoint, 
from the sources used in this thesis, whether all of this holds true for the second-generation. 
We can assume that living in the suburbs, and growing up with Christian traditions still gives 
assimilative benefits. Yet, having foreign-born parents, and living through 9/11, means that 
these Arab Americans are still subject to stereotypes used about both immigrants and Arabs. 
The second generalization to be made is that Arab Americans do not seem to be 
following the third trajectory of segmented assimilation – often called downward assimilation. 
The proximity to Detroit, with its significant urban underclass, is not a draw to disenchanted 
Arab-American youth. Comparing African Americans and Arab Americans of Wayne County 
using a variety of socioeconomic criteria, this study found that Arab Americans are better off 
in most regards. One exception, that Arab Americans are more likely to not have completed 
high school, can be explained by foreign birth. The other exception, higher poverty rates 
among Arab Americans lacks obvious explanations. However, there is a segment of the Arab 
community that belongs to the lower socioeconomic class: the Southend Yemeni and Iraqi 
Muslims. It is possible that this population, along with other recent immigrants make up the 
population with high poverty rates. There is no evidence that Arab-American youth are 
replicating patterns of school drop-out that plague Detroit. Neither is there evidence that 
Arab-American youth are joining urban gangs in Detroit, nor that they are creating their own 
gangs. One possible explanation for this is that Arab Americans do not wish to associate with 
African Americans, either because they are racist, or because they use distance to blackness as 
a means to gain access to mainstream society. Another possible explanation is that the Detroit 
Arab community’s strength renders downward assimilation unnecessary. Youth can find 
community, networks and acceptance in Detroit, leaving the Detroit underclass a less 
attractive option.  
Yet, there is a segment of Arab Detroit that is displaying characteristics typical of a 
socioeconomic underclass, for instance in higher numbers of welfare recipients. The Southend 
population is consistently described as separate and unassimilated. Their geographic isolation 
along with low levels of social capital and higher poverty rates makes them distinct in Arab 
Detroit. There are many refugees in this population, meaning they are likely to have 
experienced hardships in their past, and their status as “boaters” means they are discriminated 
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against by others in the Detroit Arab community. These factors are likely to contribute to a 
sense of alienation among young Southenders, who may or may not seek out alternative forms 
of resistance to American society. One such outlet could be Islamic radicalism. There is no 
evidence that this is taking place among these Southend Muslims, but one could wonder if it 
is a possibility in the future. The current political climate in the United States - portraying 
Muslims as America’s number one enemy - would seem to make radicalism an even more 
attractive option for alienated youth. Certainly, radical groups can identify this vulnerability, 
and may try to take advantage of it.  
The other factor that can lead to downward assimilation in this population is the 
danger of dissonant acculturation and role reversal, which leaves the parents unable to cope 
with their children’s behavior. Joseph mentions that young Yemini boys are struggling to find 
their place, and are disrespectful of their teachers. He has hope for the newly realized 
recreation center where he hopes youth will find a “controlled outlet of using their energy in a 
worthwhile way.”769
The third, and perhaps most important, conclusion to be made is that the second 
trajectory of segmented assimilation is the most fitting scenario regarding Arab Detroit. The 
second trajectory describes an ethnic environment that is diverse and healthy enough to 
support its inhabitants, who through actively cultivating an ethnic identity are able to adjust 
socially as well as advance economically. Arabs in Metro Detroit, who do not feel 
comfortable in, or have access to the white mainstream, can find networks, jobs, ethnic- and 
religious pride, ethnic- and religious institutions, parental support, political power, protection 
from discrimination, and connections both to the Old Country and to American life in the 
Arab-American enclave. The diversity of the community leaves many options open to second-
generation youth who will be able to cultivate identities that are more likely to fit into both the 
Arab-American community, and to American society as a whole. These bicultural identities 
are exemplified by the high levels of bilingualism in Dearborn; and by David and Ayouby’s 
findings among Dearborn second-generation youth, who they say constitute a “third Arab 
American community, symbolically situated between East and West, but with the dynamism 
and fluidity to function within either.”
 The assimilation trajectory of the Southend second generation is too 
early to predict. Many of the first-generation Iraqi and Yemeni Muslims in this area arrived as 
late as the 1990s, thus the second generation is just now coming of age. In addition, one can 
hope that the large Arab community in East Dearborn, as well as in the suburbs provides 
enough support that downward assimilation can be avoided. 
770 The findings of the American Community Survey 
show that Arab Americans in Wayne County are obtaining the same levels of education, and 
 98 
have access to the same occupations as the general population of the same area. In obtainment 
of management- and professional occupations, Arab Americans are ahead of the general 
population. The DAAS found that the younger generation of Arab Americans is getting both 
an education and higher paying jobs. Thus, in mattes of education and occupation, Arab 
Americans are not falling behind the American public. 
Muslim Arabs are increasingly embracing a religious identity, rather than a cultural 
identity. Access to American culture is likely to erode cultural practices that are seen as 
disadvantageous or old fashioned, while privileging behavior that is advantageous to upward 
mobility. For instance, U.S. born Arab-American women are more educated, have fewer 
children, have higher employment rates, and have more autonomy and power in the family, 
than their foreign-born “sisters.” Participation in religious organizations such as schools and 
mosques can hinder downward mobility by fostering psychological well-being and pride. The 
movement toward a common Muslim community – the Ummah – is also beneficial to Arab 
Muslims. A common Muslim-American community could offer some of the same benefits as 
the ethnic enclave: recognition, political power, strength in numbers, pride, and networks. In 
creating an American Islam, some of the more culture-specific practices would be left behind, 
and Islam would be more likely to be considered an American religion, drawing on the 
experiences of both foreign- and native-born Muslims. If the ascribed gender roles are a 
cultural phenomenon, acculturation is inevitably going to change them, even while 
maintaining religious identities.  
There are two factors that can be considered hindrances in this scenario. The first is 
that the tight-knit community becomes a constraint on individuals who do not fit in, or who 
do not wish to fashion an “ethnic” identity for themselves. Hopefully those individuals have 
enough social capital by the time they come of age that they can successfully integrate into 
whichever environment they seek to join. The second hindrance, and perhaps more prevalent, 
is the current hostility felt by the mainstream towards Arab and Muslims. Assimilation being 
a two-way process cannot proceed if the mainstream is unwilling to accept Arabs and 
Muslims as true Americans. The current American political- and social climate seems 
permeated by Islamophobia. Because of on-going conflicts between the West, and certain 
radical groups in the Middle East, it is unlikely to end soon. Even if Americans are willing to 
accept individuals, and individual religious behavior, the likelihood of Islam becoming a 
charter faith in the near future seems dim. The Islamophobic climate affects Arab Christians 
as well as Arab Muslims, since Americans do not have a clear conception of their differences. 
The Arab enclave offers a degree of protection against discrimination, but as argued above, it 
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is not enough if the goal is full participation in American society, and acceptance of Islam as 
an American faith. By banding together, Muslims in America are trying to realize this goal, 
and perhaps in a generation or two it will be realized, in the same way that Jews and Catholics 
were able to become recognized. However, there is a major difference. When the Jewish faith 
and the Catholic faith became recognized as true American religions, the United States was 
not at war with countries that had a strong presence of either faith. Both the perceived and the 
real threat of Islamic radicalism, as well as economic and political interests in the Middle 
East, leaves many commentators pessimistic of the future of Islam in America. 
Does this mean that religion is the main determinant in assimilation trajectories? If the 
Christian Arabs are assimilated and suburban, does this mean that Muslim Arabs are not? The 
answer is no. First of all, as many as twenty percent of Detroit’s Muslim Arabs reside in the 
suburbs. Second, the Muslims in East Dearborn are in fact doing well when we look at 
socioeconomic criteria. Their choice to live in Dearborn is clearly not affected solely by 
socioeconomic determinants. Third, Muslims in the Southend are not faring as well as their 
East Dearborn neighbors and coethnics. This cannot be explained by religious differences, 
especially since higher income and education among Muslims encourages religious affiliation. 
Perhaps a better explanation is that the difference is one of class. Cainkar’s study of Islamic 
revival in Chicago shows Iraqi refugees there as being in somewhat of the same situation as 
Detroit’s Southenders. She blames their isolation on socioeconomic status, U.S. – Iraq 
relations, and Shi’a affiliation.771 In Dearborn, the Shi’a affiliation is not the reason for the 
divide, since there are so many other Shi’a Muslims there. The Lebanese Shi’a of Dearborn 
do not display signs of isolation, or of socioeconomic difficulties. What we are left with is 
class and foreign policy. Karen Rignall says that “the more potent socio-political divisions in 
Arab Detroit exist across class lines or reflect degrees of cultural assimilation.”772 Likewise, 
Lin reminds us not to forget the importance of class when studying Middle Eastern 
immigrants.773
 Another topic of interest would be a comparative study of Arab Detroit to other Arab 
enclaves in America, or to Arab Americans who do not live in enclaves. The comparison of 
segmented assimilation trajectories between such groups would give a richer picture of Arab 
immigrants in America, and would either give legitimacy to the claims of this thesis, or find 
that the assimilation trajectories have different explanations. Louise Cainkar is currently 
 Since the Southend Muslims are more recent immigrants, and many of them 
are refugees, their differences in many cases are a difference of class. The scope of this thesis 
has not allowed for a more detailed look at class, but it would be a valid starting point for 
future research of segmented assimilation theory in Arab Detroit.  
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conducting research about segmented assimilation in Arab Chicago,774
The definition of assimilation conceived for this paper was that assimilation means 
going from being and “other” to being “one of us.” Have Arab Americans assimilated 
according to this definition? The answer lies in whether Americans can accept Arabs and 
Muslims as “one of us.” There are no other all-encompassing barriers to incorporation – Arab 
Americans as a whole resemble mainstream Americans in many regards. They are religious, 
they are well-educated, they work in a variety of fields, and they participate in American 
politics. The strength of the community means that Arab Detroiters can be part of an “us,” 
even if they are considered “other” by parts of the mainstream. Of course, first-generation 
immigrants can be quite different than the average American, but the question posed by 
segmented assimilation is whether the second-generation is able to assimilate. This thesis sees 
societal acceptance as the main barrier to Arab-American assimilation. 
 and her findings are of 
particular interest, since Detroit and Chicago have similar histories as former industrial 
Midwestern cities.  
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Appendix 
 
 
 
Map I: Michigan’s Counties  
(Source: http://www.michigan.gov/cgi/0,1607,7-158--118145--,00.html)  
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Map II: Metro Detroit. 
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Map III: Dearborn 
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